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Abstract
The recent increase in the availability of data sources for research has put significant strain on
existing data management work-flows, especially in the field of statistical disclosure control.
New statistical methods for disclosure control are frequently set out in the literature, how-
ever, few of these methods become functional implementations for data owners to utilise.
Current workflows often provide inconsistent results dependent on ad hoc approaches, and
bottlenecks can form around statistical disclosure control checks which prevent research
from progressing. These problems contribute to a lack of trust between researchers and data
owners and contribute to the under utilisation of data sources.
This research is an interdisciplinary exploration of the existing methods. It hypothesises that
algorithms which invoke a range of statistical disclosure control methods (recoding, suppres-
sion, noise addition and synthetic data generation) in a semi-automatic way will enable data
owners to release data with a higher level of data utility without any increase in disclosure
risk when compared to existing methods. These semi-automatic techniques will be applied
in the context of secure data-linkage in the e-Health sphere through projects such as DAMES
and SHIP.
This thesis sets out a theoretical framework for statistical disclosure control and draws on
qualitative data from data owners, researchers, and analysts. With these contextual frames
in place, the existing literature and methods were reviewed, and a tool set for implement-
ing k-anonymity and a range of disclosure control methods was created. This tool-0set is
demonstrated in a standard workflow and it is shown how it could be integrated into existing
e-Science projects and governmental settings.
Comparing this approach with existing workflows within the Scottish Government and NHS
Scotland, it allows data owners to process queries from data users in a semi-automatic way
and thus provides for an enhanced user experience. This utility is drawn from the consis-
tency and replicability of the approach combined with the increase in the speed of query
processing.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction – The Data Deluge and
the Expansion of Data Sources
It would be remiss not begin this introduction without the obligatory nod to the vast quantity
of data available to researchers, and the rapid increase in potential sources in recent years.
The literature and commentators often refer to the volume of electronic data available for
analysis as ‘big data’ (Lynch, 2008), the data ’deluge’ (Economist, 2010), the data ’explo-
sion’ (Microsoft, 2013) and even a data ’tsunami’ (Argonne National Laboratory, 2012). The
growth in data and opportunities for novel analysis has been recognised across disciplines.
In the health field (which formed the original backdrop for this research), the case for e-
Health and health informatics to harness these data resources has been championed by both
academic and government organisations alike (see Silber (2003); Mansell (2012); Pagliari
et al. (2007); Blaya et al. (2010)). This enthusiasm has been supported by projects to pro-
mote access to electronic health records (including (Scottish Health Informatics Programme
(SHIP); Ford et al., 2009)) as well as cross-sectoral data-linkages to explore health outcomes
from multiple angles simultaneously (McCafferty et al. (2010) for example).
This vast increase in data sources has also contributed to concerns over the role of data in
society, and the potential threats to privacy that are introduced as technology advances in
realms such as social media (Szongott et al., 2012), the digital economy (Tene and Polonet-
sky, 2012) and medicine (Steinbrook, 2008). These concerns are not new however, for ex-
ample Garfinkel’s discussion of the creation of a National Data Center in the US in the 1960s
raises similar concerns about potential attacks on personal privacy (Garfinkel, 2000). Solove
reaches even to more abstract concept of privacy that has always been described as under
attack, citing Nelson (2002) Solove notes that “[p]rivacy, it seems, is not simply dead. It is
dying over and over again” (Solove, 2008, 5).
Therefore, the enthusiasm for data has been tempered by the practicalities of providing ac-
cess, and the potential threats to the rights of citizens. The overarching difficulties of re-
2alising the potential of these new data sources have proven to be technical, ethical and so-
ciological as each discipline contributes to its own growing literature, for example; on the
affordances of privacy preserving techniques (Agrawal and Srikant, 2000), new legal gover-
nance frameworks for emerging data sources (Laurie and Sethi, 2012), or the sociology of
surveillance (Lyon, 2003). However, little attention has been paid to the interface between
these spheres and the technical operationalisation of ethical frameworks for example.
In parallel to the data deluge, has been the development of e-Science, which since its in-
ception in the UK in 1999, has widened in scope from its early focus on grid computing
and nuclear physics to the more general “application of computer technology to the under-
taking of modern scientific investigation, including the preparation, experimentation, data
collection, results dissemination, and long-term storage and accessibility of all materials
generated through the scientific process” (Bohle, 2013a). The e-Science approach is an in-
terdisciplinary one, as it combines multiple disciplines with computer science to facilitate
cutting-edge research workflows or make current workflows more efficient. As such, an e-
Science approach could be used to interrogate the interconnected spheres of technology and
ethics in the big data and privacy context. This could potentially provide new workflows
or enhance existing ones. Especially since e-Science approaches have already been applied
with positive effect for data access and data management problems in other fields (Doherty
et al., 2010).
Returning to the data themselves, in the wider UK research context, they are drawn from
myriad different sources, including a rise in administrative data being made available for
research purposes. Administrative data are routinely collected by government and other or-
ganisations for the purposes of providing some form of service or function; they were not
collected for research purposes in the first instance. These data have advantages for both
data owners and analysts. The cost of primary data collection can be prohibitive and this
limits the number of studies that can successfully obtain funding. A clear example of this
cost reduction principle in practice is the review of the UK Census. The “Beyond 2011” pro-
gramme evaluated the potential for replacing the UK paper census with data drawn, at least
in part, from administrative sources. This is already an approach taken by other countries
including Germany, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and
Israel (Office for National Statistics, 2014, 6). In their final report the project recommended
moving to an online census, but the direction of travel was laid out so that more research into
the potential for administrative data to replace the census was also recommended (Office for
National Statistics, 2014).
In addition, UK research funding councils have placed great emphasis on the secondary use
of data. The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), for example, makes avail-
3able funding specifically for this type of data initiative1. Furthermore, in 2013 the ESRC
announced funding for four administrative data research centres2 (ADRC). The Administra-
tive Data Task-force that recommended the establishment of the ADRCs cited the benefits
of reduced costs for data production, increased efficiency through data re-use and the faster
production of policy relevant research (Administrative Data Taskforce (Technical Group),
2013). Both the approach of the ESRC and the Beyond 2011 programme also resonate with
the open data and transparency agenda that has gained traction with governments and pub-
lic bodies. Through open government initiatives, such as those discussed in Janssen et al.
(2012), an increasing number of datasets are being offered to the public.
In areas like health research where datasets are likely to contain particularly sensitive per-
sonal data, data controllers have taken a more cautious approach to data access, however
access to secondary care records and clinical trials data is becoming much more common.
The National Health Service (NHS) in Scotland have the Electronic Data Research and Inno-
vation Service (eDRIS) which provides researchers with data such as the Scottish Morbidity
Record as well as the technical infrastructure for data-linkage and a secure-setting for data
analysis. Similarly in England, initiatives have been undertaken to increase information shar-
ing and access to data for research. For example, the ‘care.data’ programme (NHS England)
primary care data from GP records could become available to researchers.
Further to this, serious attention has been paid to the creation and curation of digital health
records and the infrastructure needed to store and analyse them. Projects such as the Se-
cure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) Databank provide the technical infrastructure
to house, link and analyse large volumes of data using new methodologies and computing
resources (Ford et al., 2009; Lyons et al., 2009). Similarly the governance literature and
procedures have been reviewed and updated to cope with new data sources. In this vein, the
Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) published an updated governance framework
for working with health related data (Laurie and Sethi, 2012).
Governance procedures, like those of SHIP, and data management processes have attempted
to keep pace with the expansion of data sources. However, there is some lag between the
two. This gap is also subject to shifts in societal attitudes to privacy and research. As
has been said, data privacy is not a new phenomena but with the vast quantities of digital
data that are created everyday it has recently occupied a more central position in the social
conciousness than in previous years(Halstuk and Chamberlin, 2006). As this phenomena
is not new, the techniques and approaches to protecting privacy and confidentiality have
developed over time, particularly through the workflows of government statisticians. For
1Details of the Secondary Data Analysis Initiative at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/research/skills-training-
development/sdai/
2The announcement can be found at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-and-events/press-releases/28673/the-big-
data-family-is-borndavid-willetts-mp-announces-the-esrc-big-data-network.aspx
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example, consider the discussion in Dalenius and Reiss (1982) of data swapping to prevent
disclosure in microdata releases and tabular outputs. What is new is the expectation that data
controllers should provide access to data and be able to handle multiple queries from different
users at scale and still fulfil their responsibility to protect the privacy of data subjects. In order
to achieve this, the methodologies and workflows of data controllers need to be adapted.
Statistical disclosure control (SDC), defined as a“set of methods to reduce the risk of dis-
closing information on individuals, businesses or other organisations” (Elliot et al., 2005a,
12), provides data owners and controllers with the tools to fulfil their obligations in terms of
privacy and confidentiality for their data subjects, as well as in terms of data access for their
users. Measures of disclosure risk range greatly in their complexity from simple thresholds
to complicated and highly configured statistical operations such as those proposed by Li and
Li (2009) that utilise information theory.
However, despite the body of literature on SDC, including measures of risk and data utility,
it is still not well understood how data controllers operationalise their own value or ethical
policies by translating privacy requirements into practical applications and how these deci-
sions impact on the research process. Rules for data privacy are often stated, for example
the use of thresholds for low cell counts in data tables, however the principles that underpin
such rules are not often stated.
In the context of the gaps identified in the literature above the research aims are stated below.
It should also be noted that in common with the majority of the projects discussed above, the
focus of this thesis will be the UK and, in particular, the Scottish context (for reasons of data
access discussed in Chapter 3), however comparisons have been drawn with other countries
where the contrast adds to the discussion. For example, the wider European context, as well
as that of the US and Canada which are included in Chapter 2. The Scottish context was also
chosen because of the pragmatic motivations that underpin this thesis. This research was
funded through a specific call by the Data Management through e-Social Science project3
(DAMES) and the Scottish Health Informatics Programme4 (SHIP), as such it was the fun-
ders intention that this research would contribute to their work on the collation, management,
dissemination and analysis of personal data, specifically in the area of systems for mitigating
unauthorised disclosure.
1.1 Research Aims
The aim of this research is to shed light on the practices of SDC by examining the theoretical
understanding of risk, specially risks to privacy and confidentiality alongside the responsibil-
3See http://www.dames.org.uk/ for details of the project
4see http://www.scot-ship.ac.uk/
1.2. Thesis Structure 5
ities of data controllers. This will attempt to address the gap in the literature by constructing
a framework for SDC as an interplay of scientific and value judgements in the mitigation of
disclosure risks.
As these judgements fundamentally affect the quality and utility of the data provided to
researchers; and this utility is exclusively discussed in terms of its analytical utility when
compared with the raw data, (i.e. does published data provide the same results when sub-
ject to statistical tests? For example, see Purdam and Elliot (2007)), it is also the aim of
this research to broaden the discussion on operationalised disclosure control to encompass
the practical experience of users and data controllers. The aim here is to show why it the
user experience is relevant and how it can be operationalised in the development of SDC
workflows.
Equipped with these more conceptual instruments, it is also the aim of this research to pro-
vide a practical example of this type of development work in the form of a software tool-kit
that facilitates the SDC processes of data controllers. The explicit aim here is to provide
a tool-kit that enhances current workflows, can be integrated into existing systems and is
compatible with the virtual research environments typical of e-Science projects.
1.2 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2, provides a theoretical, legal and ethical framework for this thesis to ground future
arguments on disclosure control as an interdisciplinary undertaking. This is done first by
exploring the rules that govern the collection, disclosure and use of personal data in a legal
sense (section 2.1) by examining the data protection legislation in the UK, the EU and the
US with particular reference to the use of data for health research. Having established the
rules, section 2.2 seeks to scratch under the surface of these rules and provide some per-
spective on privacy and the concerns that underpin those rules. This is done with reference
to Garfinkel, Nissenbaum and Solove. In section 2.3, a framework for disclosure risk as a
meta-risk arising through the processes of reflexive modernity is developed drawing on the
work of Ulrich Beck. In this section Beck also poses the interdisciplinary challenge for the
estimation of risk that is pursued throughout this thesis. Section 2.4, continues the theoret-
ical work by attempting to unpick the philosophical reasoning that lies beneath the fears of
technology, unauthorised disclosure and invasions of privacy, through Heidegger’s work on
enframing, acceptance and disclosure. Moving back from the theoretical to the practical,
section 2.5 discusses proposed changes to EU regulations that demonstrate a reflexive shift
in the perceived risk to privacy that new and emerging data practices reveal and the impact
this could have on future research. Chapter 2 concludes with a discussion of the public and
private spheres of data disclosure and different context specific ways in which individuals
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actions often differ from the abstract concerns about privacy that are expressed earlier in the
chapters narrative.
Chapter 3 details the interdisciplinary, pragmatic-sequential research design that frames how
this research was conducted as well as setting out the e-Science methodological context
within which this research takes place (section 3.2). Specific research methods are described
in sections 3.3 – interviews, and section 3.4 – the case study. Also in this chapter k-anonymity
as a method for disclosure control is introduced (section 3.5) and the use of quantitative anal-
yses is described as a measure of data utility (3.6). Lastly, the development of the software
tool-kit used in later empirical chapters, NIAH, is discussed in section 3.7.
In Chapter 4, a review of the literature on statistical disclosure and disclosure control is pre-
sented. Section 4.1 provides a brief insight into the historical development of disclosure
control since the 1960s and the early publication of microdata in the US as well as discus-
sion during the late 1980s and 1990s in the UK regarding Census outputs. Sections 4.2,
4.3 and 4.4 cover the literature on the measurement of disclosure risk, methods for disclo-
sure control and approaches to data utility. These three sections are interwoven with a case
study approach that provides an example of the methods discussed in the literature using the
Scottish Health Survey dataset.
Chapter 5 sets out the argument for using the framework developed in Chapter 2 to expand
the scope of the literature on statistical disclosure control to include a further perceived risk
— that data are made available as part of society’s reflexive process of introspection and
risk estimation, yet the controls put in place to balance the meta-risk of statistical disclosure
create their own set of risks that might preclude the efficient use of these data. To mitigate
these new risks, this Chapter makes the case for the user experience in statistical disclosure
workflows. In particular this is done by exploring issues of data access (section 5.1) and the
treatment of statistical outputs (section 5.2). These ideas are approached through an inter-
disciplinary relationship of qualitative concern for the user experience and the technological
accordances offered by development in virtual research environments (section 5.3).
In Chapter 6, an attempt is made to take the ideas developed in Chapter 5 and deploy them
through the development of a software tool-kit, NIAH. This includes the use of a small quali-
tative pilot study that captures the data users perspective which is used to incorporate aspects
of the user experience into the develop work (section 6.2). The new tool-kit is compared
with existing approaches to the SDC workflow that are in use by the Scottish Government
and NHS Scotland (section 6.3), before the Chapter concludes with a preliminary exploration
of the potential for integrating NIAH with existing systems and the types of virtual research
environment discussed in Chapter 5 (section 6.4).
In keeping with the pragmatic objectives and research design, Chapter 7 demonstrates how
the tool-kit and the approach discussed in the preceding Chapters can be applied to data in
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a ‘real-world’ context. Section 7.1 shows how the Scottish Government have adapted the
NIAH tool-kit and integrated it into their own systems allowing analysts to use it through a
simple web interface. In addition, section 7.2 returns to the case study approach first used in
Chapter 4 and details the use of NIAH in an SDC workflow using real, ‘raw’ data from the
field of education.
The final Chapter in this thesis, draws the discussions of the above chapters to a close and
concludes whether, and to what extent, the challenges set out in Chapter 1 have been ad-
dressed. In particular, section 8.1 pays attention to the interdisciplinarity of the overall
project and the contribution to the existing literature on disclosure control. Section 8.2 sets
out the potential spaces this research creates and what future work might take place as a
result.
8Chapter 2
Privacy & Confidentiality: A legal,
ethical and theoretical understanding
This chapter looks at the underlying ethical issues associated with large data-sets on indi-
viduals primarily through Beck’s sociology of risk and Heidegger’s concept of ’enframing’,
while acknowledging the literature on privacy and the public’s fear of the invasion of privacy.
It attempts to draw together a theoretical grounding as to why societies go to great lengths
to preserve personal privacy in research data, as well as recognising the interdisciplinary
collaboration required to make meaningful advances in the field of disclosure control and
real-world solutions to privacy concerns. The theoretical and ethical basis for this research
in statistical disclosure control will be explored. In doing this some of the tensions between
the public good and personal privacy will be exposed. From this introduction the focus shifts
to legal frameworks that seek to protect the right of citizens in not having their personal data
disclosed unlawfully; this will provide a contemporary backdrop from which to explore the
fears and insecurities that underpin these laws and their relation to statistical disclosure and
the use of personal data for research. From there the work of Ulrich Beck and Martin Hei-
degger will be used to delve deeper into the theoretical concepts that characterise the privacy
concerns of citizens in the modern world where data are growing in scope and size alongside
the analytical technologies to harness them. Once this groundwork is established it will be
used to frame discussions about changes to the legislative frameworks set out in the begin-
ning as well as explore the apparent juxtaposition in the attitudes of individuals toward data
sharing and linkage in the public and private sectors.
The position of this research is that it is not enough for societies to have rules on privacy,
and statistical disclosure control as a result, without understanding the reasons that underpin
those rules. In order to ensure the rules keep pace with the views of a society it is important
to capture the fears of the society (see the discussion at the end of section 2.1) as well as
harnessing philosophical literature that can be used in an attempt to explain these fears. In the
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pursuit of this aim, Beck’s sociology of risk is used injunction with the further philosophical
depth of Heidegger’s concern that technology has changed how people relate to each other as
human beings. This will provide the necessary foundations to understand, and take account
of, the public good versus personal privacy, and disclosure risk versus data utility balance in
contemporary debates on anonymisation and statistical disclosure control. In addition, this
theoretical exploration will position disclosure control within an interdisciplinary context
where ethical, mathematical and technological discourses are needed to solve contemporary
issues in the field.
The protection of personal data held by institutions is a serious concern for the public and
for those charged with the data’s protection. This seriousness is drawn from the emphasis
society as a whole places on privacy and security. Society’s commitment to privacy is ap-
parent in the highest echelons of political institutions; a right to a private life is enshrined
in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Attempts to store and
share more and more detailed personal data are met with fierce criticism. This is despite
the protestations of governments that this increase in data is in the public interest. As such,
public apprehension is well documented; for examples of this in the field of data-linkage
and research see Scottish Government (2011a); Aitken (2012). In the proceeding section the
legal frameworks mentioned above are discussed in further detail.
2.1 Legal Frameworks
Within the UK, aside from the overarching ECHR, personal data is subject to the Data Pro-
tection Act 1998 (DPA) which stipulates how data are to be treated by data controllers and
processors. The definition of what constitutes personal data is contentious; the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) have issued guidance that includes an eight step decision tree
to help data controllers decide if their data should be considered personal or not. For the
purposes of this research, the first two steps provide a relevant definition of personal data.
First, if an individual is identifiable from the data, and here identifiable means directly iden-
tifiable by name or date of birth, for example. Second, if the data are not directly identifiable
does the data ‘relate to’ an individual. This is a form of indirect identification, that the ICO
define as: “Data which identifies an individual, even without a name associated with it, may
be personal data where it is processed to learn or record something about that individual, or
where the processing of that information has an impact upon that individual” (Information
Commissioner’s Office, 2012, 9). Defined in this way, personal data can cover anonymised
data, which is the focus of this dissertation. The DPA sets out eight data protection prin-
ciples. Principle 7, in particular, forms part of the basis for this research into statistical
disclosure control because of the emphasis it places on the data controllers to ensure data are
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not disclosed unlawfully.
DPA Principle 7: “Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be
taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against
accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data” (Data Protection
Act 1998, Schedule 1).
This legal framework that puts the onus on data controllers to process sensitive personal data
fairly and prevent the loss of personal data is not unique to the UK. As has been discussed,
the right to privacy is a common commitment across Europe through the ECHR. Legislative
protection of personal data can also be seen in the United States. Although the US does not
have one piece of coverall legislation such as the DPA, the right to privacy and the protec-
tion of personal information is upheld through various statutes. In the health field the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 1996 (HIPAA) requires institutions engaged in
health care and related activities to prevent the “wrongful disclosure of individually identifi-
able health information” (US Congress 1996). In Canada, the Personal Information Protec-
tion and Electronic Documents Act 2000 (PIPEDA) provides a similar regulatory framework
to the UK with an ombudsman responsible for ensuring that data controllers are compliant.
Aside from setting out the legal obligations of the data controllers, all of the above legisla-
tive frameworks acknowledge the public versus personal tension in some way. In the UK
this is done through a series of exemptions for activities for which the public interest is
considered to outweigh the personal. For example, the DPA carries an exemption for the
use of data to safeguard national security and an exemption for data used for research and
statistical purposes. This public versus personal balance has been tested in court. In Eng-
land & Wales High Court (2011) the Department of Health (DoH) contested an Information
Tribunal’s decision to force the disclosure of abortion statistics. The DoH argued that the
disclosure “would create a real risk of patients being identifiable” and would infringe their
right to privacy. However, the Court found in the Information Commissioners Office’s (ICO)
favour and ordered the DoH to disclose the information. In coming to this decision the Court
reviewed the Information Tribunal’s earlier conclusions which included an assessment of the
benefits of disclosure in this case. The Tribunal saw seven areas in which the data would
serve the public interest:
“checking compliance with the Abortion Act; enabling public scrutiny of the
way abortion law was applied; ensuring accountability in relation to medical
practitioners; providing external checks and balances to Department of Health
scrutiny; identifying trends; planning healthcare services, including monitoring
the rates of foetal abnormalities; and informing public debate” England & Wales
High Court (2011).
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On the other side of the balance was the potential risk to the patients and the potential harm
this could cause. The Tribunal had taken expert evidence from statisticians including guid-
ance from the Office for National Statistics. They concluded “that the possibility of iden-
tification by a third party from these statistics was extremely remote” (cited in England &
Wales High Court (2011)), and thus the balance was tipped in the public interest’s favour.
Similarly, in the US, HIPAA provides exemptions and alternative access regulations for mat-
ters concerned with the public good and states that it “strikes a balance that permits important
uses of information, while protecting the privacy of people who seek care and healing” (US
Congress 1996). As with the UK legislation, it provides exemptions for public health activity
and research, allowing data controllers to disclose personal information without the individ-
ual’s consent provided the activity meets certain criteria. Unlike the ombudsman systems of
the UK and Canada, under HIPAA, violations can be criminally prosecuted and recent cases
against workers in the healthcare industry have resulted in custodial sentences for unlawful
access of medical records.
This is a brief overview of the legal requirements for the handling of personal data. The
fact these regulations exist is testament to the importance placed on the right to privacy and
the protection of personal information. However, there is an attempt to capture the balance
between the public interest and personal privacy, specifically in England & Wales High Court
(2011). This case saw the judiciary balance the specific disclosure risks of data against the
possible public benefits. What the legal frameworks do not do is give any reasoning at a
theoretical level, as to why these laws are deemed necessary or unpick the calibration of
these balances. In the next sections an attempt is made to do this primarily drawing on
concepts developed by Beck and Heidegger.
2.2 Perceptions of Privacy and the Public’s Fears
Having established that this chapter is something of a theoretical justification for statistical
disclosure control and the protection of an individual’s privacy, it is important to understand
the fears that the public have surrounding the potential risks to privacy that underpin the
rules set out above. Before proceeding with the theoretical substance of these sections it is
worth acknowledging the literature that documents some of these fears and the perspectives
they offer on privacy. Although the dictionary definition of privacy is“the state of being free
from the attention of the public”1, Garfinkel (2000) argues that the term privacy is somewhat
limited in its ability to capture the wider concept. For Garfinkel privacy is not simply about
’hiding things’ but also encapsulates ’self-possession, autonomy, and integrity’ (Garfinkel,
1Oxford Dictionary Definition of Privacy http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/privacy ac-
cessed 08/08/2015
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2000, 4). Garfinkel also offers, in his discussion of the ’database nation’, a description of
the fears attached to the centralisation of data that resonates with the opening-up of data and
data-linkage that features in contemporary debates and resembles the fear of a modern digital
Panopticon (Betham, 2008). The National Data Center proposed by the US Government in
the 1960s would centralise data from the federal agencies into one system, however the fear
that one single databank would place too much power in the hands of bureaucrats and reduce
individual autonomy was articulated strongly enough to prevent the data centre being built.
In the contemporary context this argument against granting power to a single authority has
parallels with the discussions surrounding data linkage, and the ability of organisations to
create hybrid data sets on individuals by linking distributed sources. It should be noted that
although Garfinkel is critical of the National Data Center, he is also critical of the alternative
‘nation of databanks’ that took its place, specifically the potential for error. His critique
provides an interesting commentary on the role of government and how by not proceeding
with central controls they absconded from their responsibility to protect the rights of citizens
and allowed data, and decisions about how that data are processed, to be siloed and carried
out in secret by private organisations. This critique is worth bearing in mind when we return
to the public versus private dichotomy in section 2.6.
The public’s fear is not limited to the centralisation of data, but also the collection of data
on individuals or surveillance. Nissenbaum takes up this aspect of privacy in her explo-
ration of the concept of public surveillance and discusses more specific cases for concern
than Garfinkel (Nissenbaum, 2004). Highlighting three guiding principles that feature in
public and legal discourse in the US: “(1) limiting surveillance of citizens and use of infor-
mation about them by agents of government, (2) restricting access to sensitive, personal, or
private information, and (3) curtailing intrusions into places deemed private or personal.”
(Nissenbaum, 2004, 125) we can see that disclosure control would fit neatly within the sec-
ond principle. Nissenbaum attempts to move the discourse on from the usual public versus
private dichotomy by setting out the argument for contextual integrity, which sets two tests
and should either one be not be satisfied then privacy has been undermined. These two tests
rest on the ideas of appropriateness, in a particular context should data be revealed, and the
distribution of data, does the flow of information conform to the norms associated with that
context. These two tests will be revisited in section 2.6.
Also advancing a different perspective on the concept of privacy is Solove (Solove, 2008;
Strandburg, 2006). Focusing on the future of privacy in the digital age, Solove draws on
Orwellian (big brother-like centralisation of data under a central authority) and Kafkaesque
(the subjection of individuals to bureaucratic processes) metaphors to illustrate the problem
of modern databases (Strandburg, 2006). There is some similarity here with the concerns of
Garfinkel over what is at stake, i.e. individual autonomy. Solove suggests that distributed
databases ‘disempower’ individuals not through the deliberate, malicious actions of an au-
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thority but: “there is a web of thoughtless decisions made by low-level bureaucrats, stan-
dardized policies, rigid routines, and a way of relating to individuals and their information
that often becomes indifferent to their welfare” (Strandburg, 2006, 10). In addition, Solove
raises the fear of identity theft as a consequence of growth in personal data collection and
distributed storage. The risk of identify theft has increased as our digital identity is essen-
tial for so many day-to-day processes and the victims of this suffer the “pollut[ion of ] their
digital dossiers” (Strandburg, 2006, 11).
The discussion above provides insight into approaches to privacy and the concerns of the
public. Perceived threats to privacy arise from the increasing volume of personal informa-
tion that is collected in central government systems as well as the private databases that
Garfinkel and Solove critique. These fears, at their heart, are concerned with the autonomy
of individuals and their control over their own information, the loss of which conjures images
of totalitarian, bureaucratic dystopia or a future of identity theft and cyber-crime where our
digital identity is synonymous with our true self. This literature also provides different per-
spectives on privacy and how to conceptual the public versus private balance, Nissenbaum’s
contextual integrity in particular reminds us that the contexts in which information is col-
lected and processed are complex and subject to societal norms. These discussion provide
further background context, alongside the description of legal frameworks above, that should
be carried forward into the proceeding sections and will be explicitly revisited in section 2.6.
2.3 Ulrich Beck and the Risk Society – Statistical Dis-
closure as Meta-Risk
Having discussed approaches to privacy and some of the fears over threats to privacy and the
rights of individuals, the concept of risk in social theory is now considered as the significant
first step from the contemporary, pragmatic, world into the theoretical and philosophical. It
would be remiss to not first look for a contemporary framework of risk that can be adapted
for the purposes. Ulrich Beck’s work on the risk society, developed during the 1980s with a
backdrop of growing concern over environmental risks (and subsequently the Chernobyl dis-
aster), provides a theoretical framework for a reflexive modernity that is in a constant state
of flux and uncertainty, assessing, mitigating and re-assessing perceived risks and making
value judgements about them. This framework is set out below starting with his definition
of risk, and then it is applied to the context of statistical disclosure. The application of this
framework sets statistical disclosure in the position of a meta-risk, or risk born of the risk
assessment (reflexive modernity) process itself. This allows for the problem of disclosure
control to be discussed in terms of Beck’s sociology of risk, which at its core sets the eval-
uation of these risks as a interdisciplinary challenge that must navigate both scientific and
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social rationality.
Beck in Risk Society defines risk as “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecu-
rities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (Beck, 1992, 21). Underpinning this
definition is Beck’s approach to modernisation, which is described as:
“[...] surges of technological rationalization and changes in work and organiza-
tion, but beyond that includes much more: the change in societal characteristics
and normal biographies, changes in lifestyle and forms of love, change in the
structures of power and influence, in the forms of political repression and par-
ticipation, in views of reality and in the norms of knowledge. In social science’s
understanding of modernity, the plough, the steam locomotive and the microchip
are visible indicators of a much deeper process, which comprises and reshapes
the entire social structure” (Beck, 1992, 50).
One could include the current expansion of data as one such visible indicator which is re-
shaping the social structure. As we have seen in the preceding section, new technological
innovation in the collection and storage of data have questioned and subsequently reshaped
societal attitudes (reframing of existing boundaries – section 2.5) and our relationship with
governments (data protection legislation – section 2.1), other institutions (data sharing and
user agreements – section 2.6) as well as each other (the rise of social media for exam-
ple). Also from Beck’s concept of modernisation, it is important to note that the modern era
is distinguished by the rise of ‘manufactured’ (consequences of deliberate human agency)
rather than ‘external’ (natural disasters for example) risks (see (Beck, 1992, 183), but also
(Giddens, 1999)).
Having laid some of the groundwork the focus moves back to Beck’s definition of risk, which
can be broken down into two parts. First, ‘dealing with hazards and insecurities’ i.e. the risks
that societies face. At this stage in the definition this could apply to past epochs as no dis-
tinction is made about the type of risk. Second, “these hazards are induced by modernisation
itself”, seizes on the point made above, these hazards are manufactured through the very
process of modernisation. Further, as a constant reflexive process, modernisation does not
just induce risks but through this modernity it also mitigates against these risks.
A note of caution should be sounded before this discussion of risks proceeds, as Beck notes,
risk is not the fulfilment of the potential, it is not the occurrence of a hazard but the potential
for such a consequence: “The concept of risk thus characterizes a peculiar, intermediate
state between security and destruction, where the perception of threatening risks determines
thought and action” (Adam et al., 2000, 213). Similarly, Armstrong articulates this in the
health context: “Risk has no fixed nor necessary relationship with future illness, it simply
opens up a space of possibility. Moreover, the risk factor exists in a mobile relationship
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with other risks, appearing and disappearing, aggregating and disaggregating, creating spaces
within and without the corporal body” Armstrong (1995, 401).
What position does data, and specifically big data, occupy in this modernity? As Kerr and
Earle suggests it is a product of the risk society which offers predictive powers and “opportu-
nities like never before to anticipate future needs and concerns, plan strategically, avoid loss,
and manage risk” (Kerr and Earle, 2013, 66). Reflexive modernity has been characterised
by the production and processing of ever-increasing volumes of data to capture, assess and
mitigate perceived risks. To return to Beck, he describes the sociology of this risk as “a
science of potentialities and judgements about probabilities” (Adam et al., 2000, 213). Data
facilitates these ‘judgements’ and arguably forms part of the science of potentialities (see
the alignment with Armstrong’s medical risk factors) but Beck also introduces the idea of
subjectivity through the use of the term judgement, who makes these judgements?
Beck recognises the importance of information in the risk society, and the power that those
that have the information wield. However, he suggests that this reflexive modernity, in which
society focusing in on itself “throws all of the [...] basic principles into flux” (Beck et al.,
2003, 2) - such as the dominance of the nation state, reliable welfare systems and the nuclear
family – is also leading to a democratisation of risk. Another tension can be identified here
between scientific and social rationality. Beck argues that “in the definition of risks the sci-
ences’ monopoly on rationality is broken.” The perception of risk by the public is a challenge
to scientific authority, whose ability to claim expert status is questioned: “Where and how
does one draw the line between still acceptable and no longer acceptable exposures?” The
problem for science in assessing risk, Beck argues is that “one must assume an ethical point
of view in order to discuss risk meaningfully at all” (Beck, 1992, 29).
The subject of this research, disclosure control, can be positioned within these concepts. If
the collection, processing and analysis of data is an intrinsic element in society’s reflexive
process of risk identification, monitoring and mitigation, statistical disclosure – is a risk pro-
duced by this process of reflexivity itself. Webster (2002) describe such risks as ‘meta-risks’
or the ‘riskiness of risk assessment’. Therefore, disclosure control forms a response to this
meta-risk of disclosure. Establishing disclosure as a meta-risk allows us to apply the soci-
ology of risk and the balance of scientific and social rationality, within the contemporary
social power structures. This tension can be seen in how data are viewed as personal, or sen-
sitive, and where relative anonymity is pursued through the manipulation of data to mitigate
perceived risks to privacy.
To take Beck’s line of argument, the ethical dimension is important to consider in any han-
dling of data or analysis of disclosure risk. It also justifies to some extent why attempts as
‘experts’ to fully automate assessment and management of risk are ill advised (see Solove
on Kafkaesque bureaucracy) or fall into technological determinism (see Heidegger on the
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technological way of thinking in section 2.4). Instead, the process should be democratised
by providing tools that allow the sciences, the public and government to reach an agree-
ment on what is ‘acceptable exposure’ in the pursuit of a specific ‘public good’ — whether
that be identifying and analysing patterns of social inequality, or searching for new medical
advances.
It is also important to note, before leaving the reader with the notion that science is redundant
in the sociology of risk, that Beck’s work does not propose an uninformed dictatorship of
public perception. It recognises that risk is a quasi-scientific interplay of mathematical prob-
ability and ethics, a combination of factual and value claims. Therefore the statistical models
devised to estimate risk cannot be separated from questions about what society considers to
be acceptable or unacceptable. For research into disclosure control, as an exploration of
meta-risk, Beck sets an interdisciplinary challenge: “[Risk statements] can be deciphered
only in an interdisciplinary (competitive) relationship, because they assume in equal mea-
sure insight into technical know-how and familiarity with cultural perceptions and norms”
(Adam et al., 2000, p215). This challenge is seen in the statistical disclosure control litera-
ture, which with few exceptions, notably Duncan et al. (2011)), approach disclosure control
from a purely technical or statistical direction. This has resulted in a series of advancements
in anonymisation techniques and how the risk of re-identification is assessed (see Elliot et al.
(2005a), Reiter and Mitra (2008) and Dankar et al. (2012)). However, these advancements
have occurred in relative isolation from the real-world workflows that combine the ethical
and technical.
As has been described above, Beck provides a set of useful definitions of risk and modernisa-
tion that can be used to describe the big data risk society. By exploring the reflexive process
statistical disclosure can be positioned as meta-risk born of the process itself, and therefore
the estimation of risk must be undertaken in the interdisciplinary relationship Beck notes
above. This framework supports the interdisciplinary approach set out in this thesis through
the interplay of the methods set out in Chapter 3. However, Beck’s analysis does not capture
the ‘why’, as in why at a philosophical level statistical disclosure is considered a risk at all.
Some of this is hinted at in the above section on approaches to privacy. However, in order to
go deeper and inspect the substrata beneath these foundations, a more philosophical under-
standing of society’s relationship with technology and its influence on how people relate to
each other is needed. For this another German writer’s work is considered; the narrative of
Martin Heidegger will be applied to the contemporary context.
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2.4 Martin Heidegger, Enframing, Aletheia and Gelassen-
heit
Martin Heidegger, the 20th Century German philosopher, is considered to be one of the most
important philosophical thinkers of that century, despite his extremely controversial support
for National Socialism. Being and Time is Heidegger’s best known work and is said to have
influenced a number of leading thinkers that followed (Heidegger, 1962). Normally asso-
ciated with the schools of phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism, it might seem
odd to call upon Heidegger to provide insight into the basis for statistical disclosure con-
trol and the balance of the public and private spheres. However, despite Heidegger’s deeply
philosophical writings on the nature of being, he also engaged in writing about subjective
experience and its connection to contemporary thought. He also fills a gap in the earlier con-
sideration of Beck; as will be shown, Heidegger captures something of the fear and insecurity
that surrounds and permeates the ‘big data’ revolution.
In addressing this revolution as the deluge of digital data that is harnessed to allow indi-
viduals, organisations and societies to make sense of their world through actions like mass
surveillance, the deployment of ‘smart’ sensor networks or the electronic tracking of trans-
actions; Heidegger and ontological philosophy offer concepts to aid in the description of the
world in which disclosure control operates. ‘Erschlossenheit’ or world disclosure is Heideg-
ger’s concept for how human comprehension of objects is developed through interaction –
the day-to-day use of an object and interactions with other people gives it meaning (Heideg-
ger, 1962). It is also important to note that this ontological description of an object and its
attributes is the theoretical basis for the idea of ontologies in the field of information science
(for example see Gruber (1993)) and is used extensively in big data technologies that use
linked data strategies or semantic web approaches.
Given Heidegger’s own subjective experience as witness to the Second World War, it is not
surprising that he would write about the effect of technology on the relations between human
beings, and it is this work on the philosophy of technology that will be drawn upon. Born
in 1889, throughout his lifetime he witnessed the rapid advancement of technology toward
a state of total war. In an essay written in 1950, The Question Concerning Technology,
he expresses his disdain for the way technology has converted all things into resources on
stand-by, waiting to be manipulated, with a particularly disturbing tone:
“Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, essentially the same as the man-
ufacture of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the
blockade and starvation of countries, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen
bombs” (Heidegger, 1978).
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Polt (2003) argues for looking beyond the superficial shock that this quote generates, and
for readers to recognise the challenge to ask whether or not these processes are all ‘essen-
tially’ the same. This requires reflection on the technological approach to the world that
dominates the modern era. Of course these actions are not ‘essentially’ the same, but this
description sets the scene for Heidegger’s conceptualisation of technological thinking. Polt
also associates this view of technology with Huxleyan (as opposed to Orwellian) visions of
the future; a future where all people and things are heavily conditioned resources existing
in an artificial, safe and happy society that spurns the individual and any attempts to subvert
this controlled existence. Heidegger uses two labels for this managed resource view of the
world, Machenschaft (machination) and Ge-stell (enframing); enframing will be used from
this point onward (Polt, 2003, 142 & 172).
Echoes of ‘enframing’ can be seen in the public’s apprehensive approach to the use of their
personal data. When asked, people raise questions about what data will be used, who will
have access, and will it be secure. They discuss their data as if it were a commodity and a
resource to be managed. They also express a view on authorisation and ownership. Consent,
to the use of their data, is seen “as being a means of respecting individuals” (Aitken, 2012,
2) and is often considered essential, despite the practical problem of collecting such consent
for the use of data collected, stored and analysed in different physical locations, at different
times and for different purposes.
Heidegger also posits that the technological way of thinking is driven for its own sake. En-
framing transforms everything into resources, a power base for further development of more
technology and so on (Zimmerman, 1990, 248). This ‘because we can’ reasoning for the ac-
cumulation of resources also resonates with public fears over the use of their data. Contem-
porary debates over the draft Communications Bill in the UK, which would see an expansion
of the state’s power to intercept, collect and store personal communications data, has been
criticised from a position of ‘just because we can, does not mean we should’. For example,
Liberty, the civil liberties campaign group in the UK, responded to the draft bill by con-
cluding that the bill “not only exacerbates human rights concerns but also makes clear that
this proposal is about extending rather than maintaining the ability of the State to monitor
communications” (Liberty, 2012). Liberty in this response questions the enframing, techno-
logical thinking and concludes that just because we can collect more data does not mean we
should. In this statement’s shadow, Beck can be seen separating the perceived risk of the
Communications Bill into factual statements, ‘we can collect it’, and value statements ‘we
shouldn’t collect it’.
For Heidegger, this enframing of personal data would likely have been another step toward
his fatalistic view of technology; society’s unquestioning use of technological solutions to
perceived problems. However, this chapter is concerned with tensions and balances and
Heidegger’s enframing is, in the personal data context, set against his concept of Mitsein
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(Being-with) – being in the world together with one another. Olafson (1998) succinctly
describes Mitsein:
“The plain fact is that, at every step we take in whatever endeavour the lives
may be devoted to, we are constantly supplementing the own observations and
the own recollections from a common fund to which we call contribute. So
profound is the dependency that the idea that we could draw a line demarcating
what we ourselves have supplied out of the own resources from what we have
drawn from the common stock is more than a little problematic” (Olafson, 1998,
26).
So between enframing and Mitsein there is a tension. Heidegger criticises the enframing of
existence because it causes the relationship as human beings to be dominated by a technolog-
ical way of thinking, which in turn reduces everything to resources to be operationalised, ma-
nipulated and optimised. However, he acknowledges through Mitsein that individuals make
sense of the world as social beings, through shared subjective experiences and a common
pool of knowledge. As an attempt to describe the use of personal data in relation to this ten-
sion, the public versus private dichotomy set out in the beginning of this chapter re-emerges.
Mitsein or ‘being-with’ others can be defined as the pooling of collective experience – and
in this context, this collective pooling takes the form of data stored for processing. This
data allows individuals to ‘discover the world’ together as Heidegger might have described
it, through the identification of patterns or trends in the data. This interpretation of Mitsein
provides the public weight in the balance between public versus private good; data are ques-
tioned, interrogated and analysed in order to help make sense of the world. The personal
weight, scales with the enframing threat the data represents – how much of oneself is given
up as resource (or perhaps how detailed are the data and who has access)?
Heidegger also realises that this tension cannot be resolved simply, it is not Mitsein or en-
framing; to use technology or not. Instead he uses the term Gelassenheit or ‘letting-be’ a
term in this context described by Polt as an alternative to a crude choice between action
or passivity (Polt, 2003, 172). Heidegger suggests technology can be used without being
dominated by it, or by succumbing to enframing and the technological way of thinking. His
central concern is that the use of technology should not subsume an individual’s ‘being’ or
their ‘being-with’ others, it should not affect their ‘core’. He expresses this in Discourse on
Thinking:
“It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be short-sighted to
condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they
even challenge us to ever greater advances. But suddenly and unaware we find
ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall into bondage
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to them. [...] We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also
deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste to
the nature” (Heidegger, 1969, 53,54).
To return to the contemporary world again, the interplay of Heidegger’s Mitsein versus en-
framing tension has been described, and it has been shown how this relates to the public
versus private balance when personal data is used for research. Therefore, to extend the
argument beyond these crude dualities, Heidegger’s concept of ‘letting-be’ must be incor-
porated. This is constituted as a cautious acceptance of technological advancement (in this
case greater analytical, linkage and storage capacity of data). It is cautious engagement that
introduces the opportunity to calibrate the public versus personal balance to prevent this
technology from affecting one’s core as Heidegger suggests. Or to really bring together
the argument as a whole; what can be done to mitigate the risks to one’s core being is the
application of statistical disclosure control methods.
Having positioned disclosure control in the space created by gelassenheit and the acceptance
of technology, we can also describe disclosure control in Heideggerian terms. ‘Aletheia’,
taken from the Greek for truth, unconcealment or disclosure is adopted by Heidegger to
discuss when a ‘world’ is disclosed (see the earlier discussion of Erschlossenheit) (Bartky,
1979). We can see how the act of statistical disclosure, which disclosure control is set against,
is therefore a revelation, a disclosure of an entity. Heidegger also offers an example of how an
object relating to a being can disclose some aspect of that being’s character. In a description
of a painting by Van Gogh, Heidegger describes how a pair of shoes reveal something of the
character of the peasant women who owns them:
“From the dark opening of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stands
forth. In the stiffly solid heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity
of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the
field, swept by a raw wind. On the leather there lies the dampness and saturation
of the soil. Under the soles there slides the loneliness of the field-path as the
evening declines. In the shoes there vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet
gift of the ripening corn and its enigmatic self-refusal in the fallow desolation of
the wintry field.” cited in Bartky (1979, 214).
One could draw a similar, if less poetic, comparison with the details of a census, survey or
patient record that reveals something of the character of the data subject not its true nature.
For example their position in an occupational classification does not reveal the intimate detail
of a persons day-to-day life but it does establish the broad sphere in which one would expect
that they operate in.
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It is also important to note here that Heidegger in later writings, and more contemporary
scholars (Kompridis, 2011), have sought to separate aletheia from absolute truth: “To raise
the question of aletheia, of disclosure as such, is not the same as raising the question of truth.
For this reason, it was inadequate and misleading to call aletheia in the sense of opening,
truth” cited in Kompridis (2011, 188). This is important because in our context, we know
from Solove and Garfinkel (see 2.1) that conflating data that discloses information about an
individual and the absolute truth pertaining to their identity is dangerous for the negative
effects it can have on individual autonomy and integrity. This revision of aletheia adds a
subtlety that makes it an appropriate concept for disclosure in the current context.
Lastly on Heideggerian disclosure and disclosure control, the beginnings of a link between
the concerns over privacy articulated by Solove and Garfinkel and statistical disclosure as
a form of aletheia was framed above. Within the concept of disclosure itself Heidegger
makes no mention of the agency of beings or control over the process of disclosure. As
Garfinkel and Solove suggest privacy is a problematic term but encapsulates autonomy and
self-possession, here then one would want to assert an individuals agency in what disclosures
are made through the exploration of objects pertaining to themselves. IN the sotrage of data
and its subsequent processing we as a society cede our individual agency to organisations,
governed by societal norms (read Nissenbaum’s tests for appropriateness and distribution),
laws or user-agreements (see section 2.6). Statistical disclosure control is then a device for
mitigating the risk of unauthorised aletheia and the associated risks to an individuals privacy.
The above might seem like a convenient philosophical judgement to make, however there is
evidence of it in how the public and researchers’ view storage and analysis of personal data.
To return to the public engagement work of the Scottish Health Informatics Programme,
participants expressed a strong preference for their data to be anonymised to protect their
confidentiality, so as to protect themselves from any injury resulting in their re-identification
and misuse of their data. Participants also noted something that resonates with the philo-
sophical point about enframing in this context:
“In one discussion group a researcher described how he used data and that he
did not tend to think of data subjects as being ‘real people’, this was described
as being reassuring by another participant. Thus, anonymisation - or deperson-
alisation - of data was perceived as an important reassurance in relation to uses
of personal medical data” (Aitken, 2012, 2).
This last quote raises another challenge that should be answered here. The researcher’s view
that data subjects in a dataset are not ‘real people’ is something that at first glance might cause
Heidegger to label such thought as enframing. The researcher sees a data subject’s data as
a resource ready at hand for his manipulation. However, the anonymisation encompassed in
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statistical disclosure control facilitates the authorised disclosure of information that provides
some characterisation of their identity. That resource which can now be pooled with that
of others in order for the process of ‘being-with’ to proceed. This also chimes with the
legal frameworks discussed earlier, the DPA’s exemption for research includes the need to
avoid being “processed in such a way that substantial damage or substantial distress is, or
is likely to be, caused to any data subject” and stipulates that “the results of the research or
any resulting statistics are not made available in a form which identifies data subjects” (UK
Parliament (1998)), in effect these rules call for data controllers and data users to satisfy the
tests that Nissenbaum set out for appropriateness and information flow.
To further combine the theoretical framework set out above with the main subject of this
research, two further areas are addressed. In light of recent developments at the European
Parliament it seems prudent to discuss the impact of proposed reforms to the Data Protection
Directive and how these might fit with this research. It would also be valuable to compare
and contrast public and private sector approaches to this topic, the collection and use of
personal data is discussed in the government and social media context.
2.5 Proposed Revisions to the EU Data Protection Di-
rective
Earlier in this chapter, the legislative framework, including the Data Protection Act (DPA),
was set out to provide a contextual backdrop for this research. To further enhance the case for
considering statistical confidentiality in an interdisciplinary context, it is useful to consider
proposed changes to the DPA. These changes are being discussed at the European level and
would subsequently reform the UK’s legislative framework. It will be shown that the legisla-
tive framework is not static and therefore a deeper understanding of statistical confidentiality
is required to adequately address the problem at the centre of this research.
The proposal set out in European Commission (2011) seeks to replace the 1995 Data Protec-
tion Directive and reinforce individuals’ rights to privacy. In the Commission’s report they
provide a justification for reforming the 1995 Directive: “The current framework remains
sound as far as its objectives and principles are concerned, but it has not prevented fragmen-
tation in the way personal data protection is implemented across the Union, legal uncertainty
and a widespread public perception that there are significant risks associated notably with
online activity” European Commission (2011, 3).
The EU’s call for individuals’ data privacy rights to be strengthened has been welcomed
by data privacy advocates and campaign groups. Much of this support has culminated
around high profile clashes between large technology firms, such as Google, and the Eu-
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ropean Union, for example see Big Brother Watch (2014). While public opinion welcomes
these moves by legislative bodies to enhance legal protections for data privacy, the research
community has been quick to point out potentially serious threats to future research if the
proposed changes go ahead without consideration of their impact on issues of statistical con-
fidentiality and consent.
In an editorial for the British Medical Journal, Ploem et al. (2013) highlights how these
new proposals threaten the research exemptions and justifications that have been discussed
earlier in this chapter. Focusing on amendments put forward by the European Parliament’s
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Ploem draws on the Committee’s
suggestion that ”[p]rocessing of sensitive data for historical, statistical and scientific research
purposes is not as urgent or compelling as public health or social protection. Consequently,
there is no need to introduce an exception which would put them on the same level as the
other listed justifications.” In effect what the Committee proposes is the removal of the re-
search exemption that underpins much of the research carried out using personal data at the
present time. In addition to this, the Committee recommends limiting the ability of individ-
ual member states from providing exceptions to proposed rules by setting the bar high with
an ‘exceptionally high public interest’ test for research to proceed without the direct consent
of data subjects (EU Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2012).
Mascalzoni et al. (2013) probes deeper into the proposed changes and considers the moti-
vations of the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee. In their editorial for
Nature, Mascalizoni et al note that the real target for the Committee’s amendments are pri-
vate companies who might seek to use the research exemption to use personal data for its own
ends without consent from individuals. Furthermore, they highlight the potential for private
companies to link personal data for more detailed processing outside it’s intended use. This
provides the European Parliament with a difficult navigation of public opinion, in regards
to the use of their data by private companies for example , and the needs of the research
community. However, as Mascalzoni also suggests, it is not only the EU that finds itself in a
difficult position. A number of public bodies have incorporated data sharing requirements in
their rules for awarding research funding.
The UK Research Councils (RCUK), for example, insist that research data should be passed
to data repositories for future use by other researchers working on potentially very differ-
ent research projects. The Economic and Social Research Council have spent significant
resources promoting the secondary reuse of data generated from publicly funded projects.
This has included the Secondary Data Analysis Initiative (SDAI) (ESRC, 2012) offering
grants of £200,000 to analyse existing data sources. Not only have this type of initiative
increased the emphasis on data sharing, but it has in part also changed the economic model
for research funding by reducing the focus on data collection.
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Recognition of the benefits of data sharing in research communities has not only been driven
from the top by funders. The more grass-roots ‘open access’ movement has also supported
efforts for greater replicability of research findings through the public archiving of research
data and supporting methodological work. The Public Library of Science (PLoS) which
publishes a number of open access science journals, recently introduced a new policy on
open research data and the need for authors to share data for published articles (Silva, 2014).
Given the degree to which the research community is moving toward greater data sharing,
the threat posed by new EU legislation is serious on a number levels as highlighted in the
discussion above.
To round out the evidence in this vein, Andersen and Storm (2013) seeks to simulate the
cost to research if a new EU Directive curtails the research exemption. Their case study
focuses on the impact to public health if the use of cancer registries are effected by new
legislation. The potential costs include: loss of research which cannot feasibly be carried out
using controlled trials; increased error in statistical results as potential data sources shrink in
size; and the loss of unbiased population level data which is then substituted by anecdotal,
small trial or data based on stakeholder interests.
In this section, the shifts in the legislative framework that yield potential threats to data
sharing and secondary analysis of research data have been established. As such, it also
cements further the principle of statistical confidentiality as an interdisciplinary subject that
must lie between legal, ethical and technical constituencies in order to fully encapsulate the
needs of both the individuals whose data are being made available with the data users and
the communal structures that exist to promote the public good. This section also sits at the
sharp edge of the theoretical grounding on risk from Beck’s work set out earlier.
2.6 Public and Private Sector Approaches
So far the narrative of this chapter would indicate that individuals jealously guard their per-
sonal data, that they are sceptical of data sharing and are wary of the influence of technology
on their lives. However, from anecdotal experience, it would seem obvious that the real nar-
rative is not so linear. Individuals’ attitudes to their private data are highly context-specific,
as captured in Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual integrity (see the end of section 2.1). In
this section it will be shown that different contexts can provide a fundamental juxtaposition
of the public’s concern for data privacy and their willingness to distribute and publish their
data. This will be done using evidence of the public’s approach to data sharing within the
governmental context and the context of social media, such as Facebook. A tension exists
between the lengthy deliberations on ethics and the use of personal data in the public sec-
tor and the terms of service consent model used by private companies. This tension stands
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in stark contrast to the public’s attitude which often sees the first as problematic and the
latter much less so. These tensions will also be discussed with reference to the theoretical
framework set out above and the literature on privacy.
To take the public sector context, if the contemporary issues of surveillance and government
‘snooping’ are left to one side, the focus can shift to public sector use of personal data in the
delivery of public services and research. Through its routine business, government collects
a vast quantity of data on its citizens. This data collected for administrative purposes also
forms the basis for research - so much so that the Office for National Statistics (ONS) has
recommended supplementing and in the future replacing the UK Census with data drawn
from administrative sources (Office for National Statistics, 2014). To set out a brief case
study for comparison with the private sector, consider the use of secondary care health data
collected in hospitals in Scotland. This data is used in research such as McAllister et al.
(2013), in which academics in collaboration with NHS Scotland analysed ten years worth of
hospital admissions data to test for a link between socio-economic deprivation and the risk of
hospitalisation during the winter months. In order to access data of this kind, the researchers
would need to have sought ethical approval from their institutions ethics committee as well
as seeking ethical approval from the NHS’ Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC), a process
which in the case of this thesis research took over a year (for information on PAC see NHS
National Services Scotland (2013b)). This is complemented by studies of public opinion
to data sharing such as Wellcome Trust (2013) and those specifically in the health field
Scottish Government (2011a) which explore both participants’ reluctance and support for
their data to be shared. What emerges from both studies is that individuals expressed a
degree of cynicism when discussing governments collection and storage of personal data.
This cynicism was often supported by anecdotal personal experiences or by citing newspaper
stories of data loss (BBC (2009) for example). This cynicism also speaks to the general
concern over governments centralising of data that Garfinkel discusses (Garfinkel, 2000).
As for attitudes toward data sharing in the health field, the research suggests that the cyni-
cism expressed in the general case was tempered by support for a ’public good’. The idea,
common among participants, was that if data sharing resulted in improved public health then
the collective good should take precedence over individual rights to privacy, with the caveat
that data should be treated as sensitive and handled with particular care. As shown in the
Scottish Government report, this attitude became more pronounced if participants accessed
more information about how data sharing is carried out and what safe guards are in place
Scottish Government (2011a, 3.32). This contextual approach to the use of data for a public
good, is similarly described by Nissenbaum as satisfying the tests of contextual integrity,
it is both deemed an appropriate level of data to reveal to legitimate health researchers and
with the various measures, including data security, it conforms to the norms of information
distribution that society would expect from this context. To illustrate this further, when de-
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scribing societal norms of information flow in the healthcare context Nissenbaum suggests
ways in which the physician-patient relationship change with the context, i.e. “where it poses
a public health risk, and where it is of commercial interest to drug companies” (Nissenbaum,
2004, 124).
These discussions of public attitudes to data sharing in the public sector resonate more
strongly with the more pessimistic outlook of Heidegger and the enframing described above.
Having set out one side of the apparent juxtaposition, the second side can be established
to complete the contrast. The situation regarding data sharing through social media plat-
forms or other web based services is much less well defined than the earlier case study. The
processes for data collection, analysis and dissemination are effectively closed within the
confines of private companies, although they do provide statements of intent, for example
Facebook (2013) or Google (2014). However, there has been some research into public
attitudes toward data sharing within these services.
Although the specific and seemingly rational fears identified by Nissenbaum, and to a lesser
extent Garfinkel, seem to fit with the above discussion of the use of data in the public sector.
They seem less applicable when discussing the sharing of data with private companies. In
this context the scepticism discussed in Solove (2008) seems more relevant, he discusses the
public’s concern regarding privacy as abstract, and citing Goldman notes that “stated privacy
concerns diverge from what [they] do” (Solove, 2008, 5). This dismissal of the public conern
for there on data is somewhat simplistic and the transactional nature of this engagement is
explored below. Triangulated with Nissenbaum and Garfinkel this contradiction actually
lends weight to parts of their argument. Garfinkel’s reluctance to allow private organisation,
in his context credit agencies and here social media companies, to build myriad secret data
warehouses is because of the ambiguity this introduces and the lack of public scrutiny over
the use of personal data. Equally, if these two contexts are viewed through the prism of
contextual integrity, there has been a great deal of public scrutiny over the appropriateness
and distribution of data in the business of government and research. However, the same level
of scrutiny has not been applied in the social media context, in fact the norm thus far is
for individuals to provide data to these companies who then have full control of those data
(see Solove’s criticism of Amazon.com’s ‘unfettered ability’ to use personal information
(Strandburg, 2006)), if with some degree of self-regulation through user agreements.
To illustrate first the model used by these services, a new user is asked to agree to the terms of
service which often carry wide ranging clauses on how their personal data will be processed.
For example, Facebook’s terms of service2 state the following:
[clause 2.1] For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like
photos and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the following permis-
2The terms of service can be found at https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms
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sion, subject to your privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive,
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP con-
tent that you post on or in connection with Facebook (IP License). This IP Li-
cense ends when you delete your IP content or your account unless your content
has been shared with others, and they have not deleted it. ... [clause 10.1] You
give us permission to use your name, profile picture, content, and information
in connection with commercial, sponsored, or related content (such as a brand
you like) served or enhanced by us. This means, for example, that you permit
a business or other entity to pay us to display your name and/or profile picture
with your content or information, without any compensation to you. If you have
selected a specific audience for your content or information, we will respect your
choice when we use it.
These two examples demonstrate the degree to which users provide Facebook with the ability
to process their personal data. This interaction between Facebook and individuals at a per-
sonal level also allows for the processing of large volumes of data at an aggregate level. This
aspect of Facebook’s model has often been referred to an iceberg as illustrated in figure 2.1.
Having highlighted this relationship between Facebook, users and their data, it can be shown
Figure 2.1: The Facebook Iceberg Model (Debatin et al., 2009)
that user attitudes do not necessarily reflect the level of access to their data ceded to social
media platforms when they agree to the terms of service. Debatin et al. (2009) provides a
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comprehensive review of existing literature on this topic. Debatin et al draw on previous
studies of Facebook users, citing Jones and Soltren (2005), for example, which revealed that
over 70 percent of MIT students surveyed posted demographic data about their age, gender
and location. In addition, the users largely ignored the terms of service, 91 percent agreed to
it without reading it, and 89 percent acknowledged that they had never read the privacy pol-
icy. What is also striking from the literature is that the correlation between privacy concerns,
trust, and greater information highlighted in the government example does not seem to apply
here. Govani and Pashley (2005) suggests that even when users that express privacy concerns
receive more education about privacy setting in social media platforms these remain under
utilised and yet privacy concerns remain post-education.
A substantial difference between disclosing and sharing personal information with govern-
ment and social media are the tangible benefits of such activity. As indicated in the literature
above on public attitudes to data sharing in the public sector, individuals often support the
’public good’ argument about data sharing. However, this type of collective, non-immediate
outcome sits in contrast to those outcomes identified from participating in online social net-
works. Ellison et al. (2007) discusses the creation and maintenance of an individual’s social
capital through participation in online social networks. They highlight the use of these online
networks to create, build and maintain relationships with local peers or the maintenance of
connections if users move away from an area. These immediate benefits of social network-
ing are also complemented by potential longer term benefits, for example, Ellison suggests
“Such connections could have strong pay-offs in terms of jobs, internships, and other oppor-
tunities” Ellison et al. (2007, p1164).
To tie this brief summary of social media to the wider theoretical framework, the benefits of
online social networks resonate with Heidegger at the Mitsein dimension of the enframing
versus Mitsein tension identified earlier. Acknowledging that people are social beings that
understand the world through shared subjective experiences and a common pool of knowl-
edge lends itself to explaining the popularity of online social networks like Facebook. The
tangible benefits to individual users serve to mitigate the privacy concerns of sharing data to
an extent to which users ignore policies and settings available to protect their privacy. This
hook into individuals’ social understanding of the world is far less visible in the case of gov-
ernment or public sector data usage. This gap forms an important context for this research
and lends itself to the interdisciplinary approach taken forward in the succeeding chapters.
What has been shown in this section is that individual approaches to data privacy are highly
context specific, and that there is a degree of evaluation, conscious or sub-conscious, of risk
and reward framed by societal norms. This balance of risk and reward, or utility, runs through
this research from this theoretical framework through practical application of statistical dis-
closure control measures. In identifying this continual tension between approaches to online
services and government data sharing and research, an avenue for further work is potentially
2.6. Public and Private Sector Approaches 29
created. Future research could consider a variation on the model used by private companies
through terms of service agreements in the public sector and research sphere. This has the
potential to redraw the risk and reward balance to further public knowledge, participation
and trust of data sharing in this context as well as to some extent assuage concerns over
informed consent.
It has been shown that there is stable conceptual ground for research into disclosure control
drawing on different disciplinary perspectives. What will be set out in later chapters are
further combinations of different disciplinary approaches to more applied methodological
areas of statistical disclosure control. Having this conceptual grounding is important to avoid
pursuing disclosure control in only the mathematical, statistical or technological sense. As
Beck’s sociology of risk indicates there are factual (technical and statistical) judgements as
well as value (ethical and sociological) judgements to be evaluated in this process. This
perhaps goes some way to explaining why the uptake and understanding of this field up
to now has been limited to specialist statisticians aided by technology. As the ‘big data’
revolution changes how vast amounts of personal data are stored, collected and analysed,
a greater understanding of the accompanying risks are needed. This understanding has to
include the data subjects themselves to ensure that the public can consent, whether explicitly
or tacitly, to their data being used, otherwise the cause of data analysis could suffer by tipping
the balance too far in either direction as the proposed changes to EU legislation suggest.
Perhaps, there are lessons for government to be learnt from the approach taken by Facebook
in at least recognising the transactional nature of their interaction with their users. Heidegger’
s challenge in this field remains, statistical disclosure control is a constant rebalancing of the
‘enframing’ of technological progress with the ‘Mitsein’ of the social world calibrated by a
‘Gelassenheit’ letting-be to protect the rights of the individual and advance the social good.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 Research Design
In Chapter 1 the research problem was discussed in detail. In order to address these research
questions within the evolving, practice focused fields of data management, administrative
data research, and confidentiality, the research design set out below draws heavily from the
pragmatic tradition. As Creswell (2013, p11) sets out that the pragmatists place the problem
at the centre of the research occupying a more important position than the necessity to apply
one set of methods or stick to a more rigid philosophical framework. This allows pragmatic
research designs to focus on solutions and ‘what works’ approaches. The flexibility afforded
by the pragmatic approach make it easier for researchers to mix methods from different tradi-
tions and, as Jick (1979) discusses, the products of these different methods can be engaged in
triangulation to leverage data and findings that potentially address the weaknesses or biases
inherent in any one method. Also as Creswell notes, audience is important when adopting a
research tradition to anchor the overall design. As the audience for this research crosses both
academia and data controllers working in the public sector, it was important to acknowledge
the needs of both groups and provide potential solutions to current problems.
Following from the pragmatic approach discussed above, this research utilises a sequential
strategy. Cameron (2009) summarises the sequential strategy as one where “One type of data
provides a basis for collection of another type of data” (Cameron, 2009, p144). Creswell
expands on this and describes the sequential strategy as one in which the researcher can
respond to opportunities for further data collection and react to situations as they evolve.
Although the methods set out below should not be considered strictly linearly sequential, they
do follow some sequential patterns. For example, the interviews preceded the development
of tools like NIAH, and to some extent the statistical analyses that provide evidence of data
utility. In the sections below the individual methods used in the pragmatic-sequential mixed-
methods adopted in this thesis are discussed. Before moving to specific methods, the e-
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Science concept is discussed in greater detail because it adds further character to the chosen
research approach.
3.2 e-Science as a Methodological Context
E-Science, as a concept, sits between the discussion of an overarching approach to the re-
search (pragmatism) and specific methods that constitute the study design. As stated in 1, in
the broadest sense, e-Science is defined by “the application of computer technology to the
undertaking of modern scientific investigation, including the preparation, experimentation,
data collection, results dissemination, and long-term storage and accessibility of all mate-
rials generated through the scientific process” (Bohle, 2013b). However, it is important to
expand upon this definition and clarify why this methodological context is important for this
research.
John Taylor, then Director General of Research Councils in the Office of Science and Tech-
nology introduced the term e-Science in 1999 to describe emerging collaborative, and mul-
tidisciplinary, approaches in science and engineering. At its inception e-Science was the
label for large investments in computing infrastructure, especially distributed technologies
like ‘Grid Computing’, to support scientific enquiry. For example, infrastructure designed to
assist with the experiments planned for the, then under construction, Large Hadron Collider
were at the forefront of an e-Science collaborative effort between computer scientists and
particle physicists (Hey and Trefethen, 2002). From this early projects the concept solidified
around the idea that modern computing techniques could be developed and applied to enable
the scientist’s workflow.
With time, the concept of e-Science was applied to other disciplines, while maintaining the
idea of the ‘enabled researcher’s workflow’ at its core. In 2004, the Economic and Social
Research Council launched its own programme of e-Science through the National Centre for
e-Social Science (NCeSS). This programme contained two strands: one focused on appli-
cations of the technological developments emerging from the e-Science sphere; and another
focused on the social study of technology - questioning how these technologies were being
developed and applied in the social sciences and what implications that might have (Half-
penny and Procter, 2010). Here the early focus on Grid computing was seen as less important,
and instead the application of computing science techniques more broadly was given greater
importance. For example, the Data Management through e-Social Science (DAMES) project
was funded through this programme and was a collaboration between social scientists and
computing scientists at the universities of Stirling and Glasgow to facilitate and improve data
management processes such as mapping between different occupational classifications (Tan
et al., 2009).
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For this research, e-Science, and its social science offshoot, provides a methodological con-
text for collaboration between the computing and social sciences which focuses on facilitat-
ing and improving the workflow of data controllers, data analysts, research coordinators and
data users in their management, preparation and analysis of potentially disclosure data. This
context also necessitates a multidisciplinary exploration of this workflow which provides
space for the theoretical and ethical discussions of Chapter 2, as well as the development of
software tools like NIAH (and the extensions of NIAH in Chapter 6), and the mixed methods
of quantitative data utility analyses alongside qualitative discussions of the user experience
(see Chapters 4, 5 and 7). In the remaining sections of this Chapter, the techniques and
methods used are described in more detail.
3.3 Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were used across a number of purposes in this research: they pro-
vide a contextual backdrop to the exploration of the issues raised in the research questions;
they offered insights into stakeholders’ experiences and expectations; and they provided
user requirements that helped to inform the development of analyses and tools including
the NIAH toolset developed later in this thesis.
Flowing from the pragmatic mixed-methods research design, these interviews provide an
opportunity to explore in-depth some of the practical issues that arise from the legal, ethical
and theoretical discussions in Chapter 2. These are explored within the frame of reference
of practitioners, and analysts who manage and analyse data from administrative sources, pri-
marily in the sphere of health and social care in Scotland. Practitioners offer access to a
pool of knowledge and experience that would rarely be available to an academic researcher,
however negotiating access to these participants introduced limitations in the scope of the
interview guide and limited the ability to publish specific extracts from individual interviews
(These limitations will be discussed in detail after the range of participants has been estab-
lished).
In total, five semi-structured face-to-face interviews were carried out at the participants place
of work during March - June 2012. The interviews were conducted by the researcher in the
presence of a Scottish Government statistician, the interviews were recorded where consent
was given. The interviews had both ethical approval from the University of Glasgow, College
of Science & Engineering as well as the Scottish Government. Information sheets, Consent
forms, and an interview guide can be found in Appendices A, B and C. The participants
were drawn from three main archetypes: data users - two local authority analysts (from
different local authorities with different levels of analytical capacity) and an academic with
experience of using administrative health data; data managers - a programme manager for
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a large project on electronic health records; and data controllers - a senior health board
manager with responsibility for data confidentiality. In addition, one participant occupied
both the data user and data manager space - a senior researcher from a health informatics
project.
The limitations highlighted earlier were introduced for two reasons. The Scottish Govern-
ment served as gate-keeper and also facilitator because these interviews were carried out
during an internship with the Health Analytical Services Division. They provided access
to networks of local authority and health board contacts. Further, during the interviews the
researcher occupied both their own research position and an intern position and as such a
compromise was reached regarding the interview guide. This compromise ensured that both
the researcher and the Scottish Government obtained useful information from this data col-
lection. The second limitation was a product of the topics sensitive nature and the positions
of the participants. Participants were willing to be interviewed, but were more comfortable
consenting to remain anonymous and preferred their information to be used as contextual
background rather than explicitly quoted. Although these limitations are acknowledged they
did not present a significant problem for the research design because they were intended to
inform other aspects of the research rather than be the central research result in themselves.
One benefit from the first limitation was the continued support of Scottish Government con-
tacts which is discussed further below with reference to the case study approach.
3.4 The Case Study Approach
In order to keep this research grounded for the interdisciplinary audiences, the design makes
use of the case study approach. Hammersley describes case study as a broad concept with
the potential to be used in a number of different ways (Hammersley, 2004). However, there
are commonalities in the uses he describes; the concentration on one or a few cases allows
for greater detail and potentially different types of data to be collected. Also, the case study
is a common component in research that draws on the e-Science methodological context,
for example see (Goderis et al., 2006; Salayandia et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2007; Addis
et al., 2003). IN fact, this use of case studies in e-Science has itself been the subject of
philosophical discussion (Beaulieu et al., 2007). In e-Science case studies are often used to
present tools or approaches that offer general solutions to problems (mining large volumes
of text for example) but within the scope of a interdisciplinary project (applying those text-
mining techniques to the parliamentary record - Hansard (Sarwar et al., 2013)) In the context
of this research, the case study is used to provide practical examples of research methods (the
use of the Scottish Health Survey throughout Chapter 4) and arguments and proposed tools
or workflows (see Chapter 7). At its highest level of abstraction, the ‘case’ which is under
3.5. k-Anonymity as a SDC Method 34
scrutiny is the Scottish confidential data environment in which the Scottish Government and
other public agencies operate. Within that scope lower level operations like the Scottish
Health Survey and administrative data services can be probed.
In the above discussion of the use of interviews, two limitations were described. The need for
compromise within the interview guide was highlighted because this compromise facilitated
access to participants. In addition, this collaborative approach facilitated access to potentially
rich case studies on how systems of data management, access and utilisation evolve in the
governmental context.
In common with the e-Science examples cited above, the case study presented in Chapter
7 is used to propose a solution to the research problem that can be adapted and developed
by future work. Lastly, to return to the idea of the audience for this research, the case
study using existing administrative infrastructure provides a familiarity for practitioners in
the administrative data space which potentially eases the integration or discussion of the
solution proposed alongside current practices.
3.5 k -Anonymity as a SDC Method
K-anonymity is a measure of re-identification risk that presents an idea that can be simply
understood and communicated to data controllers, researchers and the public. It was first
introduced in 1998 by Samarati and Sweeney (1998a). Since then, it has been built upon
(El Emam and Dankar, 2008), expanded (Stokes and Torra, 2012) and critiqued (Domingo-
Ferrer and Torra, 2008). The basic definition provided by Samarati and Sweeney still holds
true throughout the later incarnations. They stated that “Each release of data must be such
that every combination of values of quasi-identifiers can be indistinctly matched to at least
k individuals” (Samarati and Sweeney, 1998a, 4). Critiques of k-anonymity focus on its
inability to protect against attribute disclosure, rather than re-identification. Domingo-Ferrer
and Torra provide a clear example to illustrate this problem: “Imagine that an individual’s
health record is k-anonymized into a group of k patients with k-anonymized key attributes
values Age = 30, Height = 180 cm and Weight = 80 kg. Now, if all k patients share the
confidential attribute value Disease = AIDS, k-anonymization is useless, because an intruder
who uses the key attributes (Age, Height, Weight) can link an external identified record
(Name= John Smith, Age= 31, Height=179, Weight=81) with the above group of k patients
and infer that John Smith suffers from AIDS (attribute disclosure)” (Domingo-Ferrer and
Torra, 2008, 991). As can be seen if a set of records have the same variable value and this is
considered sensitive, then k-anonymisation is not enough to protect those individuals from
disclosure. In this research, the methodology we have used tacitly considers the threat of
attribute disclosure as part of the subjective judgements made during the data sensitivity
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Age Post Code Gender Illness
22 G1 5FL M Diabetes
22 G1 5FL M AIDS
22 G1 5FL M Diabetes
36 G2 4FG F Heart Disease
36 G2 4FG F Heart Disease
Table 3.1: An Example of p-sensitive k-anonymity
step.
There are enhancements to k-anonymity in the literature such as l-diversity (Machanava-
jjhala et al., 2007), p-sensitive k-anonymity (Truta and Vinay, 2006), and t-closeness (Li
et al., 2007). These enhancements introduce approaches to cope with the attribute disclosure
problem highlighted in the above example. As they rely on the same logic, it is possible
to provide a high-level illustration to these approaches with an example of p-sensitive k-
anonymity. In order for a data set to satisfy p-sensitive k-anonymity, it must first satisfy the
k-anonymity requirement specified in the definition (all records indistinguishable from k-1
other records across a set of quasi-identifiers). Within these k-anonymous sets of records the
sensitive variables that contain the confidential information that needs to be protected (typi-
cally identified in a sensitivity analysis) must contain p number of different values. The value
of p is always less than or equal to k. Table 3.1 provides an example data set which can be
described in terms of p-sensitive k-anonymity. In this example, p-sensitive, k-anonymity is
satisfied where p=2 and k=3. Therefore, an intruder cannot say with certainty that they know
the illness associated with any one record should they match it to their external data. In the
example, attribute disclosure would occur for the second group, here p=1 and k=2, because
p=1 an intruder knows that a female aged 36 in that postcode must have heart disease.
The problem with implementing p-sensitive k-anonymity is that it has a devastating impact
on data utility. In much the same way as, but worse than, if the data controller’s assessment of
the data environment resulted in a large number of quasi-identifiers. The more privacy con-
straints introduced, the more the raw data must be manipulated to satisfy those constraints.
3.6 Data Utility Analyses
The approach taken to data utility here draws on examples in the literature of replicating ‘real
world’ analyses to estimate data utility, see Purdam and Elliot (2007); McCaa et al. (2013);
Brickell and Shmatikov (2008) (alternatives to this approach are considered in section 4.4).
In particular, Purdam and Elliot (2007) offers a case study approach to the effects of disclo-
sure control on publicly released microdata that is particularly appealing given the pragmatic
research design and our earlier outline for the case study approach favoured by this research.
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The use of case studies allows for the discussion of data utility in the overarching context of
SDC, and thus the practical utility of the data. The authors contacted researchers that had
published work using census derived microdata samples such as the Sample of Anonymised
Records (SARs) and asked them to complete a questionnaire, and for permission to replicate
their analysis on different versions of the SARs with varying SDC measures applied. The
results were somewhat surprising given that the authors of the work under scrutiny had been
published in well-respected publications. The replication of analyses highlighted significant
differences in the accuracy of some of the analytical results. One notable example detailed
the inflation of minority ethnic groups within a given social class. As discussed by the au-
thors these differences not only cause concern in terms of analysis of the specific dataset,
they also raise concerns if these conclusions are used in comparison with data from other
sources, smaller scale sample surveys or administrative records for example.
In Chapter 4 and 7 research questions are posed and quantitative analyses are constructed and
then applied to the original and disclosure controlled data in order to demonstrate the data’s
practical utility to users that might carry out similar analyses. This approach was chosen
because it ties neatly to the pragmatic research design, as well as providing results that can
be communicated to users or data controllers with experience of quantitative analysis.
3.7 The NIAH Methodology
The NIAH toolset, which was developed during the course of this research and forms part
of its overall output, is a set of command line tools that together constitute part of the SDC
workflow. It is used in the analysis presented in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. Overviews of the
k-anonymity algorithm used and the other tools in the set are provided below. This section
describes the NIAH tool set in its finished form, however its development cycle closely fol-
lowed the pragmatic-sequential design outlined in this Chapter. Therefore, the justification
for NIAHs design and developed are not discussed here but can be found in Chapter 6.
A k-Anonymity Algorithm
At the core of this tool-set is the k-anonymity algorithm. As has been discussed earlier in this
Chapter, k-anonymity was defined by Samarati and Sweeney (1998b). Their specification
for k-anonymity as a privacy property is easily defined. In order to satisfy a k-anonymity
requirement, all possible combinations of quasi-identifiers (also referred to as key variables)
must apply to at least k records.
To assess whether a dataset complies with this privacy requirement, an algorithm is needed
to process the data. At the abstract level, the algorithm used in the NIAH tool-set performs
the following tasks:
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Algorithm 3.7.1: VOID NIAH(D,nColumns, nRows, V, nV, k)
comment: Apply k-anonymity algorithm to dataset D, which has nColumns and
nRows using quasi-identifiers V of size nV, and for value k upon return, each row in
D that is tuple unique will be marked as such. N.B. the sort algorithm used must be
stable
for i ∈ 1 to nV
do sort D by column V[i]
for each subset of rows of D with the same value in column V[i]
do if number of rows in subset <k
then mark each row in subset as minimal unique
comment: Now eliminate tuple combinations that do not meet required k-anonymity
for i ∈ nV to 1
do sort D by column V[i]
for each for each subset of rows of D with the same values in columns V[1] to V [nV ]
do if number of rows in subset <k
then mark each row in the subset as minimal unique
Each of these items is addressed in turn and a low level summary of design and implementa-
tion decisions are given. It should also be noted that the basic approach outlined above is in
part based upon the first stages of the Special Unique Detection Algorithm (SUDA) set out
in Elliot et al. (2005b).
NIAH takes a series of command line arguments set out in the usage statement. This includes
the input CSV file. CSV was chosen as a ‘lowest common denominator’ so that NIAH
could be integrated with various workflows, as most data analysis software will accept and
export CSV format data. Integration is discussed in greater detail at the end of this chapter.
Although CSV is a common format, it can be a problematic format to work with across
different software tools. This is because there is no defined standard for CSV format. There
have been attempts to standardise CSV, for example Shafranovich (2005). However, some
inconsistencies still remain including the use of quotation marks to denote string values
that may contain commas themselves. The overall approach in the development of NIAH
attempted to do as little ‘harm’ to the input data as possible so that NIAH’s output would be
consistent. In keeping with this approach, instead of replacing those commas within variable
values or changing the data directly, a custom split method was written for strings which
ignores commas between quotation marks.
The internal data structure was conceptualised to form a table-like structure similar to a
data table in a spreadsheet. Variable values are held in cells and cells are held in rows.
An assumption was made that a trade-off of complexity set against availability of resources
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would, in this context, favour less complexity and greater allocation of system resources.
This was assumed so that speed could be prioritised over memory usage - in order to provide
faster performance all data are read into memory. Performance results are provided at the
end of the next section.
The data are read into an ArrayList of ArrayLists in Java, as these “Resizable-array imple-
mentation[s] of the List interface” 1 allow the data structure to dynamically resize as more
records are read in. Although memory usage was a secondary consideration, the decision
was taken to store the data values as an Array of Bytes as opposed to Java String objects.
This saves space because each element in the Byte Array only occupies one Byte as opposed
to the two Bytes (at least) for each character in a String object (Strings store characters in a
character array, so the space required will be dependent on the encoding). Also, within each
‘cell’ in the data structure, the type of the cell, string, integer or double-precision floating
point number, is indicated. This is included so that type-appropriate comparison methods
can be used and so that the data structure provides further functionality (this further func-
tionality is discussed below).
The user specifies the column number(s) of the quasi-identifier variables in the command
line arguments. The data is then sorted by each of these variables in turn and each value is
compared with the value of the same variable in the adjacent records to produce a count for
every represented value of the respective variable. If this count is less than the specified value
of k, then the row number of the records with that value is stored in an array. To borrow the
terminology from Elliot et al. (2005b), these records are referred to as minimal uniques. The
logic in identifying these minimal uniques is that if variable values within one key variable
do not satisfy k it is not possible for tuples that contain that value to satisfy k. This also cuts
down the number of tuple comparisons needed.
Once the minimal uniques have been identified, it is important that the sort method imple-
mented before the tuples are analysed is a stable sorting algorithm. This is necessary to main-
tain the relative order of the elements prior to the sort if the elements are sorted iteratively.
This application of iteratively sorting the data structure by the specified quasi-identifiers re-
sults in the grouping together of tuples that share the same combination of quasi-identifiers.
The data is sorted across the quasi-identifiers in reverse order. This produces the result above
with one less sort operation required when compared with a sort across quasi-identifiers in
their normal order.
Once the record (row) position of both minimal uniques and tuples that do not satisfy k-
anonymity are recorded these records are copied into a new instance of the data structure
described above and subsequently removed from the original. Both of these data sets are
then written out to separate CSV files with a user specified output name.
1This text is taken from the Oracle website at http://docs.oracle.com/javase/6/docs/api/java/util/ArrayList.html
Accessed:11/07/2014
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NIAH - Further development
NIAH as a research tool was developed by incorporating the qualitative evidence from the
case studies and interviews presented later in this thesis (see Chapter 6). Here, two of the
development use cases are set out. These cover two common activities carried out by data
controllers when considering disclosure risk. To set these use cases in their correct context
it should be noted that each contain pre-conditions. These parameters drive the k-anonymity
assessment, which in turn only provides useful output if there has been a rigorous process to
determine suitable parameter values. These parameters are numerical representations of the
ethical judgements Beck encourages risk analysts to make in Chapter 2 and the qualitative
elements of disclosure risk assessment that will be discussed in Chapter 4.
1. Initial disclosure risk analysis for microdata.
Actors:
Data Custodian / Research Coordinator / Guardian
Goal:
Provide evidence of underlying risk in stored data.
Preconditions:
Actors must have selected key variables and an initial threshold.
Summary:
A k-anonymity assessment is performed on the data with the selected key variables
and threshold.
Related Use Cases:
2. Statistical disclosure review of research outputs 3. Disclosure risk analysis for
publication of tabular microdata.
Steps:
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Actor actions: System responses:
1. Start NIAH Shell
2. Display shell console window.
3. Create log file and capture log entries
from now until console window is closed.
4. Invoke command ‘NIAH’ with neces-
sary arguments.
5. Display confirmation of input argu-
ments.
6. Create ‘[output] safe.csv’ and ‘[out-
put] atrisk.csv’.
7. Display runtime.
8. Return to shell command line.
9. (Optional) invoke command ‘Stats’.
10. Display Summary statistics for last
run of NIAH.
11. Return to shell command line.
12. Close console window
13. Save log file and exit.
Post-conditions:
The system has a record of the risk analysis carried out and the arguments specified.
This can be used for replication of analysis.
2. Statistical disclosure review of research outputs.
Actors:
Data Custodian / Research Coordinator / Guardian / Analyst
Goal:
To provide evidence for Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) decisions about publish-
able research outputs.
Preconditions:
The researcher has carried out some statistical analysis using their package of choice.
The underlying dataset with the researchers modifications are saved in a shared lo-
cation in CSV format. The data custodian has selected initial key variables and a
threshold for analysis.
Summary:
A k-anonymity assessment of underlying data is carried out. The results of this as-
sessment determine the actions of the data custodian: The data are deemed to be of
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acceptably low risk; the risk is too great and SDC algorithms are applied and the data
are reassessed. Once the data are considered low risk the data can be re-analysed in
the statistics package for data utility.
Steps:
3.7. The NIAH Methodology 42
Actor actions: System responses:
1. Guardian: Start NIAH Shell
2. Display shell console window.
3. Create log file and capture from now
until console window is closed.
4. Guardian: Invoke command ‘NIAH’
with initial arguments and underlying
dataset.
5. Display confirmation of input argu-
ments.
6. Create ‘[output] safe.csv’ and ‘[out-
put] atrisk.csv’.
7. Display runtime.
8. Return to shell command line.
9. Guardian: (Optional) invoke command
‘Stats’.
10. Display Summary statistics for output
files.
11. Return to shell command line.
12. Guardian: (Optional) invoke ‘Viewer’
command.
13. Display safe and/or atrisk output files.
14. Guardian: invoke ‘[SDC-algorithm]’
command.
15. implement [SDC-algorithm] on last
NIAH input dataset.
16. Guardian: (Optional) invoke ‘Undo’
command.
17. Revert to last NIAH input dataset.
- Guardian: repeat steps 4 - 16 until satis-
fied with results.
18. Guardian / Researcher: invoke ‘stata’
command.
19. open stata in a new window with cur-
rent working NIAH input file.
20. Guardian / Researcher: reruns
analysis for data utility (not logged)
- if data utility is satisfactory.
21. Guardian / Researcher: generates re-
search outputs in stata.
22. Guardian: Close console window
23. Save log file and exit.
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Post-conditions:
The system has a record of the risk analysis carried out and the arguments specified,
this can be used for replication of analysis. The guardian and researcher can provide
evidence for decisions about published outputs.
Although the above use cases are written for microdata, they are also applicable to tabular
data similar to that often published in Government statistical reports. In the tabular case, the
data underlying tabular outputs are used as input for NIAH and its associated tools. This
completes the overview of the research design and methods used in this thesis. Chapter 4
continues and provides a review of the literature on statistical disclosure control and positions
this research design in its proper context.
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Chapter 4
Review of the Statistical Disclosure
Control (SDC) Literature & existing
SDC Methods
4.1 A Historical Note
To provide some historical context to this chapter and also the wider research frame, some
highlights in the historical development of statistical disclosure control (SDC) are drawn out
and a short comparison of how different countries have approached the SDC question is set
out below. The first point to make is that the origins of much of the work on SDC have
been tied to the practical considerations for data collection, mostly by governments, rather
than demands in public discourse or academic research. In the USA, the Census Bureau has
led on much of the SDC development. Greenberg (1990) sets out that SDC or ’disclosure
avoidance’ became an area of research around the time that the first general public microdata
release from the Census of Population and Housing 1960. Greenberg also discusses that the
suppression of values (discussed later in this Chapter) was the preferred method of disclosure
control for US Census outputs through the 1970s and into the 1980s.
At the same conference in 1990, Skinner et al. (1990) discusses the situation in the UK. Un-
like the US, the UK were yet to make public microdata releases from the population census,
but plans were laid out for a Sample of Anonymised Records (SARs) from the 1991 census.
In their introduction, Skinner et al comment on the public’s attitude to these plans: “Public
fears in this regard seem to have moved away from state surveillance more to commercial
intrusion and ‘junk mail”’. This is interesting if only because it suggests the opposite to the
contemporary position discussed in Chapter 2. Although it is also interesting to note that
this development in disclosure protocols coincides with the timing of Becks work on the risk
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society (see section 2.3), this process of reflection on societal norms regarding privacy is an
example of the process of reflexive modernity and the perceived risks of human agency, i.e.
the publishing of greater volumes of data.
The UK’s plans for the SARs focused on methods of disclosure control that sought to retain
the ’data’s integrity’ (value suppression or aggregation for example) as opposed to ’contam-
ination’ methods that transform the data values themselves (e.g. adding noise). This paper
also highlights a discussion about the data environment which is of particular relevance later
in this chapter. The central argument in this discussion is the need for data owners to con-
sider their release of data alongside existing data releases from their own and other external
organisations. Skinner et al note the tension that exists here, researchers have argued that
trying to review the whole data environment is an almost impossible task (McGuckin and
Nguyen, 1988) while others acknowledge the difficulty, but insist that such an attempt is
worthwhile (Marsh et al., 1991).
As the development of statistical disclosure control in the US and UK has been linked with
the production of outputs from large scale national surveys and population censuses, it is
worth drawing comparisons with other nations. The Netherlands has been responsible for
a significant amount of SDC development in the European Union, which has included the
development of methods and software (for example see Hundepool and Willenborg (1996)).
Unlike the US and UK, the Netherlands operates a population register rather than a decen-
nial survey based census. Therefore, one might expect their SDC development might have
taken a different form. However, Nordholt (1999) discusses the rules operated by Statistics
Netherlands (the national statistical agency of the Netherlands). These rules bear a strong
resemblance to those of the UK and the US, despite the difference in how they collect and
store data on their citizens. At the time, Statistics Netherlands implemented rules that used
suppression of variables, specifically including nationality, country of birth and ethnicity. In
addition they stipulate specific rules relating to geographical variables; direct regional iden-
tifiers are not included, instead aggregate descriptive values are combined and released (for
example, the size class of the place of residence). The Netherlands also operate secure sites
from which analysts can work on more detailed microdata that is not deemed safe for release
(These secure sites are discussed further in Chapter 5). Nordholt (1999) also discusses the
development of SDC processes in EU transition countries after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, suggesting that many of the countries took methods and processes from established
EU member states. This combined with the need for compliance with EU regulations on data
privacy and security mean that a significant amount of homogenisation has occurred in SDC
processes across Europe. This includes states, like the Nordic countries, that have tradition-
ally had a different relationship with the EU. Sweden uses the well established methods of
record swapping for their census outputs (Andersson et al., 2013; Jansson, 2012). In the 2011
Census, Statistics Norway took a different approach from other European states. Heldal and
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Badina (2013) set out the use of rounding of small counts in tabular census outputs, which
the authors argue offers sufficient protection comparable to the cell suppression used in other
countries.
The Scottish Government and National Records of Scotland surveyed the methodologies
used in other countries ahead of their 2011 census data releases (National Records of Scot-
land Census Division, 2013). This summary reinforces the homogeneity discussed above,
see Table 4.1. It is important to note that despite new methods or more complex variations
on existing methods (which will be highlighted in the rest of this chapter), national statis-
tics agencies have chosen to stick with existing methods. This is important for this research
because in the case studies and qualitative work that have been carried out, the majority of
data owners look to their national statistics agencies for guidance on SDC for both tabular
and microdata releases. Therefore, there is a gap between new statistical techniques in the
literature and their implementation at the production level by data owners. A possible reason
for this gap is the lack of literature that fully explores the ‘real world’ utility of data that
has been subjected to new, more complex, statistical techniques. Cleveland et al. (2012) and
Purdam and Elliot (2007) demonstrate that ensuring data utility for the widest possible set of
use cases is not a trivial task. As a consequence, although new methods are highlighted in the
proceeding sections the main focus is the implementation and effects of existing techniques.
Method Countries
Pre-tabular record swapping Scotland, England, Wales, Northern
Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Israel
Post-tabular cell perturbation
algorithm
Australia
Pre-tabular perturbation algorithm Germany
Combination record swapping and
post-tabular rounding
Sweden
Rounding of small counts Norway
τ -argus post-tabulation software Slovenia
Source: National Records of Scotland Census Division (2013)
Table 4.1: Statistical Disclosure Control Methods Used in Different Countries
4.2 Measures of Risk
The measurement of disclosure risk has to be considered as a collection of processes that col-
lectively provide the parameters that can be input into disclosure risk estimation (for example
see the discussion of ’factors which contribute to risk’ in Greenberg and Zayatz (1992) and
the section on ’estimating re-identification risk’ in Hundepool et al. (2012)). These estimates
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might be metrics or more qualitative evaluations. These processes are labelled in different
ways across the literature but their definitions are very similar; for examples of different
labelling see El Emam and Dankar (2008) and Duncan et al. (2011). For the purposes of
this research, these processes are discussed under three headings; the data environment, the
sensitivity of the data, and the characteristics of the data.
The data environment is a term most associated with researchers from the University of
Manchester (Elliot et al., 2011; Mackey and Elliot, 2013). The data environment is an ac-
knowledgement that data do not exist in isolation from each other. This concept has existed
in the literature for some time (see Paass (1988) and Lambert (1993)). This is of signifi-
cance for statistical disclosure control because the type of intruder attack upon which this
research is focused is one in which an intruder attempts to match data they already have to
anonymised sensitive data. This matching is done in order to expose information about in-
dividuals. When a data controller makes data or statistical outputs from that data available
they, in effect, release that information into a data environment. On the face of it, attempting
to analyse the entire environment would seem impractical because of its sheer size and the
number of unknowns. Despite this, there have been attempts to produce methods for doing
so, such as the automated Data Environment Analysis Project (ADEA) which is under de-
velopment at the Cathie Marsh Institute for Social Research at Manchester University (Elliot
et al., 2011).
The more traditional way of interpreting the data environment is for an organisation to have
a well-documented collection of previously released data that could contain overlaps with
the proposed data or output for release. In addition, some effort is required to simulate how
an intruder might cause disclosure. This simulation hinges on what knowledge the intruder
has available to them, and is often done with varying degrees of sophistication. At a basic
level, data controllers can consider information commonly made available to the public, such
as the electoral register. The register contains demographic details; your full name, address,
nationality and age. From these basic details, data controllers can then build scenarios of
intrusion. This ‘quasi-criminology’ approach is described in more detail in Elliot and Dale
(1999) and also to some extent El Emam and Dankar (2008). This qualitative approach to
capturing the data environment is favoured by this research, and it is demonstrated in case
studies presented in this Chapter and Chapter 6.
It is also important that data controllers document how statistical disclosure control has been
applied in previous releases to ensure an appropriate and consistent approach. This body of
evidence also assists in the accurate assessment of the data environment and ensures that data
perform consistently between different output reviews. In the qualitative interview evidence
collected for this research, discussions with users and data controllers raised this as an area
for concern by both groups. The main concern expressed was that due to the ad hoc nature of
disclosure control assessment and implementation, many of the subjective judgements made
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by data controllers are not recorded. This can introduce confidence issues in the relationship
between data users and data controllers which resonates strongly with the research prob-
lem. In the field, NHS Scotland has a documentation procedure within its disclosure control
protocol (NHS Scotland ISD, 2012a).
Definitions of statistical disclosure do not distinguish between the level of detail in the data
or its relative sensitivity, see for example Eurostat (1996). If an intruder has been able to
re-identify an individual and learn some piece of confidential information, a disclosure has
occurred. This definition provides data controllers with a substantial challenge in balancing
the disclosure risk with data utility. If all information contained in data sets is treated as
having the same impact upon disclosure, only the most conservative risk assessment and
disclosure control can be applied. Instead, the literature suggests data controllers should
make an informed judgement about the impact of disclosure in relation to the variables a
data set holds. This will differ between data sets, variables, and their respective levels of
detail. As the health sphere is the backdrop for this research, it is worth noting what the
NHS considers to be sensitive data (NHS Scotland ISD, 2012a), see Figure 4.1.
Sensitive Topics
• sexually transmitted infections
• abortions
• suicides, self harm
• pregnancies under 16 years of age
• alcohol or drugs misuse
• mental health diagnoses and treatments
• prescriptions for contraceptives, mental health or any ‘sensitive’ condition
• crime related statistics e.g. gunshot injuries, assault, stabbings
• other sensitive diagnoses or treatments
Figure 4.1: NHS Scotland (ISD) Statistical Disclosure Control Protocol list of sensitive top-
ics
As is also noted in the protocol, this cannot be a definitive list (NHS Scotland ISD, 2012a).
To mitigate this lack of definition, data controllers should carry out some form of sensitivity
analysis. The most robust method would be achieved by discussing the possible impact with
the type of individuals represented in the data. When the number of records is in the millions,
it is not feasible to do this with every individual but strategies such as the use of focus groups
and surveys can help inform data controllers. For the social care, health and housing data
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linkage project, the Scottish Government commissioned a piece of research that explored the
public perception of the project (Scottish Government, 2011b). In a similar vein, the Scottish
Health Informatics Programme research group has carried out public engagement work that
can shed some light in this area (Aitken et al., 2011). Their work highlights the public’s
concern about the use of patient data, especially when linked to other sources. Trust appears
as a central concept for individuals; trust in the organisation holding the data; and trust
in the organisations seeking to access the data. As Aitken et al conclude, data controllers
and researchers must engage the public in these discussions of data security if that trust
relationship is to be cemented and secured for the future. Drawing on the conceptualised
balance of disclosure risk and data utility set out in Chapter 2, it is acknowledged that the
balance is biased toward mitigating risk rather than data utility. This is in order to properly
preserve the privacy of individuals, however data sensitivity analysis allows a data controller
to configure and fine tune that balance more accurately and decide just how much bias is
necessary.
Having discussed the need to analyse the environment into which data are being released
and the sensitivity of the variables the data set contains, data controllers can focus on the
data themselves. This might appear to be an obvious statement to make; however, measuring
the risk presented by the variable values and combinations of values is a non-trivial task.
Removal of direct identifiers is a given for all the data sets discussed in this research, and the
disclosure risk presented by variables labelled as ‘quasi-identifiers’ such as the demographic
variables discussed as part of the data environment is difficult to measure. Historically the
focus of disclosure control had been on aggregate data, usually tables of counts representing
underlying individual records (see the work of the group behind the τ -argus software in
Hundepool and Willenborg (1996)). For this type of data, the data controller referring to
the policy of their organisation, applied a threshold to counts in the aggregate table. This
threshold was used to limit the possibility of unique counts, and therefore some form of
attribute disclosure, or low counts that pose an unacceptable level of risk. Low cell counts in
published tables can risk attribute disclosure through differencing with other data tables (this
type of attribute disclosure is considered to be distinct from the re-identification problem in
contemporary microdata). A commonly used example is a table that shows age and marital
status, a sixteen year old widow would likely appear as a low count. The equivalent in the
case of microdata would be to look for low instances of a variable value and low instances
of a combination of values. Even for small data sets of c.100,000 records (The Scottish
Homecare Census, for example) this is no trivial task if attempted under human analytical
power alone.
This consideration that low cell counts represent the identification of rare cases in the popula-
tion, is the basis for the k-anonymity method used in this research and discussed in Chapter
3. To extend that discussion beyond k-anonymity and its enhancements, it is also worth
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mentioning here that techniques which use probabilistic rather than observed methods exist
in this field (Skinner and Shlomo, 2008; Carlson, 2002). However, these focus on the risk
associated with sample survey microdata because of the ambiguity introduced by using a
sample subset. In these cases a data controller needs to be able to estimate the risk that an
intruder finds a match in the sample data that is also a correct match in the context of the
whole population. A series of processes that, when combined, provide data controllers with
a methodological framework for assessing the risk of disclosure, have been set out above.
Where this type of framework has been used by organisations and embedded in their own
processes will now be considered.
Skinner and Elliot (2002) provides us with a succinct summary of different approaches em-
ployed to measure disclosure risk. In order to discuss these approaches, some basic context
for the data should be described. What is being considered here is a set of records that con-
stitute a micro-level data set, which is itself drawn from a finite population. An example
of this data context would be the individual level Sample of Anonymised Records (SARs);
this is a 3% sample of the national Census and is maintained by the Cathie Marsh Institute
for Social Research. One such method, the population unique method, revolves around the
uniqueness of a record in the population; whether a record can be considered unique to a
particular population if it is found to be unique in the sample. This presents a rather basic
measurement of risk. For example, given a situation where an unauthorised person seeks
to access the data for malicious purposes, and has knowledge that can identify a record in
the population, they can also identify that record in the sample (if it is present) and disclose
additional information about that record.
As discussed in Greenberg and Voshell (1990), this method has been used on large data sets,
such as the US Census. Their primary focus in this paper was the effect of geographic region
on the percentage of population uniques, and this provides a useful example of this method
in practice. For a given geography, there might be 100,000 records of which 10% are unique
to that geography, this 10% present a high risk of disclosure. Therefore, a data provider
could use the above measure of risk to consider expanding this geography to a larger area in
order to reduce the percentage of population unique records. In their conclusions, Greenberg
& Voshell note that different combinations of identifying variables and geographies result
in different degrees of disclosure risk; from this they stress the need to consider each data
set individually; this is a subject that will be returned to in the later section on the practical
implementation of SDC.
The sample unique method flows from the same logic as the population unique method.
Instead of measuring the percentage of population uniques, the percentage of sample uniques
contained in a given microdata release can be considered, as only these can potentially be
population uniques. The risk in this method is expressed as the probability that a sample
unique is also a population unique and that a successful match can be achieved by an attacker.
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The third measure, as discussed in Skinner and Elliot (2002), is an attempt to construct a
more nuanced approach to the measurement of risk. The problem the authors discuss is
that thus far no inference method currently exists that can adequately predict the relevant
values needed for the methods previously discussed without the use of a series of modelling
assumptions. As a high level overview it is important to note that differing conclusions on
the measurement of disclosure risk exist in the theoretical literature.
A brief discussion of the probability of a sample unique also being a population unique as
an adequate measure is useful, despite Skinner & Elliot’s description of this method as ’opti-
mistic’. Optimistic in this sense means that the estimate of disclosure risk generated by this
model should be seen as an under-estimate of the disclosure risk. To justify the inclusion of
this ‘optimistic’ measure in this review of the literature, the empirical evidence from Skinner
and Holmes (1998) is considered. In this study, the authors present an implementation of
sample uniqueness as a measure of risk. This is demonstrated through an analysis of a 10%
sample of data from the 1991 UK Census, that once sampled and analysed using a log-linear
model, present accurate estimates for the number of sample uniques that prove to also be
population unique. The actual results of this example find that approximately 0.2% of the
45,000 records sampled present a high-risk of disclosure, i.e. they present a large risk of
being population unique as well as sample unique.
This section has provided an overview of the literature on measures of risk, where risk is
framed as a collection of processes that encompass three distinct areas of activity: the data
environment; the data sensitivity; and the characteristics of the data themselves. It has been
shown that data controllers should acknowledge that their data does not exist in isolation and
that attempts to capture the data environment allow for more sophisticated disclosure risk
assessments. In addition, not all data are equal in terms of the impact a disclosure might
have and therefore data controllers should conduct a sensitivity analysis at the variable level,
which can be achieved through qualitative engagement with the data’s subjects. Lastly, it has
been established that data controllers should interrogate the data directly through quantitative
testing. This testing can take the form of policy-driven thresholds, or probability driven
metrics such as measures of sample-to-population unique estimates for example. Having
now established some basis in the measurement of disclosure risk, a case study using the
Scottish Health Survey is set out in the following subsection.
4.2.1 A Risk Analysis Example: The Scottish Health Survey (SHeS)
2003
To illustrate the disclosure risk assessment methods discussed in the previous section, a risk
assessment example case study using publicly available data from the Scottish Health Survey
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Quasi-identifiers
Sex
Age
Health Board
Marital Status
Ethnicity
Standard Occupational Classification
Table 4.2: Quasi-identifying Variables from the Scottish Health Survey (SHeS) 2003
2003 (SHeS) has been set out. The SHeS is a sample survey and participants are drawn from
the Postcode Address File. It is not an annual survey and the collection periods have varied.
In 2008 the SHeS changed to a continuous survey with a report published each year. The
latest sample (2012) is not used as there is a particular interest in the treatment of Standard
Occupational Classifications (SOC2000 in this case). Therefore the 2003 sample which is
the most recent to carry the SOC codes was used. The survey provides a detailed picture
of the health of the Scottish population and includes variables on physical activity, diet, and
socio-economic factors. As a sample survey, were this a real disclosure risk assessment the
risk is greatly reduced as the dataset does not represent the whole population. Therefore
unique individuals in the sample might not be unique in the population. Also as a public
release file, the survey content has almost certainly had some statistical disclosure analysis
applied to it, so this analysis should only be viewed as a demonstration of the methods
and concepts previously discussed. Due to the survey design the dataset is lopsided (in
terms of the number of questions preceded by filter questions) this only affects the sensitive
variables, i.e. the variables to protect from disclosure, therefore this should not impede the
risk assessment.
The main concern throughout this analysis is the possibility of re-identification; could an
intruder use the anonymised data and their own knowledge to identify individuals in the
dataset and learn something new about them. As a first step, in this risk assessment the
variables in the SHeS that might form quasi-identifiers, variables that an intruder can use for
re-identification, have been considered. These are usually demographic details that could
be easily obtained or known a priori by an intruder. The variables selected for this purpose
are contained in Table 4.2. As discussed in the previous section, the data environment that
the data is released into forms the basis of our reasoning for choosing quasi-identifiers. In
this case, the decision was taken to use quasi-identifiers that mostly represent physical or
spatial attributes that could be observed by an intruder or that they could know a priori from
publicly available data. In this scenario the intruder could fit the journalist archetype fishing
for information on an individual. In order to construct these quasi-identifiers they could use
a public social media profile, knowledge from a neighbour or data from the electoral register.
This set of quasi-identifiers is quite limited in terms of scope for a realistic SDC analysis.
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This is mainly because of the lack of geographical detail. However, there are enough vari-
ables here for an exploration of their respective influence on attempts to re-identify individual
records. For a more realistic assessment of disclosure risk see the case study of education
data in Chapter 5.
Using the prepared 2003 Scottish Health Survey, k-anonymity, where k=3, was implemented.
For this implementation the set of key variables were; age, sex, marital status, SOC2000
code, and ethnicity. The NIAH suite of tools were used to partition the dataset into those
records that meet the k=3 requirement and those that do not. This means that records are
only deemed safe if there are at least three instances of their combination of key variables
values. This partitioning provides two datasets which can be analysed to highlight where the
disclosure risks are concentrated. The first step in this analysis is a comparison of summary
statistics for the raw data, the ‘safe’ records and those deemed ‘at risk’.
An initial observation is that for k=3, a relatively loose privacy requirement in k-anonymity
terms, the number of records deemed ‘at risk’ is very high. Of the 7, 897 original records1,
7, 854 (99 per cent) are deemed ‘at risk’. This is likely to be due to the high level of de-
tail provided by the SOC2000 codes. However, it is important to clearly understand the
k-anonymity output in this case. Those records marked as ’at risk’ do not satisfy the k=3
criteria, but at this stage in the analysis there is insufficient information to state that these
records present a credible threat to privacy. To illustrate this point further the unknowns can
be stated: it is not known which variable or combination of variables has the strongest influ-
ence on a record’s position of being safe or at risk; the distribution of key variable values for
those at risk records is unknown; and the potential interaction effects of the key variables are
not known. It is therefore clear that in order for a disclosure control decisions to be made, the
risk assessment must probe the k-anonymity results at a deeper level. In this vein consider
the following summary statistics. Table 4.3 shows us the comparison of averages for the
three versions of the data with missing and non-applicable values ignored.
Given that there are only 1 per cent of safe records to compare against it is not surprising
that the at risk records look like the original data. However, it is interesting to note the
composition of the remaining 43 safe records. The homogeneity present in the original data
is further exaggerated here, the records are 100 per cent white and most likely married. Also
it is worth noting that despite the small number of records the mean age does not shift away
from the original data significantly. This again is unsurprising as it is expected that the only
records to satisfy the k-anonymity requirement will be clustered around the average value
on each of its key variables. To follow on from the hypothesis that the level of detail in the
SOC2000 codes could be the biggest factor in the k=3 results, the same measures as in Table
4.3 are used in Table 4.4 with SOC2000 removed from the key variables. From this second
1Children have been removed from the data for the following analysis, as earlier experiments showed that
they skewed the data for the age variable significantly
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=43)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=7854)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (33.3) 50.6 (67.9) (31.4) 50.6 (69.7) (33.3) 50.6 (67.9)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (93%) Female (55%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (65%) Married (57%)
Ethnicity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (84%) Scottish (100%) Scottish (84%)
SOC2000
Mode (% of N) 7111.Sales and
retail assistants
(5%)
9233.Cleaners,
domestics (44%)
7111.Sales and
retail assistants
(5%)
Key Variables: Age, Sex, Marital Status, Ethnicity, SOC2000, Health Board.
Table 4.3: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output for all Key Variables and Health Board, k=3
Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=3603)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=4294)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (33.3) 50.6 (67.9) (34.7) 50.3 (65.8) (32.3) 50.9 (69.9)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (57%) Female (54%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (79%) Married (37%)
Ethnicity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (84%) Scottish (98%) Scottish (73%)
Key Variables: Age, Sex, Marital Status, Ethnicity, Health Board.
Table 4.4: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output by Health Board without SOC2000, k=3
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partitioning for k=3 shifts in the marital status and ethnicity variables can be seen. Also it
should be noted that age has remained largely static across the partitions. This is of interest
because the hypothesis regarding SOC2000 was based on the number of possible categories.
There are 353 SOC unit codes in SHeS, and 81 possible ages in the data set. If the number of
categories alone was a decisive factor it would be reasonable that age might present a greater
challenge. However, another factor in this hypothesis should be the relatively sparsity of the
values. SOC2000 has a number of sparsely populated categories among the 353 possible
unit codes.
Also in both of these iterations of k=3 no details of the geographic variable health board,
have been included. Figure 4.2 provides the frequency distribution for Health Board for the
at risk records for both iterations. Despite the big change in N for the two at risk partitions
the distribution of health board has been largely unaffected.
From the above summary statistics the SOC2000 codes appear to be providing the majority
of the disclosure risk for k=3, followed by some influence from marital status and ethnicity.
Although age has stayed relatively static, the analysis was repeated dropping age from the
key variables to see what effect that had. The results of this are presented in Table 4.5. In
Table 4.5 the level of detail in the SOC2000 codes was reduced to represent just the two
digit sub-major encoding. The descriptive summary indicates that age has little effect when
removed from the k-anonymity assessment. There is a small increase in the size of the safe
partition, however this could also be due to the recoding of SOC2000. To scrutinise the
relationship between age and the partitions further a logistic regression model was fitted for
the effects of age on a binary ’at risk’ flag which denotes which partition the record was
in after the k-anonymity analysis. This results in a regression coefficient of 0.0002691 and
an R2 value of 0. This indicates that the effect has no statistical significance which would
support the descriptive results above. This type of scrutiny was also applied to the SOC2000
codes. Table 4.6 shows the effect of the SOC major groups on whether or not a record is
considered at risk or not (our reference category here is the lack of a recorded SOC group).
All of the SOC groups return a statistically significant result, however the R2 only indicates
that the SOC groups alone account for 1% of the variation in the at risk variable. This low
R2 is perhaps unsurprising when it is already known that the at risk variable is a product of
a complex cross classification of all of the key variables.
To reinforce the conclusion that the SOC variable is the major influence on the partitioning
of the data into safe and at risk records, the SOC variable has been removed completely from
the key variables. Figure 4.3 presents three scatter plots showing age plotted against health
board for the original data, the safe partition when the SOC sub major groups are included
and the safe partition when no SOC codes are included. Although the scatter plots do not
give a particularly instructive description of the health board profile, the contrast of the three
scatter patterns clearly highlights the effect of the SOC variable in reducing the availability
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Figure 4.2: SHeS: Frequency Distribution of Health Board for ‘at risk’ Records, all Key Vari-
ables (N=7854) and Frequency Distribution of Health Board for ‘at risk’ Records, SOC2000
removed from Key Variables (N=4294)
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=383)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=7514)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (60%) Female (56%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (80%) Married (56%)
Ethnicity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (84%) Scottish (100%) Scottish (84%)
SOC2000 Sub-Major Groups
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration &
service occupa-
tions (12%)
92. Elementary
administration &
service occupa-
tions (27%)
92. Elementary
administration &
service occupa-
tions (11%)
Key Variables: Sex, Marital Status, Ethnicity, SOC Sub-Major Groups, Health Board.
Table 4.5: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output by Health Board, SOC2000 Recoded and Age
Removed from Key Variables, k=3
At Risk Coef. Std. Err. t P>‖t‖ 95% CI.
Administrative and
secretarial occupations
.0299 .0050 5.95 0.000 .0200 .0397
Associate professional and
technical occupations
.0330 .0050 6.51 0.000 .0230 .0428
Elementary occupation .0182 .0049 3.72 0.000 .0086 .0277
Managers and senior officials .0330 .0051 6.46 0.000 .0230 .0430
Personal service occupations .0330 .0053 6.22 0.000 .0226 .0434
Process, plant and machine
operatives
.0330 .0052 6.39 0.000 .0228 .0430
Professional occupations .0292 .0051 5.70 0.000 .0192 .0393
Sales and customer service
occupations
.0173 .0054 3.21 0.000 .0067 .0278
Skilled trades occupations .0330 .0051 6.49 0.000 .0230 .0429
constant .9670 .0044 218.28 0.000 .9583 .9757
Table 4.6: SHeS: Logistic Regression showing the effects of SOC2000 Major Groups on the
Records marked as ‘at risk’, (N=7897)
safe data. Having established a preliminary survey of the disclosure risk for the 2003 Scottish
Health Survey data, these results were then used to inform the the SHeS case study which
continues to explore disclosure control methods in an applied context, see section 4.3.1.
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Figure 4.3: SHeS: Scatter Graphs of Age by Health Board for Original, ‘safe’ and ‘at risk’
Data
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4.3 Disclosure Control Methods
Having discussed approaches to estimating disclosure risk, this section reviews existing
methods devised to prevent statistical disclosure. These can be divided into three distinct
groups; recoding and suppression; the addition of noise to disguise the data; and the less
common approach of generating synthetic data. Fienberg and Willenborg (1998) uses a sim-
ilar classification of SDC strategies setting out three approaches: “Reporting only a subset
of the data, by selection of cases and/or variables; modifying the data in some form; Not
reporting the observed data at all, but only ‘pseudo data”’ (Fienberg and Willenborg, 1998,
338). Each group will be discussed and the positive and negative aspects of their approaches
considered before summarising within the context of this research and the types of applica-
tion these methods could be used for. However, it is important to note, as Fienberg does,
that these approaches are not mutually exclusive and data controllers can use combinations
of methods from all three.
Recoding and suppression are techniques common to data analysis and provides perhaps
the most intuitive methods for statistical disclosure control (SDC). Recoding is also fre-
quently used by researchers to prepare their data for analysis, and this forms a vital part of
the data management process. For a useful discussion of what is meant here by data manage-
ment, with a worked through example, see Lambert and Gayle (2008). As intuitive methods
that feature in common data workflows, recoding and suppression for SDC have existed in
the literature since SDCs inception, for example see the discussion of data suppression and
‘rolling-up’ (recoding) in (US Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, 1978) and a
more contemporary example in Willenborg and De Waal (2001). Ultimately, if data are too
sensitive to release they are suppressed by data controllers. Suppression as a method needs
little further scrutiny apart from to note that it operates as a binary switch between disclo-
sure risk and data utility for those values that are suppressed. However, the consequences of
choosing to suppress some data and not others does provide a more complex challenge to the
data’s utility. For example, if a variable by case matrix were constructed representing 100
per cent data utility and then a series of counts for occurrences of a particular variable value
(or combination of values) were produced. These counts might indicate that only a small
number of cases display this combination and deem those cases as a potential disclosure risk
(this represents a simplistic version of the disclosure risk assessments illustrated in Section
[3.a]). At this stage a data controller could simply suppress these records or blank out their
values for variables deemed to be at risk. As Fienberg et al note, this particular strategy has
a significantly negative impact on the data’s utility: “The principal problem we have with
cell suppression as a method is that it intentionally ‘distorts’ the information in the table by
purposely selecting cells to suppress. As a consequence, users can be led into misleading
and, in particular, biased inferences on the basis of the cell values that are reported” (Fien-
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berg and Willenborg, 1998, 488). For this reason the rather blunt instrument of record or cell
suppression is often only seen as a ‘last-resort’ in the SDC literature. Despite this it does
feature in many data controller statistical disclosure control protocols and is often used in
tabular data releases, for example see Scottish Government (2007).
Recoding is another possible technique that data providers can deploy and it covers a number
of different sub-types. Winkler (2004) offers a succinct summary of some of these methods.
Macrolevel recoding, referred to by Winkler as ‘global recoding’, addresses the level of de-
tail presented in a variable. This involves the aggregation of possible values into higher level
categories. As indicated earlier, this is often done by researchers in the preparation for their
analysis. For example, a measure of occupations such as the International Standard Classi-
fication of Occupations (ISCO) can be collapsed or expanded to fit the requirements of the
researcher in furthering their analysis and providing a clearer narrative. In the SDC case,
data controllers restrict access to the lower levels of the hierarchy. In practice, data that con-
tains age as an individual integer frequently could represent a disclosure risk. If the highest
age values are relatively rare in the distribution, suppressing this value could drastically alter
the statistical properties of the data. Therefore as an alternative, ages could be grouped by
recoding the individual integers into bands of an appropriate length. Another common ex-
ample of this technique is employed when data carries geographic identifiers: if the number
of cases within a particular geography is considered to be too small, the geographic variable
can be recoded to a higher level of abstraction, for example from post code to parliamentary
constituency in the UK context (Witkowski, 2008).
In the geographical case, this type of global recoding can prove problematic because differ-
ent geographical hierarchies do not match up exactly, or additional geographical detail from
other variables could increase the risk of disclosure rather than reduce it (Steel and Sper-
ling, 2001). There is also some debate over the assumption that disclosure risk scales with
geographical detail. As suggested by Greenberg and Voshell (1990), intuitively the num-
ber of rare records should decrease as the size of the geographical area, and the underlying
population, grows. However, as Elliot et al. (1998) suggests this relationship can be non-
monotonic. Although this approach is easily implemented in most instances, it does create
problems for the researcher trying to utilise the data for analysis. These problems include the
aforementioned loss of information at the top or bottom end of a distribution and also that
the aggregation of values prevents finer-grained analysis. As an alternative to macro level
recoding, microlevel aggregation performs a similar coarsening of detail but this is achieved
as a function of the data values themselves. As Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz (2002) sets
out, records can be grouped based on similarity and then average values can be calculated
for each group and these average values replace the original record values. To the user of
the data, records will seem more homogeneous than they are in reality, and the disadvantage
over global recoding is that the user cannot easily attach this homogeneity to a variable hier-
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archy that they recognise. Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz (2002) primarily deals with the
numerical case, however the same type of simple aggregation has been applied to categorical
data as well, see (Mares and Torra, 2012).
Data-swapping can be considered a sub-type of recoding. This type of method has been used
by national statistics agencies including the US Census Bureau and the Office for National
Statistics (Zayatz et al., 1999; Office for National Statistics, 2011). In order to protect the
data, variable values are swapped between a pair of records. This can be done with reference
to some other variable (often referred to as a control (Dalenius and Reiss, 1982)). For exam-
ple, if income is considered sensitive then a pair of cases selected from different geographical
areas could have their values for income swapped. These swaps are often done systemati-
cally and therefore it is important that the data provider keeps the details of their swap system
confidential so that they cannot be undone. This technique targets and distorts the data on
the basis of a few cases and variables. This distortion has to be managed, for example, if
given a control such as geography, the values of a sensitive variable would ordinarily follow
some identifiable distribution, then the swapped-in values would seem anomalous and could
indicate to attackers that a swap has occurred. This distortion would also effect the results of
statistical analysis, or create impossible situations; records for prisoners could be swapped
to an area that has no prison. There is a difference in the way that data swapping protects
the data from disclosure when compared with global recoding. As opposed to suppression
or recoding where values are removed or coarsened, data swapping creates uncertainty. Cen-
sus outputs are usually samples so an intruder has to grapple with the sample unique versus
population unique problem, and by swapping a percentage of the records intruders cannot be
certain that their potential match has not been swapped.
New methodologies that seek to address the problems of record swapping include the ‘data-
shuffling’ methodology proposed by Muralidhar and Sarathy (2006); Muralidhar et al. (2006)
which was evaluated using Irish Census data in McCaa et al. (2013). Shuffling reassigns the
values of individual records to different records with reference to the rank order correlation
of the data set as a whole. Muralidhar and Sarathy (2006) suggests that this ensures that all
monotonic relationships between variables are maintained which provides a higher level of
data utility compared to swapping. On evaluation this claim does stand up to scrutiny at least
for the example statistical analyses carried out by McCaa et al. (2013).
At this juncture, the majority of disclosure control methods applied in practice has been
covered. Many data controllers rely heavily on suppression and recoding, some argue that
these methods provide the only robust solution to the privacy versus utility problem that
have a predictable impact on the data utility (Cleveland et al., 2012). However, the literature
continues to supply older methods, like noise addition, and newer methods such as synthetic
data generation.
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The addition of noise as a technique for disclosure control has been established for some time
(Kim, 1986). For continuous numerical data this method is reasonably simple to implement.
Consider a variable by case matrix that contains values for age and income, to obscure the
original data one could increase each value by 10% (or any appropriate percentage) so it is no
longer possible for an attacker to identify the individuals in the sample using exact matching.
As with data-swapping this addition of noise is deployed systematically, and therefore the
data provider must keep that system secret. In reality applications of this method are more
complex and involve adding noise relative to the covariance of the original data, so that
covariances and means remain accessible (Yancey et al., 2002). Proponents of this method
provide evidence that noise added in this way yields strong analytical validity, however as
noted by Winkler (2004) specialist software is required to analyse data that has had this
method applied. As such, it is an unpopular choice because it forces the user to operate
outside their normal software environment.
Noise addition can also be implemented for categorical data, although a categorical variable
cannot be increased by 10% because the values are discrete and may contain no order or hi-
erarchy. Gouweleeuw et al. (1998) proposed an implementation of the Post Randomisation
Method (PRAM) in order to apply the concept of noise addition to categorical data. Noise in
this case is regarded as the deliberate misclassification of the value(s) for a given record in
a given variable. Gouweleeuw et al provide a neat example to illustrate this, which is sum-
marised here. In this example the variable in question is gender with two possible scores,
male and female, which are assigned the value 1 and 2 respectively. PRAM is applied as a
probability mechanism for the number of possible values, in this case it is generated as 0.9.
Consider a dataset that holds 100 males and 100 females. The new disclosure controlled
dataset would still have 100 males and 100 females, however 10% (the inverse of the proba-
bility mechanism value) would be misclassified. Therefore in the controlled data 10 females
are actually male and 10 males are actually female. As the above example illustrates this
method lowers the probability that an attacker can make an exact match using their external
knowledge because the misclassification creates uncertainty. This method has potentially
severe implications for variables that have a strong correlation, for example if another vari-
able in the data contains values that are gender specific, such as number of pregnancies, an
independent variable misclassification would result in a number of males with a number of
pregnancies greater than zero.
In addition, PRAM is very dependent on the selection of the probability mechanism, an
issue highlighted in Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz (2002) and De Wolf et al. (1999).
De Wolf et al also reflect on another disadvantage of PRAM; In order to achieve realistic
results from statistical analysis of a dataset that has had PRAM applied, standard statistical
methods have to be altered to mitigate the PRAM’s effect on results. The data provider could
issue the controlled release data with details of the Markov matrix or its inverse so that the
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researcher can estimate the variance from the truth created by PRAM. This has a significant
risk attached to it as a user with the Markov matrix could use this to undo the effects of
PRAM at the individual level. As a partial solution it is suggested the data controller could
provide multiple controlled datasets so that a researcher could conduct analysis across the
set and take an average of the results. Again this carries a high level of risk. An intruder
could analyse the multiple data files and given that the value for a given record is unlikely
(due to the randomisation element) to be misclassified across all the data files, one could
simply calculate the value that occurs most frequently and take this as a strong candidate
for the real value. This method of using multiple datasets also draws strong parallels with
the literature of multiple imputation used in the treatment of missing data, see (Rubin, 1987;
Schafer, 1997; Schafer and Olsen, 1998).
So far the above methods attempt to obscure the real data by altering the values to avoid
record matching by an attacker with some a priori knowledge. These methods are em-
ployed by national statistics agencies and other data controllers, and to date the number of
disclosures is very small when compared with the sheer amount of data that has been col-
lected. This is confirmed in Committee for the Coordination of Statistical Activities (2014,
2), in which the Committee for the Coordination of Statistical Activities acknowledged that
“[w]hile there has been no major incidents reported so far, this risk cannot be ignored. In
response to these risks many data producers and depositors have adopted a conservative ap-
proach by severely limiting or excluding access to their microdata”. However, it should be
noted that the primary focus of the methods in this section were static public release files
where SDC methods are applied once before data are released. The advances in data avail-
ability and data-linkage discussed in the introduction to this research mean that data con-
trollers need to be able to perform SDC on outputs generated in secure-settings rather than
one-off public release files. This also coincides with the increase in computational power of
the would-be-intruder. As noted in a number of the papers cited above, the scenario that has
been the main focus of work in this area is one in which the attacker employs exact matching
techniques for re-identification. In modern data management and analysis, exact matching is
now combined with probabilistic data-linkage methods to provide far greater accuracy. Prob-
abilistic matching (sometimes referred to as fuzzy matching (Bell and Sethi, 2001)) matches
records that, although not identical, have a high probability of being a correct match (Fel-
legi and Sunter, 1969). Jaro (1995) provides an early implementation of this method in the
linkage of large public health micro-level datasets. With the development of probabilistic
linkage, the data masked by SDC can potentially be unmasked if an attacker treats recod-
ing, data-swapping, and noise injection as simply misclassification or data collection error.
Although this may not provide an attacker with exact matches to their a priori knowledge
it may provide a much smaller subset of the population that could be correct matches. Fur-
ther methods could then be utilised, for example triangulation through the analysis of other
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external data to reduce the subset of possible matches. This also has implications for what
is considered a disclosure breach, if an attacker can obtain a subset of individuals that are
potentially correct matches; could that be considered a disclosure by a data controller. This
issue is discussed further in the context of PRAM in Shlomo and Skinner (2010).
The above discussion sets the scene for the third SDC strategy. The creation of synthetic
datasets for public release is still a relatively new process especially outside of the United
States. This method was born out of a developments in data management and analysis in-
tended for the treatment of missing data. For a comprehensive review of dealing with missing
data see Schafer and Graham (2002). Synthetic data is data generated in an attempt to main-
tain the relationships, and therefore the validity of inferences, without being ‘real’ in the
sense that it does not represent the observed values of any one individual in a population.
Reiter (2002) discusses the creation of synthetic datasets:
“In this approach, the agency selects units from the sampling frame and imputes
their data using models fit with the original survey data. The approach has three
potential benefits. First, it can preserve confidentiality, since identification of
units and their sensitive data can be difficult when the data for some or all of
the variables in the data set are not actual, collected values. Second, with appro-
priate estimation methods based on the concepts of multiple imputation [...], the
approach can allow data users to make valid inferences for a variety of estimands
without placing undue burdens on these users. Third, synthetic data sets can be
sampled by schemes other than the typically complex design used to collect the
original data, so that users of synthetic data can ignore the design for inferences”
Reiter (2002, 2).
Having described synthetic data it is necessary to briefly describe methods for its genera-
tion. There are two proposed methods in the literature. The first is drawn from the multiple
imputation literature on missing data. Drechsler et al. (2008) used the German Institute for
Employment Research (IAB) Establishment Panel. The data controller first takes a sample
of the population data and treats the rest of the data in the population as missing. The values
for this ‘missing data’ are then imputed. For a given missing value, a number of imputa-
tions are generated, drawn from a probability distribution for that variable based on the other
variables and values present in the sample. These imputations are then combined using a
set of rules to allow analysts to carry out their analysis as they would normally. A number
of the imputed datasets are created and then these are released to the public. The accuracy
of statistical analyses is preserved by the combined effect of the probability distributions,
dependent on the number of datasets released. The results in this example looked at standard
statistical analyses (regression analyses and summary statistics). The results from the syn-
thetic data were highly accurate, the majority of analyses returned significance of the same
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magnitude, and those that did not were only slightly attenuated,for example with significance
values at the 5% level rather than 1% level. This level of accuracy is encouraging, especially
when the disclosure risk is very low, because the released data does not contain any real
representations of individual records.
Drechsler’s example involved the imputation of all variables in the release dataset. The par-
tial synthesis of data has also been proposed. Partial in this context is described as a selection
of variables considered to be of high disclosure risk (Reiter, 2003). The intruder does not
know which variables have been synthesised and which are original. The most significant
disadvantage of this approach is that the accuracy of the synthetic values, in terms of rela-
tionships preserved, is reliant on the model which generates the new values. Also statistical
models feature parametric assumptions, which may or may not actually be true for the target
data. In terms of efficiency, this limits the usefulness of this approach if a data provider has
a significant amount of data to which SDC must be applied. Recognising that this problem
exists, Reiter and other authors began working on non-parametric implementations for the
generation of synthetic data. This forms the second generation method, the non-parametric
model considered here is the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) model used by Re-
iter (2005). The CART model is an approach borrowed from machine learning, which breaks
the prediction of values down using a decision tree. The model can handle categorical and
numerical data, by using the classification and regression aspects of the model respectively.
In the context of SDC, fitting CART models to a sample of the population allows for the
prediction of the values for a given set of identifying, or sensitive, variables. The key to the
model’s use in SDC is the pruning of the tree structure; this is done to avoid over-fitting the
model which might return the real values of the population, which would defeat the models
purpose. Reiter provides some advice on this topic, however the pruning tends to be gov-
erned by some external disclosure threshold or similar measure. Once the necessary tree
has been constructed and pruned appropriately, it is used to generate estimates for the values
needed. From this pool of estimates, the values to be imputed are selected at random. At this
point, the analysis of this synthetic data can be done using standard statistical methods that
a researcher would use on any data.
As before, the data controller might issue a number of these datasets so that a researcher
can combine the results of analyses and increase the accuracy. There are various advan-
tages to this method; it is not beset by parametric assumptions; the generation of data is
semi-automatic as these trees can be generated by computer without the need to fit complex
statistical models; the accuracy of the resulting analyses has proven to be good in the litera-
ture. However, it also carries disadvantages; it is possible that CART will not capture all the
relationships in the population (this relies of the selection of the sample). If the relationship
is not present when the tree is grown, it will not be captured. Another perhaps less technical
disadvantage of synthetic data in general is its ‘unnatural’ feel. This second disadvantage is
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said to have the bigger impact (Reiter et al., 2009). If the simulated evidence presented in
the methodology literature is correct, then this problem would seem to be one of perception
rather than substance. However, until more studies involving synthetically generated data
are published, this problem will likely persist.
In this section, the existing literature on robust disclosure control methods has been reviewed.
It has been shown is that the simplest methods, such as suppression and recoding, often have
the greatest impact on data utility in order to protect confidentiality, yet are still considered
the methods of choice for data controllers. The more recent developments in terms of syn-
thetic data might provide a better balance of risk and utility given the contemporary context.
However, this approach has yet to prove itself popular, especially with researchers. Data
shuffling might also prove to be fruitful, however the lack of clear documentation for its im-
plementation prohibits its use here. As this research seeks to provide a set of algorithms that
allow data controllers to review outputs, rather than create static public (or restricted) release
files, it was decided that the robust methods currently used by data controllers were the best
candidate for development in response to the research problem. These are well documented
and tested and allow for comparison between existing approaches and the approach set out in
this research. As will be shown in the next sub-section, these traditional methods are applied
to the Scottish Health Survey as an example case study, continuing from the estimation of
risk in 4.2.
4.3.1 A Disclosure Control Example: Scottish Health Survey continued
In this section the result of the risk analysis in section 4.2.1 are combined with some of the
techniques reviewed in the previous section to generate potential disclosure control scenarios
for the Scottish Health Survey (SHeS) data. To briefly summarise the results from section
4.2.1, it was shown that the SOC2000 (Standard Occupational Classification) codes are the
primary focus of disclosure risk for a k-anonymity assessment with k=3 and the key vari-
ables: age, gender, health board, marital status, ethnicity and SOC2000. In addition to SOC,
age was also considered as a target for disclosure control because of the large number of age
categories when age is presented in single years. These will be the targets for statistical dis-
closure control methods. Using the NIAH tool-set (detailed in Chapter 6) banding, recoding,
noise addition and random misclassification of categorical variables will be implemented. K-
anonymity assessments will also be used to illustrate the effects of these disclosure control
methods, however a more detailed analysis of the resulting data’s utility will be discussed in
section 4.4.1.
The first method implemented was banding; this consists of grouping variable values into
higher level categories. The age variable was coarsened from single year age to age in 5
year bands. This type of coarsening is often carried out by analysts to structure research
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data in a particular way to help with the clarity of their analytical narrative (for example
see the use of age groups in Townsend et al. (1994)). For this reason, it is the least radical
of the disclosure control methods, which is an important consideration for data controllers,
because it provides common ground on which to discuss disclosure control with data users.
Age is often the target of this method of disclosure control because integer age values can
be easily collapsed into categorical age groups (see Willenborg and De Waal (1996)). As
a first iteration, age was grouped into 5year categories, with the exception of the first and
last category; the data excludes children and is bottom-coded from 21 and younger, and
top-coded for ages 97 and above.
The SOC2000 values are recoded from four digit unit codes to two digit sub-major groups.
The structure of the SOC2000 variable makes this transformation simple to implement as
the 2 digit sub-major group can be extracted from the 1st two digits of the unit code. This
hierarchical structure lends itself well to coarsening the detail in this way. However, as will
be discussed later in this section, it can cause complications for other disclosure control
methods that fail to capture this hierarchy and make illogical changes to data. For example,
the data values might be changed to those outside a hierarchical sub-grouping. In addition,
different codes at the same level of the hierarchy are not symmetrical. For example, some
four digit codes could cover broad enough categories to make collapsing them unnecessary,
while some two digit codes might still provide too much specificity when tested for statistical
disclosure.
Table 4.7 provides the results of a k-anonymity assessment based on the data reconstituted
with 5 year age categories and SOC sub-major groups. Again, a high proportion of the
records do not meet the k=3 criteria. Despite the recoding of SOC2000 codes, it still appears
to be the variable that carries the greatest disclosure risk when combined with the other key
variables.
To illustrate this further, table 4.8 shows the same descriptive analysis for the recoded dataset
without the SOC codes included in the key variables. The level of records that do not sat-
isfy k=3 are reduced significantly. In addition the partitions also provide enough depth to
highlight the shifts in modal values between safe and at risk. For example, the table seems
to indicate that a safe record is more likely to be married and ‘white: Scottish’. The geo-
graphical variable, health board, that is not shown in the table, is shown in Figure 4.4, which
provides a comparison of the health board distribution across all records and the safe records.
From this comparison, it is clear that the smaller health boards such as the Western Isles dis-
appear almost completely and those records that remain are concentrated into larger health
boards like Greater Glasgow.
Table 4.9 pursues a further compromise of the age variable detail in an attempt to retain
SOC at the sub-major group level. Ages has been grouped into 10 year categories and top
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=1631)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=6266)
Age
Mode (% of N) 37-41(10%) 52-56(14%) 37-41(10%)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (63%) Female (54%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (82%) Married (51%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White: Scottish (84%) White: Scottish (99%) White: Scottish (80%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(21%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(10%)
Key Variables:Age(5yrs), Sex, Marital Status, Ethnic Group, SOC Sub-Major Groups,
Health Board.
Table 4.7: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output using Recoded Age and SOC2000 Sub-Major
Groups, k=3
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=6156)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=1741)
Age
Mode (% of N) 37-41(10%) 37-41(10%) 37-41 & 52-56(10%)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (57%) Female (52%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (65%) Married (28%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White: Scottish (84%) White: Scottish (92%) White: Scottish (55%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(11%)
Key Variables:Age(5yrs), Sex, Marital Status, Ethnic Group, Health Board.
Table 4.8: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output using Recoded Age and SOC2000 has been
Removed from Key Variables, k=3
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Figure 4.4: SHeS: Frequency Distribution of Health Board for All Records (N=7897) and
‘safe’ Records (N=3603)
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=3016)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=4881)
Age
Mode (% of N) 38-47(20%) 68+(22%) 38-47(20%)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (60%) Female (54%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (77%) Married (44%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White: Scottish (84%) White: Scottish (98%) White: Scottish (76%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(17%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations (9%)
Key Variables:Age(10yrs), Sex, Marital Status, Ethnic Group, SOC Sub-Major Groups,
Health Board.
Table 4.9: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output for Age Recoded into 10yr categories and
SOC2000 Sub-Major Groups, k=3
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coded from 68 years and upward. The disclosure risk situation, in terms of k-anonymity, has
improved with 38% of records deemed safe at k=3. For comparison, Table 4.10 repeats the
k-anonymity assessment removing the SOC variable. As is expected the size of the at risk
partition reduces still further from that presented in Table 4.9. It can also be verified that the
health board distribution has been largely unaffected by these changes.
Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=6959)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=938)
Age
Mode (% of N) 38-47(20%) 38-47(20%) 48-57(20%)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (57%) Male (50%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (61%) Married (26%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White: Scottish (84%) White: Scottish (91%) White: Scottish (39%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
Table 4.10: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output for Age Recoded into 10yr categories without
SOC2000 Sub-Major Groups, k=3
This method of coarsening data into categories has reduced the potential for disclosure by
reducing the number of outliers in the data set as a whole and therefore limiting an intruder’s
ability to target specific records with certainty. However, this reduction comes at a cost of
excluding more than 70% of records as they still do not meet the k-anonymity requirement
unless the SOC variable is suppressed completely or there is a further reduction in the detail
of the age variable. Even if SOC is suppressed, the resulting safe dataset over reports the
number of married, and white records. This should be considered when assessing the data’s
resulting utility, which will be covered in section 4.4.1.
Having explored banding and the effects of further categorisation, noise addition will be
considered. As set out in section 4.3 noise addition is used in this context to obfuscate
variable values and introduce uncertainty for a would be intruder attempting to match a priori
knowledge with a data set. In this scenario the age variable has had random noise applied to
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=288)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=7728)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (32.4) 50.2 (68.0) (21.7) 40.7 (59.7) (32.5) 50.1 (67.7)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (66%) Female (55%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (56%) Married (58%) Married (56%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White: Scottish (85%) White: Scottish (100%) White: Scottish (84%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(11%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(22%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(11%)
Key Variables: Age(10yrs), Sex, Marital Status, Ethnic Group, Health Board.
Table 4.11: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output for Age with Added Noise, k=3
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it. Every record has either been increased or decreased by a random integer between 0 and
5. Table 4.11 shows the familiar summary of NIAH output. The first observation to make
is the change in N, which has increased to 8016 from 7897. This is because the number
of adults has increased. This is because some records younger than 18 have had their ages
increased and this group was larger than the number of records over 18 that had their ages
reduced to below 18. The overall picture is less than satisfactory with 4% of records deemed
safe. However, this is a suitable juncture to acknowledge the limitations of k-anonymity in
this respect: k-anonymity cannot capture disclosure risk when variable values are altered
beyond their ‘true’ value. That is to say it cannot capture the uncertainty introduced by the
added noise. Also as discussed in section 4.3, a different approach is needed to capture the
disclosure risk in these cases. One form, briefly presented here, is an exploration of the false
positives an intruder might find in an attempted attack.
In this example an intruder believes they have partial knowledge of a data record. The in-
truder has data for a 45 year old female postal worker. With access to the raw data the
intruder would find a unique match for their a priori data. As the SHeS dataset is survey
data there is a degree of uncertainty inherent in the dataset. This is because the intruder does
not know for sure that the unique match they have found is unique in the population and
therefore the record they specifically mean to target. A conservative estimate might suggest
that if a sample survey that is a 10% sample of the population has been used then if a unique
match is found it is estimated that there are likely to be 10 people in the population with those
characteristics. If the intruder were given access to the dataset where the age variable has
had noise applied to its values they would find no record that directly matches their knowl-
edge. At this stage an intruder may assume that as there is no match for the record they wish
to target, it is not in the survey. However, perhaps they persevere and attempt some fuzzy
matching technique to find likely candidates for a match. If they broaden their search to
include all records with an age between 40 and 50 inclusive (which actually has the intruder
implementing a banding scheme of their own), their search returns 3 results (this includes
the unique match from the raw data whose age was altered to 42 from 45). To add further
uncertainty, the SOC values are released at the sub-major group level. In this scenario an
intruders search query would return 109 records of females aged between 40 and 50 with a
SOC sub-major group of 92, which includes postal workers.
Noise addition in the above limited example appears to offer a degree of protection to the
records in the dataset. However, as will be discussed in section 4.4.1, the implications of such
wide spread randomised noise addition on the utility of the dataset are difficult to predict and
are potentially serious for data analysis.
To complete this exploration of applied statistical disclosure methods another form of noise
addition is considered. Random misclassification of categorical variable values has a similar
effect to that of noise addition for numerical variables. Discussed in the earlier section is the
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Post-Randomisation Method (PRAM). A simpler method for illustration purposes is used
here. For this example, 10% of the records were selected at random and their geographical
variables are randomly misclassified using the whole range of possible values. Given this is
a simple example, the algorithm implemented to select the records to be misclassified was
a Fisher-Yates shuffle of the record indexes (similar to randomly selecting records out of
a hat). Then the first 10% of the shuffled records were misclassified. To miss-classify the
record, one of the possible variable values was drawn at random from a uniform distribution
and assigned to the record in place of its original value. Table 4.12 presents the summary
of NIAH output. As with the noise addition scenario, the overall summary is problematic,
k-anonymity cannot capture the effect of changing variable values and 98% of records do
not meet k=3. This summary also does not include the health board variable. To verify
the position post-misclassification consider figure 4.5. This shows the distribution of Health
Board for the original and misclassified data. The distributions are very similar; the largest
effect has been on the smaller Health Boards, but the relative distribution is the same. There-
fore, the 10% misclassification does not appear to have affected the data significantly. As
shown earlier with numerical noise addition, a possible intruder scenario to demonstrate this
statistical disclosure control’s effects can be explored. Consider an intruder, with a priori
knowledge that their target is a 33 year old female from the Forth Valley health board area.
If the intruder had access to the original data direct matching would return 3 records. If the
same direct matching were carried out 4 records would be returned from the misclassified
data. So in the first instance the intruder might be able to distinguish between the 3 original
records by obtaining more knowledge of their target, and therefore suffer only the uncer-
tainty that their target is not population unique. In the second instance the intruder could
attempt to do the same, however their uncertainty is also compounded by the uncertainty
that their target was one of the 10% of records misclassified. The act of misclassification in
this case has already added 1 further potential match for their a priori knowledge. It should
also be noted that, as is the case for all SDC methods that directly alter variable values, the
intruder is very unlikely to know the SDC scheme that has been implemented. This adds
further disclosure protection to the records.
It has been shown that different methods can be applied to microdata to prevent disclosure.
In the following section, data utility is discussed and the Scottish Health Survey example
is continued with a demonstration of capturing some measure of data utility post-SDC. To
provide a more robust dataset for the data utility experiments, ethnicity was also recoded into
white and non-white categories, an approach that is often used when reporting administrative
statistics, see (Scottish Government, 2011c). This further decreases the size of the at risk
partition when a k-anonymity analysis is carried out. To show how this changes the NIAH
output partitions consider table 4.13. The results for recoded age and SOC are used as
the basis for this further SDC application. Although the recoding of ethnicity does have
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Figure 4.5: SHeS: Distribution of the Health Board Variable for the Original Data and 10%
Misclassified Data
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a positive effect on the size of the safe partition, the SOC codes still provide a significant
barrier to records being deemed safe at k=3. Therefore, the final dataset used in section
4.4.1 will suppress the SOC codes. This can be carried out in this case because the example
research question does not require SOC values. Suppressing SOC reduces the at risk partition
to 505 records representing 6% of the total data. This remaining 6%were suppressed and the
effects of this will be discussed in the analysis of the data’s utility.
Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=199)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=7698)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (33.3) 50.6 (67.9) (37.4) 52.8 (68.2) (33.3) 50.6 (67.9)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (66%) Female (56%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (77%) Married (57%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White: Scottish (84%) White: Scottish (100%) White: Scottish (84%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(28%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
Table 4.12: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output for Health Board with 10% of Records Ran-
domly Misclassified, k=3
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=7897)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=3661)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=4236)
Age
Mode (% of N) 38-47(20%) 48-57(20%) 38-47(21%)
Sex
Mode (% of N) Female (56%) Female (59%) Female (53%)
Marital Status
Mode (% of N) Married (57%) Married (77%) Married (40%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White (98%) White (99%) White (96%)
SOC2000 (Sub-Major Groups)
Mode (% of N) 92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(12%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations
(16%)
92. Elementary
administration
and service
occupations (8%)
Key Variables:Age(10yrs), Sex, Marital Status, Ethnic Group (Binary), SOC Sub-Major
Groups, Health Board.
Table 4.13: SHeS: Summary of NIAH Output for Binary Ethnicity with SOC Sub-Major
Groups, k=3
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4.4 Data Utility
Data utility is at the heart of the tension between data controllers and researchers. The poten-
tial for disclosure is a serious problem for data controllers, not least due to the aggressive data
protection framework within which they have to work. In the health field, a good example of
this are the Caldicott principles used in the NHS (Department of Health, 1997) or the Euro-
pean Union’s Data Protection Directive (discussed in Chapter 2). As with the measurement
of risk, a number of different approaches to data utility have emerged. It is useful to set out
some definitions for data quality. Put simply, for researchers, data quality is defined as the
comparison of the released data to the original data in terms of its operationalisation when
conducting statistical analysis. By extension, statistical outputs reviewed by data controllers
should provide the same results after review.
Approaches to data utility can be divided into two broad types; replication of ‘real world’
analyses (Purdam and Elliot, 2007; McCaa et al., 2013; Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008), or
targeted utility measures independent from analyses (Rastogi et al., 2007; Li and Li, 2009;
Askari et al., 2012). Both have their disadvantages; data owners that use research questions
to test the utility of their data cannot guarantee that it will perform as well in all possible
analytical iterations that potential users might select. While on the other hand, those that use
techniques specifically designed to assess data utility struggle to articulate how data might
perform for a given user. Brickell and Shmatikov (2008) provides a succinct summary of the
difficulty inherent in measuring utility: “[The U]tility of any dataset, whether sanitized or
not, is innately tied to the computations that one may perform on it. For example, a census
dataset may support an extremely accurate classification of income based on education, but
not enable clustering based on household size. Without a work-load context, it is meaningless
to say whether a dataset is ‘useful’ or ‘not useful,’ let alone to quantify its utility” (Brickell
and Shmatikov, 2008, 5).
This juxtaposition, has led to a call for verification services to be provided by data owners,
post-statistical disclosure control and analysis. In this vein, Reiter et al. (2009) recommends
data owners to provide verification servers that could carry out a users analysis on the origi-
nal data and the data to which SDC methods have been applied. This server could then report
a measure of ‘fidelity’ which users could include when making claims about statistical in-
ferences. A measure of ‘fidelity’ also assuages a demand by users to know what the data
owners have done to the original data; data owner’s do not publish specific details regarding
their statistical disclosure control regimes for fear this would aid an attack on the data.
Away from specific techniques, Zaslavsky and Horton (1998) offers a conceptual framework
which sets out the problem of whether to disclose data as a decision problem. They discuss
the application of decision analysis, and present the case for calculating the impact of deci-
sions to disclose data in terms of loss of information that could have been publicly useful.
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Using this framework they plot data utility against potential disclosure risk to provide a sen-
sitivity analysis for different non-disclosure decisions. However, as acknowledged in their
conclusions, this approach does not provide an implementation that data owner’s can readily
use.
As has been shown above, different approaches to data utility exist in the literature. Given the
pragmatic research design outlined in Chapter 3, and the conceptual ideas of trust between
data owners and users, discussed in Chapters 2, 5 and 6, the approach pursued in this research
takes the real world, case study, model as a template. This has the advantage of presenting
data utility in a language familiar to data users, which makes it easier for data owners to
articulate. In the next section, assessing data utility is demonstrated using the Scottish Health
Survey and the SDC work from the preceding sections.
4.4.1 Estimating Data Utility: An analysis using the Scottish
Health Survey
The literature and associated methods for assessing data utility are captured in the preceding
section 4.4 In this section the Scottish Health Survey (SHeS) is used to demonstrate the ap-
plication of some of the methods discussed. In section 4.3.1 a ’safe’ dataset was constructed
by applying a series of statistical disclosure control measures (SDC) to the SHeS dataset.
This safe data is used for the analysis throughout this section. Also the two supplementary
datasets constructed using forms of noise addition will be considered. First, some descriptive
statistics are provided to show an overview of what the dataset looks like post-SDC. From
this position of re-familiarisation, a demonstrative research question is examined to ascer-
tain the effects of the SDC methods employed when the ’safe’ data are compared with the
original SHeS data.
To provide a simple overview of the aggregate differences in the original and disclosure
controlled data, demographic variables are compared. Figure 4.6 shows the comparison of
ages in both datasets. Here, the detailed age variable in the original has been recoded to fit
the age categories in the SDC dataset. This allows for greater comparability and the extent
of data utility lost here will be picked up further in the analysis. As is shown, the overall
distribution of age has been unaffected by the suppression of the 6% of records deemed at
risk.
In addition to the changes to the data set out above, the ethnicity variable has again been
recoded to a common scheme so that a direct comparison can be made (this binary represen-
tation is referred to in section 4.3.1). This shows that the homogeneity increases further from
98% white to 99.5% white for the safe data. The loss in detail will be examined further in due
course. However, from the research question and regression modelling, it will be difficult to
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Figure 4.6: SHeS: Age Distribution for the ‘safe’ and Original Data
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show the impact of this data loss as even in the original data the total number of non-white
ethnicities is potentially too small to yield significant results. What can be highlighted at this
stage is that the safe data potentially renders any research with a focus on ethnicity particu-
larly difficult and perhaps not viable at all. This effect also has wider ranging implications
outside the ethnicity example provided here. Although the focus is more likely to be on the
effect of SDC on summary statistics, the elimination of rare cases in datasets could be critical
across any combination of variables relevant to a given research question.
Figure 4.7 compares the distribution of marital status across both datasets, revealing no sig-
nificant changes between original and safe data. Also a comparison of gender indicates a
small increase of 1% in the number of women in the safe dataset when compared with the
original data.
Figure 4.7: SHeS: Marital Status Distribution for the ‘safe’ and Original Data
The results above are to be expected given that the data values themselves were not changed
but aggregated to some more coarse level of detail. In addition, the low level of records
suppressed (6%) to enforce the k=3 k-anonymity requirement has made little difference to
the overall distributions of demographic variables. The additional two datasets constructed
in section 4.3.1 that carried some form of noise or misclassification were also analysed to
ascertain what effect the SDC has had on high level distributions. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 provide
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distribution comparisons for the two additional disclosure controlled data sets. Figure 4.8
shows the distribution for age for the original data and the data that has had noise applied to
the age variable.
Figure 4.8: SHeS: Distribution Plots for the Original Age and Age with Noise Added Vari-
ables
Figure 4.9 presents a picture similar to that of the data with noise added. The distributions of
the health board variable are broadly the same for both datasets. The geographical location
of 10% of the records has been randomly misclassified. From this data, it is observed that the
less prominent health boards have been inflated by 1˜% but the overall distribution remains
relatively static. Given these results, a degree of confidence could be expressed when pro-
ducing univariate statistics. Therefore, an analyst could generate univariate statistics from
the data that has had disclosure control applied with confidence that the statistics were accu-
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rate for the underlying original data. However, the data that has had either numerical noise
or categorical misclassification applied has directly altered the total counts for the respective
variables. In terms of the age variable with random noise applied, the number of adults in the
dataset has increased from 7897 to 8016, an increase of 1.5%. This is perhaps an insignif-
icant difference however, a number of statistical publications, especially those released by
governmental organisations, rely heavily on the accurate use of aggregate tables of counts
and therefore the disclosure control used here could be prohibitive.
Figure 4.9: SHeS: Distribution of Health Board for the Original Data and 10% Misclassified
Data
Having considered the validity of univariate statistics, it would useful to scale up the level
of complexity and analyse the effects of the disclosure control measures applied in section
4.3.1 to some bivariate statistical analyses. The relationship between age and marital sta-
tus was explored using the data with disclosure control applied and the original raw data
for age in years. An ANOVA test for age and marital status was conducted and no signif-
icant change in the correlation was found (original age(F=758.88***) and age with noise
added(F=777.15***)). From the earlier comparison of distributions, the overall distribution
of age compared with noise added age seemed to indicate no significant shift and from that
it could be assumed that maintaining a single year of age measure could yield greater data
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utility than the 10 year age category recoded age variable, and these results support this
assumption.
Scaling up the level of complexity further, the following example research question is now
considered: what is the effect of social class on healthy eating habits? In order to examine
this, an indicator based on the Government’s guidance for individuals to consume at least
five portions of fruit and vegetables a day has been constructed from variables regarding diet
in the health survey. Having given attention to a number of the variables that will be included
in the analysis, a description of the indicator for the 5-a-day guidance is also included. Fig-
ure 4.10 illustrates the prevalence of this indicator for the original data. This shows that
only just under a quarter of the sampled adult population actually meet the Government’s
guidance. There are numerous studies that have included some analysis of the ’5-a-day’
government message, for example see Ashfield-Watt et al. (2004), Naska et al. (2000) and
Pomerleau et al. (2005). Social class is represented in the health survey using the National
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC). For this analysis, the 8 category NS-
SEC has been used. Figure 4.11 shows the distribution of the NS-SEC categories across the
surveyed population.
Figure 4.10: SHeS: Pie Chart of the ‘5-a-day’ Fruit & Veg Indicator using the Original Data
(N=7897)
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Figure 4.11: SHeS: Distribution of NS-SEC using the Original Data (N=7897)
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To determine the effect of social class on whether a respondent is likely to meet the Gov-
ernment’s guidance, a series of binomial regression models have been constructed. Table
4.14 shows the results of these models for the original data and the safe dataset from section
4.3.1. Model 1 and 1a present a base-line model using age, gender and marital status. Mar-
ital status has been simplified into a binary indicator of married or not-married. This was
simplified to capture some effect from marital status without constructing dummy indicators
for other marital status values, some of which have low counts. Also, the obvious difference
between these two models is the way age of respondents is presented. Our original data has
single year of age and the safe data has age grouped into categories that span 10yrs. These
base line models explain very little of the variation in the data with R2’s of 0.003 and 0.008.
Being female has a significant positive effect on whether a respondent consumes 5 portions
of fruit and vegetables a day. Similarly, being married also has a significant positive effect.
Should further analysis of this data be explored, there is potential for an interaction effect to
test for being female and married. Studies in this area have also suggested that marital status
has a pronounced affect on men’s diets, for example see Eng et al. (2005). This could also
be explored further looking at an interaction effect of being male and married. Age presents
potentially counter-intuitive results suggesting that the safe data does a better job then the
original, however these results can be unpicked. Continuous single year of age does not have
a significant effect on the 5-a-day indicator. A quadratic relationship was also tested by using
age squared values, but this also did not provide a significant result. Whereas the grouping
of age into 10yr bands does produce significant results for the 48-57 and 58-67 age brack-
ets. Both of these groups show a significant positive effect when tested against the reference
category 18-27. What in essence has been shown in these two models is that there is not a
linear relationship between age and the consumption of 5 portions of fruit and vegetables.
Model 1a appears to give a better analytical narrative, however using the raw original data
a number of different categorisations of age could be constructed to pursue the relationship
between the two variables. If the safe data are used the only option is to reduce the level of
detail still further.
Models 2 and 2a introduce a set of indicator variables to explore the geographical effects on
5-a-day consumption. The reference category here is Greater Glasgow, therefore all results
should be interpreted as being in a given health board rather than being in the Greater Glas-
gow health board. With the introduction of geography, there is a modest increase in the R2
values. These indicate that 1˜% of the variation in the datasets are explained by the models.
For both models, gender and being married as still positive significant influences. Some of
the Health Boards show statistically significant results. Respondents from Fife and Highland
are more likely to consume 5-a-day than those from Greater Glasgow. Those respondents
from Lanarkshire and the Western Isles are less likely to consume 5-a-day than those from
Greater Glasgow. Single year of age continues to be not significant. The introduction of
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geography has also reduced the significance of being in the 58-67 age category in model 2a.
Models 3 and 3a extend the analysis further to incorporate the NS-SEC. The reference cat-
egory for the NS-SEC indicator variables is NS-SEC 1: Higher managerial and profes-
sional occupations. The demographic variables follow the same narrative as the previous
two groups of models. Being female and being married provide a significant positive effect
on 5-a-day consumption. The introduction of NS-SEC has diminished the significance level
of being married from the 99% to the 95% level. Single year of age continues to be not
significant and the two older age groups of 48-57 and 58-67 are still presenting a signifi-
cant positive effect. The geographical effects follow closely those of model 2 and 2a. The
NS-SEC classifications all produce significant effects on the consumption of 5-a-day when
compared with the reference category. There is an identifiable trend across the hierarchy of
the NS-SEC classification. The further away from 1: Higher managerial and professional
occupations a respondent is the higher the negative effect on whether they will consume 5-a-
day. The only exception to this linear trend is an overlap between intermediate occupations
and small employers and own account workers.
From these three pairs of models, it has been shown that there are subtle variations in how
each model performs when compared across the original dataset and safe data. As has been
highlighted, the serious consequence for users using the safe data is lack of extra-exploratory
depth beyond models similar to those above. The lack of detail in the age variable makes
unpicking the relationship between age and 5-a-day consumption difficult. Also having sup-
pressed the SOC occupation codes from the dataset (as was done by the Scottish Government
in the years after 2003) it is not possible to explore the effects of different types of occupa-
tions on the 5-a-day indicator. It is necessary to make the caveat that NS-SEC is derived
in part from SOC so using NS-SEC as an occupation based measure will to some degree
explain the relationship between occupation and 5-a-day consumption but this is not easy to
show coherently. For comparison, Table 4.15 shows a model that replaces NS-SEC with the
major SOC groups. SOC major group 1: Managers and Senior Officials is excluded from the
model as a reference category. This model shows that the major groups have a significant
effect on 5-a-day consumption. The only exception is the associate professional & technical
group which is arguably sufficiently close to the the reference category so as not to provide
a significant difference. The R2 for this model is marginally higher than Model 3, it is not
possible to draw out a direct difference between the effectiveness of these two models. How-
ever, it supports the loss of data utility narrative by demonstrating further that the safe data
is hampered by a lack of analytical opportunities.
To round out this exploration of data utility, the two additional datasets constructed in section
4.3.1 are considered in comparison with the original data. Model 5 and 5a compare the orig-
inal data with the data where the age values have had a random amount of noise added (+/- a
random integer between 0-5). Although continuous single year age has not been significant
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throughout the proceeding analyses, the difference here is that the co-efficient for age is even
closer to zero. Earlier it was shown that adding noise of this type to age did not significantly
affect the correlation of age and marital status and it has had no significant effect here either.
Models 6 and 6a provide a similar test of the data where noise has been applied; here the
random misclassification of the health board variable is examined. In this case the scope
of the noise is reduced as only 10% of records were misclassified. However, the results still
show significant disruption to the statistical relationships contained in the original data. Only
one consistent result remains across the two models (Highland still has a significant positive
effect). Also the R2 suggests that a model with these variables explains less of the varia-
tion than is actually the case. Should geography be a primary concern to a user’s research
question, using the misclassified data would likely lead to false conclusions. One possible
explanation for the significant changes here is linked to the change in distribution seen in 4.9.
As Greater Glasgow is our reference category and it’s share of the distribution has increased
relative to the other health boards, it is possible that strong correlations between Greater
Glasgow and other health boards have been muddied by the misclassified records assigned
to Greater Glasgow, and those removed and assigned elsewhere.
What has been shown in this section is that data controllers must proceed carefully when
considering the statistical disclosure control that they wish to apply. Although reducing the
level of detail might appear simplistic, in the research example shown above it performs
better than noise addition and misclassification. Noise addition and misclassification in this
case severely disrupt the data’s inherent statistical relationships even if the general variable
distributions are preserved. The potential for erroneous conclusions has severe consequences
for the data user experience, and the level of trust between users and data controllers. As will
be discussed elsewhere (Chapter 4) the ability for users to obtain some results, if limited in
scope, that are correct when compared with the original data is an important consideration. In
this vein, ultimately, users can build on early results and possibly obtain greater data access
to areas of interest to their research.
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Table 4.14: SHeS: Regression Models for the Raw Data (1,2,3) and Safe Data (1a,2a,3a),
that explore the factors that influence the ‘5-a-day’ Fruit and Vegetables Indicator
Variable Model 1 Model 1a Model 2 Model 2a Model 3 Model 3a
Constant -1.397 -1.600 -1.412 -1.615 -0.768 -0.855
(Standard Error) (0.093) (0.107) (0.112) (0.122) (0.113) (0.146)
Age(yrs) -0.002 -0.002 -8.99e-06
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Female 0.181*** 0.180*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.285*** 0.283***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.055) (0.058) (0.060) (0.063)
Married 0.233*** 0.172*** 0.233*** 0.180*** 0.133** 0.094
(0.056) (0.063) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) (0.066)
Age (48-57) 0.392*** 0.365*** 0.315**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.128)
Age (58-67) 0.260** 0.241* 0.287**
(0.127) (0.127) (0.132)
Health Boards
Fife 0.262** 0.253** 0.262** 0.250*
(0.122) (0.127) (0.124) (0.129)
Highland 0.411*** 0.410*** 0.419*** 0.419***
(0.108) (0.111) (0.110) (0.113)
Lanarkshire -0.433*** -0.404*** -0.450*** -0.423**
(0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.128)
Shetland 0.539* 0.137 0.552* 0.188
(0.288) (0.443) (0.292) (0.450)
Tayside -0.183 -0.253* -0.205 -0.280*
(0.139) (0.148) (0.141) (0.150)
Western Isles -0.947** -0.852** -0.979** -0.854**
(0.379) (0.408) (0.382) (0.413)
NS-SEC
Categories
Intermediate
Occupations
-0.718*** -0.708***
(0.383) (0.117)
Lower
Managerial &
Professional
-0.372*** -0.392***
(0.095) (0.100)
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Lower
Supervisory &
Technical
-0.818*** -0.828***
(0.119) (0.125)
Never Worked -1.449*** -1.408***
(0.227) (0.242)
Routine
Occupations
-1.366*** -1.39***
(0.115) (0.121)
Semi-Routine
Occupations
-1.009*** -1.056***
(0.105) (0.111)
Small Employers
& Own Account
Workers
-0.579*** -0.696***
(0.125) (0.134)
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.016 0.038 0.042
No. Obs. 7897 7392 7897 7392 7897 7392
*Only statistically significant values are reported above. This model included controls for: all age categories
above 18-27 and all healthboards except Greater Glasgow
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Variable Model 4
Constant -1.103
(Standard Error) (0.139)
SOC Major Groups
Administrative &
Secretarial
-0.415***
(0.114)
Elementary
Occupations
-0.844***
(0.113)
Personal Service
Occupations
-0.253**
(0.125)
Process, Plant &
Machine Operatives
-0.976***
(0.135)
Professional
Occupations
0.431***
(0.107)
Sales & Customer
Service
-0.608***
(0.136)
Skilled Trades -0.502***
(0.119)
Pseudo R2 0.039
No. Obs. 7624
Only statistically significant values are reported above.
This model included controls for: age, gender, marital
status, health board, and all SOC Major Groups except
Managers and Senior Officials
Table 4.15: SHeS: Regression Model for the Raw Data, exploring the effect of SOC2000
Major Groups on the ‘5-a-Day’ Fruit and Vegetables Indicator
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Table 4.16: SHeS: Regression Models for Raw Data (5,6) and Data with Noise Added
(5a,6a), that explore the factors that influence the ‘5-a-day’ Fruit and Vegetables Indicator
Variable Model 5 Model 5a Model 6 Model 6a
Constant -1.397 -1.548 -1.412 -1.473
(Standard Error) (0.938) (0.107) (0.112) (0.117)
Age(yrs) -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
Female 0.181*** 0.175*** 0.188*** 0.182***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Married 0.233*** 0.300*** 0.233*** 0.223***
(0.056) (0.063) (0.057) (0.056)
Health Boards
Ayrshire & Arran -0.155 0.283**
(0.122) (0.126)
Dumfries &
Galloway
-0.007 0.209*
(0.129) (0.151)
Fife 0.262** -0.055
(0.122) (0.132)
Forth Valley -0.024 -0.585***
(0.139) (0.174)
Highland 0.411*** 0.329***
(0.108) (0.111)
Lanarkshire -0.433*** -0.052
(0.125) (0.126)
Shetland 0.539* 0.738***
(0.288) (0.260)
Tayside -0.183 0.293**
(0.139) (0.128)
Western Isles -0.947** -0.123
(0.379) (0.278)
Pseudo R2 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.0093
No. Obs. 7897 8016 7897 7897
*Only statistically significant values are reported above. This model included controls
for: all healthboards except Greater Glasgow
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Chapter 5
Barriers to Efficient Analysis: The
case for researcher experience
In the preceding chapters, the attention has been focused on the theoretical, legal, and eth-
ical underpinnings of statistical disclosure control, as well as the existing literature on risk
analysis, disclosure methods and data utility. The focus now shifts to expand the existing
scope of the literature by considering the inclusion of the data user’s experience as a factor
in statistical disclosure control workflows. This means supplementing the risk and utility
assessments seen in Chapter 4 with the addition of some assessment of the experience of
data users. This experience is considered in respect of user’s access to data, including any
pre-conditions, their analysis of the data and the generation and treatment of outputs. This
Chapter’s argument is developed across three sections; models for data access, the genera-
tion of outputs and virtual research environments (VREs) before concluding with a potential
model for increasing the use of VREs in the health sphere and also some thoughts on how
the user experience could be assessed.
5.1 Models for Data Access
Before beginning the discussion of data access, it is worth reinforcing a point made in Chap-
ter 2. Data access in the majority of cases is granted by the organisation that collects or owns
the dataset1, however this is itself premised on the agreement, whether tacit or explicit, of
the data subjects themselves.
1An exception to this in the health field might be data controlled by the Privacy Advisory Committee (PAC)
although part of the wider NHS Scotland PAC is an arms-length body from Information Services Division
(ISD) that actually hold the data. Also, in the more general case, the UK Data Archive might exercise the role
of data owner on behalf of others.
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As such, increasing the awareness of how data are used and processed has an effect on data
access considerations, especially when building trust between researchers and participants
(see discussions of information sharing and transparency in Thomas and Walport (2008);
UK Clinical Research Collaboration (2007); Council for Science and Technology (2005)).
To illustrate this point, some qualitative work was carried out as part of an Economic and
Social Research Council (ESRC) Festival of Social Science 2012 event2. This event was
organised in conjunction with the National Records of Scotland, the Scottish Government
and The University of Edinburgh. It sought to draw together an audience that cut across the
stakeholders in the data linkage and data privacy area. As such, attendees included members
of the public, local authority data controllers, government analysts, researchers and public
pressure groups (e.g. Stonewall Scotland and Liberty). During the event the audience were
asked a number of questions, and were provided with electronic voting devices to record their
answers. These devices were assigned at random and no links between an individual and their
answers were recorded. This was done to ensure a degree of anonymity for participants. In
addition not all members of the audience chose to participate during every question. For this
reason these results are only offered as a backdrop and a potential contribution to scoping
out areas for future work.
The question most relevant to the current point on increasing the flow of information about
how data are recorded and processed was question 2: “How do feel about your personal data
being used for research, especially when it’s linked with other data?” This question was
asked at the beginning of the event and then repeated at the end. Figure 5.1 shows the results
before and after. It should be noted that the N for each is different as not all participants
answered this question in both instances. However, the general trend toward the left of the
graph (the more positive sentiment) does resonate with the more rigorous findings of similar
studies, such as Aitken et al. (2011); Aitken (2012); Scottish Government (2011b). It is
the position of this research that this approach of greater sharing of information could also
be adopted in the relationship between data owner and data user and this theme will run
throughout this chapter.
Data Access
The problem of giving researchers access to potentially sensitive data for analysis is not new;
below are some examples of data access models from this century and a description of their
constituent parts. At an abstract level these methods differ in only one respect - should the
data be brought to the researcher or should the researcher go to the data. Traditional ap-
proaches to data access have focused on providing researchers with data directly through
some physical medium (e.g. CDs or disks). Projects including the Cross National Equiva-
lence File, which provides contains equivalently defined variables from 1970 through 2009
2As noted here: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-and-events/events/festival/events-archive/2012-
specific/perceptions-privacy.aspx
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Figure 5.1: ESRC Festival Event Q2 & Q5: How do feel about your personal data being used
for research, especially when it’s linked with other data?
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for the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and similar studies from Australia, Korea, the
USA, Russia, Switzerland, Canada and Germany, still use CDs as their primary method for
data distribution (Ohio State University). Some projects also still offer this as a legacy op-
tion alongside a downloadable dataset, for example see the Surveillance, Epidemiology and
End Results Program (SEER) (National Cancer Institute, 2014). These types of data access
models require an agreement between the researcher and the data owner to be signed3. These
agreements have not changed significantly since the move from physical media to download-
able data. They place a number of conditions on the researcher’s use of the data and provide
the potential for penalties if the agreement is broken. This model is also common across
data centres where data has not been marked as in need of special restrictions (see UK Data
Archive for the the UK Data Archives standard End User Licence). The penalties in these
agreements can be severe and serve as a deterrent not only for the user themselves but also
in some cases their institution. The UK Data Archive’s (UKDA) standard End User Licence
includes permanent or temporary suspension of access to the UKDA services and the threat
of possible legal action.
When data are deemed too sensitive to offer for direct download or distribution on physical
media, the contemporary approach is to require researchers to go to the data. Traditionally
this has been in the form of physical infrastructure such as bricks-and-mortar secure settings.
For example, the UK Data Service Secure Lab has a ‘Safe Centre’ at the University of Essex;
The Scottish Longitudinal Study has a ‘safe-setting’ at the National Records of Scotland’s
Ladywell House; and within the health context, NHS Scotland Information Services Division
has a ‘Safe Haven’ in Edinburgh. This approach is also not limited to the UK, the Minnesota
Population Center4 operates a ‘Secure Data Enclave’ in Minneapolis.
Some projects have attempted to allow researchers to ‘virtually go to the data’ by providing
remote access to secure settings. These remote systems have either been based on access via
virtual private networking (VPN) from the researcher’s own computer or by creating space
(a room) for a dedicated secure-setting within institutions. In 2013 the Administrative Data
Taskforce carried out a survey of existing secure-settings and found of the 71 Universities
that responded, 26 had some form of secure-setting for accessing sensitive data (Adminis-
trative Data Taskforce (Technical Group), 2013, 27). From this it is safe to assume that at
present for a number of researchers, accessing sensitive data would mean going to a location
outside their own institution. The VPN approach, from a user’s own machine, is used by
the Health Informatics Centre (HIC) at the University of Dundee; figure 5.2 shows the sys-
tem used by HIC for remote access. The Centre’s software allows for a secure connection
where no data can be moved from the secure-setting to the local machine (Health Informatics
Centre (Dundee)).
3SEER’s sample agreement can be seen at: http://seer.cancer.gov/data/sample-dua.html
4Minnesota Population Center - https://www.pop.umn.edu/
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For an example of the dedicated safe setting, in 2014 the ESRC announced funding for pre-
fabricated secure settings, ‘SafePods’, structures with the dimensions 2m x 2m x 2m that
can be installed within institutions (Administrative Data Liaison Service, b). These Safe-
Pods offer organisations like the ESRC an opportunity to standardise conditions nationally
across secure-setting locations. In a technical report for the Administrative Data Taskforce
(Administrative Data Taskforce (Technical Group), 2013), it was noted that the SafePods
would operate thin-client terminals that connect the UK Data Service by secure VPN. In ad-
dition, the SafePods have controlled access, CCTV, screens to prevent anyone other than the
user seeing the data, and strong visual cues to remind users of the need for, undefined, ‘safe
behaviour’. This report also noted that perhaps automatic verbal messages could be played
within the SafePod.
As the level of data sensitivity is higher in a secure-setting, the penalties for a breach of the
usage agreement are more severe. For example, The UK Data Archive’s Secure Lab has a
penalty policy that at its most extreme includes “Permanent suspension from all ESRC data
services ([for the] individual); [and a] 5 year suspension from all ESRC data services ([for
the ]institution); [and] permanent sanction from ESRC funding ([for the] individual); [and a]
5 year sanction from ESRC funding ([for the] institution)” (UK Data Archive, 2014, 9). As
such a breach would be a serious violation of data confidentiality, the policy also includes
the possibility of a criminal offence under the Statistics and Registration Service Act (2007).
This Act includes the possibility of a fine of £2000, a two year jail sentence, and a criminal
record.
Working with data in a secure-setting
Having described a number of access arrangements, the position of the researcher is com-
pared in three different scenarios: local physical access (including data downloads), physical
secure setting access (including SafePods) and remote access to secure settings. It is useful
to set this comparison on a scale from maximum user experience to maximum data security
as this resonates with the conceptual balance of disclosure risk and data utility in Chapter
2. For users local physical access occupies the most familiar position on the user experi-
ence spectrum. For users with this type of access (it is assumed here that the baseline of
ethics approval and access being granted have been successful - this will be assumed for
all three types) will notice little disruption to their usual workflow. Data are often supplied
in a user specified format (or a common format such as Comma Separated Values (CSV)).
This means that a user can use their favourite software packages on their local machine to
carry out analysis and generate outputs. Not only do they have access to software, but also
their own previous work, code snippets, and literature, as well as an internet connection and
ready access to online resources. These resources are combined with time flexibility and the
physical environment the user is used to operating in, which often also includes access to col-
leagues for assistance with methodological queries. Potential threats to data confidentiality
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Figure 5.2: The Health Informatics Centre Services Safe Haven Environment
Source: https://medicine.dundee.ac.uk/hic-safe-haven
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include loss of physical media, unauthorised access to a researcher’s machine, distribution
to unauthorised users, lack of a user activity log, unauthorised persons viewing the data, and
failure of users to check outputs for statistical disclosure. This type of access relies heav-
ily on the trust between users and data owners mediated by a user agreement. It should be
noted that despite these threats, there is little evidence that suggests these problems have
been realised except in isolated cases.
At the other end of the scale is a dedicated physical secure-setting, the SafePod will be used
as an example of this type of access in contemporary debates although most operate similar
procedures, for example NHS Scotland’s electronic Data Research and Innovation Service
(eDRIS) has similar rules to those extrapolated from the Administrative Data Taskforce’s
technical group report (NHS National Services Scotland, 2013a). A user who has been
granted access to sensitive data for their research must first attend a compulsory accredited
training course on data security (for example, the Administrative Data Liaison Service’s -
Safe Researcher Training (Administrative Data Liaison Service, a)). Once their training is
complete, they must book into a SafePod either at their own or another institution. They
cannot take into the secure-setting any printed material, physical media, or equipment (e.g.
a mobile phone) that they could use to record or store data from the secure-setting unless
it is vetted on entry and exit. All activity in the secure-setting is monitored using CCTV
and logging software on the client machine. The researcher will have access to a range of
common statistical software packages, however if extra analytical packages or user written
extensions are required these must be requested in advance. Their time is limited dependent
on the booking system and popularity of the particular secure-setting. Unless pre-arranged
and vetted, the user does not have access to their own previous coding or statistical package
scripts. They have no direct access to colleagues for methodological support and can only
communicate with the data owner, research coordinators or other members of the their re-
search team who are named in the data access agreement. The workspace might also have
posters and audio reminding the user of the rules for using the space or deterrent messages
about ‘safe behaviour’. In this data access scenario the risks to data confidentiality are mini-
mal. The data owner retains all control over how the data is accessed and used. Importantly,
almost no trust is placed in the user beyond that they do not memorise data for later malicious
use.
The third scenario considered lies somewhere between the two scenarios described above.
In this scenario, a user is given remote access to a secure setting from their own machine
through the use of secure virtual private networking software. Data are stored at the server
side and there is a firewall between the local client and the server. The user has access to a
common range of statistical packages on the server (again any additions to this need to be
agreed in advance). Analysis can be carried out at a time convenient to the user and over
any duration. They have access to their own physical environment including literature and
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previous work. No files can be transferred from the client to the server, so previously written
scripts and code cannot be used directly but are readily available as a reference. They can
have access to the internet (via a separate machine) for methodological support, and access
to colleagues. All activity conducted while working within the secure-setting environment is
logged and can be reviewed by data owners. The threats also lie between the two scenarios
above; users could write down or photograph on-screen data, they could communicate data
to unauthorised persons (intentionally or not), if the remote system security does not contain
some form of personal verification or biometrics then users could provide their login details
to unauthorised persons. In this scenario there is a balance of trust in users with providing a
level of practical data utility to facilitate analysis.
All three scenarios share the need for a data access agreement, which require the users to
agree to common principles of data security, regardless of the mode of access, for example
compare NHS National Services Scotland (2013a); National Cancer Institute (2014); UK
Data Archive. Therefore, the significant difference is the trust between users and data own-
ers, and the amount of control data controllers are willing to cede to users. This distinction
provides another hook into the theoretical framework of Chapter 2. This balance of trust and
control versus data utility, in the form of best facilitating a user’s workflow, is an example of
Beck’s fusion of value and ethical judgements with technical and scientific statements. It is
technically possible to implement a range of access controls, but does it fit with one’s values
to implement a particular regime? If data owners want to facilitate increased and efficient
usage of their data, this is a judgement that they need to make. As a practical example of type
of judgement, members of staff from the Health Informatics Centre at Dundee were included
in a series of semi-structured interviews. The full details of these are considered in greater
depth in Chapter 6 however some respondent observations are relevant to this discussion:
The introduction of safe havens had been met with some scepticism by research respondents.
Academics discussed the negative impact of accessing data for a prescribed amount of time
in a location away from their own work environment. However they acknowledged that
the changing information governance landscape has meant that changes to traditional data
access methods were necessary. They also discussed the positive aspects of working within
a safe haven environment. These largely centred on the capacity for collaborative working
supported by the virtual research infrastructures (These are discussed later in this Chapter)
that could accompany safe havens (e.g. websites, forums, shared drive spaces).
Based on these observations, the remote-access secure setting operated by organisations like
HIC can enforce a high level of data security while also being sensitive to the needs of users.
The proposed SafePods, that at least in their design, appear to provide little compensation
to user needs, could limit the volume of research carried out on the sensitive data to which
they were supposed to facilitate access. In the next section, generating outputs becomes
the focus, and the process of output checking is considered in the context of these access
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arrangements.
5.2 Generating Outputs
In this Chapter the models of access and the process of analysis have been discussed. Three
models for data access were scrutinised for their effect on the researcher experience. In this
section those three models are evaluated in terms of their impact on how research outputs
are generated and how they are processed by data owners. The treatment of outputs can
have a significant effect on the researcher experience as ultimately it is the research outputs
that are published or disseminated to further the body of knowledge. This is also where the
research into statistical disclosure control described in this dissertation is felt most keenly as
data owners seek to protect the confidentiality of their data perhaps to the detriment of the
researcher’s analytical narrative.
Let’s return to the examples of the traditional ’data goes to the researcher’ model. The SEER
data sets are covered by a user agreement. This user agreement passes the responsibility
for the reviewing of outputs to the researcher. The project’s sample agreement contains the
common principle that researchers will not: “present or publish data in which an individual
patient can be identified [...] will not publish any information on an individual patient, includ-
ing any information generated on an individual case by the case listing session of SEER*Stat
[...] will avoid publication of statistics for very small groups” (National Cancer Institute).
A breach of this agreement is subject to the penalties described in the preceding section.
Similarly, the UK Data Archive passes the responsibility of output checking (for standard
licensed datasets) to the user through clause 8 of its End User Agreement: “To preserve at
all times the confidentiality of information pertaining to individuals and/or households in the
data collections where the information is not in the public domain. Not to use the data to
attempt to obtain or derive information relating specifically to an identifiable individual or
household, nor to claim to have obtained or derived such information. In addition, to pre-
serve the confidentiality of information about, or supplied by, organisations recorded in the
data collections. This includes the use or attempt to use the data collections to compromise
or otherwise infringe the confidentiality of individuals, households or organisations” (UK
Data Archive).
Using the conceptual scale of security versus user experience, this transference of control
to users allows them the greatest freedom to use their own judgement in the creation and
publishing of research outputs while the data controllers retain the right to retrospectively
assess whether any breach of the user agreement has been made. This freedom afforded
the user is problematic if the data are particularly sensitive, as the literature, training and
tools for reviewing outputs for statistical disclosure control from a user’s perspective are
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scarce. As such, the confidence of data owners in the user’s ability to adequately review their
outputs cannot be considered high in the general case. This subsequently impacts on their
own responsibility as data owner to have taken reasonable precautions to protect their data.
This logic underlies some of the control decisions in the other two models.
In the contemporary example of physical secure-settings, the reviewing of outputs is a pro-
cess reserved for the data owners. Users carry out their analysis within the secure-setting
and then submit research outputs to the data owner for review. It is only once they have been
cleared by the data owner that research outputs can be published or presented outside of
the secure-setting. eDRIS, NHS Scotland’s data access project, summarises the review pro-
cess in their user agreement. Outputs are submitted to Research Coordinators who carry out
tests and, if necessary, apply statistical disclosure control methods before outputs are given
clearance. The Research Coordinators can request code, syntax and a summary of how the
outputs were generated. If a Research Coordinator denies clearance for a particular output,
the user can appeal but the final decision rests with the data owner. In addition, the user
agreement adds the clause that abstracts and papers intended for publication can also be sub-
ject to review by Research Coordinators (NHS National Services Scotland, 2013a, 7). The
Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study (NILS) provides more detail than the eDRIS project
on the review process. NILS policy (Northern Ireland Longitudinal Study Research Support
Unit, 2013, 4-5) states that a Research Support Officer is responsible for output review; this
includes:
• If data are to be released in tabular form, then the NILS support officer must ensure that
any information that could potentially identify an individual is aggregated, suppressed
or removed as appropriate.
• When releasing tabular data NILS support personnel must ensure that cell counts are
10 or greater. If associated data allows the cell to be split then the support officer must
aggregate the data to the highest level consistent with the need to explain the results.
• No data on birth dates of NILS members may be released, with the exception of year of
birth. Any analyses which require month of birth or full date of birth will be conducted
by NILS-Core staff.
• No data on date of death of NILS members may be released, with the exception of
month and year of death. Any analyses which require day of death will be conducted
by NILS-Core staff.
• Exposure times may be included in aggregated datasets provided there is more than
one event in each cell.
• Sample uniques or individual cases are never allowed.
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Introducing the role of Research Support Officer or Research Coordinator as ‘gate-keepers’
for research outputs allows the data owner to retain full control of published outputs from
their datasets. However, the process of review places an extra strain on the users experience
of a data set. Neither eDRIS or NILS make a commitment in their user agreements and
policies to review outputs within a specific time-frame, or in the eDRIS case, a commitment
to a consistent approach to their review. This uncertainty over review workload and time-
scale makes it difficult for users to plan their research accordingly. For example, the time
taken to review outputs and make any potential appeal against a negative decision would
need to be considered ahead of any submission to an academic journal or conference. Indeed,
from the qualitative work carried out during this research, it was noted that labour intensive
human processes for output review often formed bottle-necks in the research workflow. It can
be assumed that current practices for reviewing outputs (the details of which are discussed
further in Chapter 6) will not be adequate at scale when the volume of data and the number
of users increases still further.
The remote access secure-setting completes the picture of the three models of access. As data
are always kept on the server side of the client-server connection, these remote access secure
settings operate review procedures in a similar way to the physical secure-settings. Users
request outputs via their client machine and these are then reviewed by the data owner before
release. HIC operate a remote access model with centralised reviewing procedures. In their
model users submit outputs for review, and a commitment is made to review them between 9-
11am on the next working day after submission (Health Informatics Centre (Dundee)). The
HIC example, alleviates some of the uncertainty highlighted above in the case of the physical
secure-setting. This is done by providing a time-scale for output review. However, there is
little difference between the physical and remote access secure-setting in terms of reviewing
research outputs. As has been shown in the proceeding section, the benefits of the remote
access secure-setting are realised in the data access and analysis aspects of a users workflow.
What the HIC example does show, however, is that consideration for the user experience can
be made and data owners can provide users with details of their processes so that users can
be fully informed when planning their research.
In this section, the role of data owners and users were considered in the context of output
review for different access models. As with data access, the balance of trust in the user
and risks to data confidentiality is calibrated by the data owner. This is done by increasing
or decreasing the amount of control over research outputs ceded to the user. For sensitive
data, like those in the health field, it would be difficult for the data owner not to review
outputs and still fulfil their obligations to uphold the confidentiality of the data subjects.
However, the approach adopted by the data owner and the level of detail and communication
with the user can have a significant impact on the user’s workflow and ability to plan their
research effectively. In the next section, the focus shifts to the possible incentives data owners
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can offer users to counter balance the restrictions of using a secure setting. This is done
primarily in the context of remote secure-settings within virtual research environments, but
the incentives could also be implemented in a physical secure setting.
5.3 Virtual Research Environments
The Virtual Research Environment (VRE) has been discussed in the literature at least since
the mid-nineties and has appeared across disciplines, see Donaldson (1997); McKee (1995);
Nikolov and Nikolova (1996). VREs are defined as any system that allows researchers
remote access to research data and tools out-with the user’s location and local network.
This wide definition could now apply to the plethora of ‘cloud’ services such as Google’s
Drive and Docs, and Dropbox, which are often used by researchers and teams to manage
access to and execute data management for research data. The variety of VREs that are
specifically relevant to this research are those that emerged from e-Science projects in the
late two-thousands including MethodBox and MyExperiment, see (The MethodBox Project,
2011; De Roure et al., 2008). In addition, the Data Management through e-Social Science
(DAMES) project developed a range of web portal based services for researchers to share
code and syntax in an attempt to mitigate the volume of repetition in quantitative social sci-
ence. DAMES also crowd-sourced the creation and improvement of metadata, and although
the services deployed through DAMES were classified as Grid Enabled Specialist Data Envi-
ronments (GESDE), they fit within the above definition. For details of the DAMES services,
see Lambert (2010); Doherty et al. (2010).
These types of virtual infrastructure has sought to address many of the barriers to efficient
analysis, especially by closing the gap between researchers and the technical infrastructure
needed to analyse complex data. For example, the MyExperiment project notes that its
objective is to improve the researcher experience (De Roure and Goble, 2007). In their intro-
duction De Roure and Goble provide comment on the need for automation: “The techniques
of e-Science help the scientist deal with increasingly large and increasingly complex sci-
entific applications. Key to this is automation, and several scientific workflow tools have
become established as a means of automating the processing of scientific data in a scalable
and reusable way” (De Roure and Goble, 2007, 1). Their particular approach was to adopt a
number of the ’web 2.0’ social technologies to enhance the user experience through collabo-
ration and sharing, but its the more abstract principle that e-Science approaches can facilitate
the researcher in analysis of complex data that is most relevant to this research.
Similarly the DAMES project sought to harness the potential of VREs and e-Infrastructure to
support data management processes. Tan et al. (2009) establishes three key reasons that un-
derpin the DAMES approach. First, the recognition, which is also made in this research, that
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the volume of data sources available to researchers is increasingly vast and that data man-
agement processes such as formatting, data linkage and manipulation occupy a significant
amount of a researcher’s time before any analysis is carried out. Second, Tan et al acknowl-
edge a significant skills gap for researchers when it comes to the computer programming
skills required to carry out complex data management tasks5. Third, Tan et al noted that a fo-
cus on data management using e-Infrastructure could afford the researcher new opportunities
for more complex data-linkage and analysis.
At an more abstract level, Keraminiyage et al. (2009) set out “critical success factors for
collaborative research” which provide a relevant framework for the benefits that VREs can
provide if these success factors can be adequately satisfied. Table 5.1 summarises this frame-
work. Although, the original targets of this framework were researchers working in collab-
oration, it is equally valid to see the relationship between researchers and data controllers
as a collaboration in a similar vein. This framework will be revisited after VREs have been
discussed in the eHealth and statistical disclosure control context.
Focus element Success factors
Trust Mutual respect and trust among partners,
Good personal relationships, Simple collab-
orative agreement, Clear and honest under-
standing of each other’s abilities
Commitment Ability
and Leadership
Top managerial commitment from all par-
ties, Active participation on project team by
all the parties, Adequate resources, special-
ist and complementary knowledge and ex-
pertise of partners, One agreed project leader
with required authorities
Transparency and clar-
ity
Common goals with no hidden agendas,
Clear understanding of each partner’s re-
sponsibilities and tasks, Clearly defined ob-
jectives Clearly defined responsibilities, Mu-
tually agreed project plan, Realistic aims,
Defined project milestones, Focused project
scope
Communication and
monitoring
Effective communication, communication
and regular contacts with partners, Regular
progress monitoring, and Ensuring collabo-
rators deliver, Monitoring project’s progress
against agreed milestones
Table 5.1: Success Factors of Collaborative Research
Table adapted from Keraminiyage et al. (2009, 61)
5The European Commission highlighted the continuing lack of general coding skills five years after Tan et
al, see Kroes and Vassiliou (2014).
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VREs in SDC Workflows
Despite the above and many other examples of innovation in the VRE sphere, statistical
disclosure control has not received the same attention and still presents a significant chal-
lenge for these e-Infrastructures. Many rely on the same onerous human processes used in
the brick-and-mortar, physical secure-settings that proceeded them and have not heeded the
‘automation is key’ message from the e-Science programme. What will be set out here is
a brief argument in support of VREs in the eHealth sphere (and more generally in quanti-
tative research that utilizes sensitive data). This will be discussed in the context of eHealth
projects which could provide a VRE for researchers with tools that benefit their workflow,
but also tools that support the data owners own data management processes such as statistical
disclosure control.
First, given that the primary focus of this research is data that are subject to particular scrutiny
because of their implications for privacy and confidentiality, the earlier definition of a VRE
should be made more prescriptive. Therefore, in this context, the scope of a VRE is limited
to one which handles data that is not publicly available and poses significant risks to privacy
and confidentiality. In the earlier discussions of data access and generating outputs, it was
noted that data controllers must strike a balance between the trust placed in individual users
and their responsibilities as a data controller. However, it is possible to calibrate that bal-
ance so that reasonable steps are taken to protect the data, while also offering incentives to
researchers to mitigate the negative aspects of secure-settings. For the researcher, access to
social technologies within a secure-setting, where researchers can share metadata and other
resources, can mitigate against the closed nature of secure-settings, for example see the types
of tools discussed in (Allan, 2009; Keraminiyage et al., 2009). These technologies primarily
address the concerns of researchers as opposed to data owners. However, these technologies
can also be used to benefit the workflow of the data owner.
In the previous section, the potential bottleneck of output review was discussed. This bot-
tleneck arises when the volume of outputs generated exceeds the data owners capacity to
review them within a reasonable time period. If data owners could employ some automation
in the process of output checking and disclosure control then their capacity to review outputs
would increase. This is because some of the analytical burden is shifted to systems which
in turn allows the data owner to concentrate on the results of those analyses. These systems
could provide features that ensure good data provenance and the prospect of reproducibility,
while also communicating appropriate status information to researchers. These combined
processes of automation and communication with researchers help to build trust between
data owners and researchers and support research collaborations.
Consider a data owner that controls individual level data on hospital admissions. The data
are deemed too sensitive for public release and access is restricted to a secure-setting. The
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data owner provides computing resources for data analysis and opts to provide a virtual
research environment for the data users. Similar to previous VREs, users have access to
wikis, forums and other mechanisms to share research objects and metadata. In addition, the
data owner’s statistical disclosure protocol is semi-automated. When users submit outputs
for review, the data underlying their outputs are automatically submitted to pre-determined
risk analysis procedures. These procedures are pre-determined through a process of review
by data owners of their data’s characteristics and the contemporary data environment (as
discussed in Chapter 3). Based on the results of these risk analyses, some potential statistical
disclosure control methods could be applied automatically to the data. As a result of these
automated sequences, the data owner has a body of evidence to review when they review the
user’s output. Further, analysis and consideration could be required before a final decision is
made by the data owner. The system can offer a tracking facility for users to track at what
stage their outputs are being considered, and in addition, the system, with the approval of
the data owner, can provide access to the evidence base for the data owner’s decision on
statistical disclosure control measures.
The approach proposed in abstract above provides benefits for the user and the data owner.
It serves to mitigate the barriers to efficient analysis highlighted earlier in this chapter as
well as provide a novel use of e-Science approaches to the problem of statistical disclosure
control within a Virtual Research Environment. Returning to the success factors set out by
Keraminiyage et al. (2009), it is possible to specify those areas of the collaborative research
process that this new approach addresses. The ability for data owners to clearly demonstrate
their SDC workflow to researchers and provide timely output review resonates with three of
the focus elements: status updates on the review process and documentation provide a level
of communication between the researcher and data owner so that research activity can be ad-
equately planned and revised. Metadata concerning data provenance and a body of evidence
to support SDC decisions help to build trust between the two parties and also demonstrate
the data owner’s ability and specialist knowledge.
Options for the Operationalisation of the User Experience in SDC workflows
At the outset of this chapter it was argued that the user experience is an important factor
in the SDC workflow. As the demand for data increases it is important that the resources
deployed in support of the data can adequately cope with the increasing number of users
and their increasingly complex analytical demands. As Deelman and Gil (2006) discuss in
their work on user experience and workflows for e-Science projects, providing users “with
satisfying experiences and enabling them to conduct their science efficiently and effortlessly
stem from the fact that user expectations vary greatly” (Deelman and Gil, 2006, 146). This
variance in user expectations is also true of the research environments on offer when analysis
of sensitive data is carried out. In our treatment of data utility in 4 the focus is on the data
behaving as close to the original as possible (without putting the data at unacceptable risk
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of disclosure), here the focus is on research environment behaving as closely to a users own
local environment as possible, and potentially enhancing that environment through the access
to new resources.
In to preceding sections the approach of data owners and controllers was presented through
this prism of user experience. The importance of communicating information to users at the
right level of detail and at a frequency that enables their workflow to proceed efficiently is a
common factor in user experience approaches, and Deelman and Gil (2006) also highlights
this in the e-Science context ensuring that users receive feedback from systems if a workflow
has stalled or needs further input from them to continue. Deelman et al also acknowledge that
users analysis develops over time, through testing hypotheses, applying different methods or
partitioning data in myriad ways. This means that enhancements, like the sandbox a VRE
can provide, as well as providing users with ‘dummy’ data to develop their workflow outside
of the secure environment can be important.
In making the case for greater consideration of the user experience, it is important for data
controllers to understand what success in this field might look like. At a superficial level this
could take the form of aggregate statistics on the number of users, the number of research
outputs or statistics on average time taken to complete a workflow. This type of measurement
provides information that standard reporting might produce for the use of a data resource.
For example, the UK Data Archive reported this sort of information in their annual report
and attempted to draw some further conclusions by linking the usage of their services with
the rating of user institutions in the now defunct Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) (UK
Data Archive, 2002).
However, in the scenarios one could envisage in the eHealth field, the total number of users
could be quite small (compared with the UKDA) and the complexity of their usage could
vary greatly. This would make extracting good measures of the user experience from these
types of metrics problematic as the numbers would carry a lot of noise. The total number
of users, and the quality of research outputs, would provide a good indication of the return
on investment made to improve access but still does not capture the user experience per se.
Data controllers could take a more qualitative approach to the user experience during the de-
velopment of data access services and research environments, a good practice example seen
above is the Health Informatics Centre in Dundee where users contributed to the development
process. This approach could be developed further if data owners draw on the literature of
software development, especially areas such as user-centred systems design (Gulliksen et al.,
2003).
In production, the systems designed to facilitate access and analysis could provide data con-
trollers with monitoring of key metrics. These metrics would probe potential bottlenecks in
the SDC workflow such as output review or the granting of access privileges. If enhance-
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ments, like those discussed above (wikis, forums, etc.), are introduced the uptake of these
tools could be monitored and also provide mechanisms for informal feedback between users
and data controllers. It is in this qualitative feedback from users, and perhaps a study of
potential users - those that produce similar research but that have not applied for access, that
would yield the most potentially valuable results. This type of qualitative evaluation has
been seen elsewhere in this thesis and is tool already used by studies of data subjects and
their attitudes toward data access and sharing (Aitken et al., 2011).
In summary, data controllers can use existing approaches from the fields of software devel-
opment (user-centred systems design), virtual research environments, and quantitative and
qualitative evaluation in junction with the technological advances of Web 2.0 infrastruc-
ture to assess and better incorporate the user experience in their SDC workflows. The next
Chapter will provide an example design for a tool-set that can be integrated with the exist-
ing workflows of data owners and other e-infrastructure in the research data environment to
further the approach suggested here.
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Chapter 6
An e-Science Model for Disclosure
Control
This Chapter draws together the theory and literature of the proceeding chapters and posits
that an e-Science approach to the problem of statistical disclosure could address the problems
highlighted, especially in Chapter 5. It begins with a discussion of the NIAH set of tools.
As will be shown, these tools were created in part through an ESRC funded internship with
the Scottish Government which provided access to potential users of these tools. Access to
stakeholders in the disclosure control process allowed for the collection of qualitative data
to inform further development of initial tools. The discussion begins with a brief summary
of the first iteration of NIAH and then proceeds to summarise and build upon qualitative
data collected from semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the statistical disclosure
control process. Once the motivations for the tool-set has been described in some detail,
the attention shifts to how these tools can be integrated with existing or proposed e-Science
infrastructures such as STAT-JR and VANGUARD.
6.1 NIAH - a k-anonymity implementation
In this section, a justification for the initial development of NIAH (see Chapter 3 for details of
the NIAH methodology) as a separate piece of software, as opposed to scripts for statistical
packages, is set out. The purpose of this research is to provide evidence that algorithms
that invoke a range of statistical disclosure control methods in a semi-automatic way will
enable data providers to release data with a higher level of data utility without any increase
in disclosure risk when compared to existing methods. As such, it was important to be able
to develop research tools that could test this functionality. Existing methods, as discussed in
Chapter 5, are often provided by ad hoc user written scripts for statistical packages such as
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SAS, SPSS, stata or by other existing software specifically designed for statistical disclosure
control, for example µ-argus (Hundepool and Willenborg, 1996).
The context for NIAH’s initial development highlighted problems with existing methods
used in the day to day operations of government departments. During work carried out
in collaboration with the Scottish Government’s Health Analytical Services Division, and
the Office for National Statistics’ Methodology Directorate, a statistical disclosure control
methodology was developed for the Scottish Government’s Home-care Census (Scottish
Government, 2003). Similar methodological work and data analysis had been carried out
for the 2010 dataset. In 2010, a k-anonymity assessment of the home care census variables
had been made using user generated scripts in the statistical package SAS. Variables were
hard-coded into these scripts and no metadata were provided to explain the relevant sections
of SAS code. Using these scripts on the latest data available (2011) proved to be difficult
without forensic examination of the SAS code and substantial re-coding to reverse-engineer
the process. In addition, the output generated from the SAS scripts still required a significant
amount of user analysis to interpret the results. This was in part due to SAS not being explic-
itly designed for k-anonymity assessments and in part the type of reports generated by the
scripts. These issues also contributed to resource constraints. The Scottish Government op-
erate a centralised SAS statistics server with user terminals running tasks on the server from
local SAS clients, the output reports generated by the user scripts often put considerable
strain on the client side machine, and on occasion, rendered it inoperable.
Given the research statement above, NIAH was designed to be portable and usable with-
out knowledge of a particular statistics package. It is the position of this research that this
approach provides the following benefits over user generated scripts:
• NIAH provides a generic implementation of a k-anonymity assessment. This means it
can be run on any dataset in the specified CSV format, without adjustment of package
specific syntax files.
• The analysis provided by NIAH is replicable. The same analysis can be re-run, and
changes to the k-anonymity assessment are trivial to make. In the further development
use cases provided, it is also envisaged that these tools will keep a log of all activity
in a format that will provide users with an audit trail of how data have been treated to
ensure good data provenance.
• NIAH is portable. Written in Java, NIAH can be run on a range of systems without
compatibility issues.
• NIAH scales with the available resources. NIAH can process large datasets efficiently
if sufficient RAM is available - many statistical packages have record/variable limita-
tions.
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• NIAH supports remote execution. The implementation of NIAH used in Health Ana-
lytical Services Division uses a web service to connect to the tool and run it remotely
on a central server (this is discussed further at the end of this chapter). This provides
the opportunity for developing statistical disclosure control processes that fit with the
virtual research environments discussed in Chapter 5, where data sources might be dis-
tributed across a number of physical locations (for an example, see the VANGUARD
system in section 6.4).
• The GPL v31 license means NIAH can be used and modified freely within the terms
of license; this, combined with the portability, enables data providers to set up their
own processes across different systems This again removes some of the barriers from
data controllers, as specific licenses for statistical packages are not required to carry
out k-anonymity assessments.
6.2 The data users’ perspective
As has been outlined elsewhere in this dissertation, statistical disclosure control forms part
of the overall exploration process when working with quantitative data. It is essential that
data owners are not only aware of, but also that they employ strategies such as those that
have been summarised in Chapter 4 to understand, the disclosure risk their data poses. It
is also important for data owners to ensure that their strategies balance not only data utility,
but also the data’s usability as discussed in Chapter 5. As outlined in the preceding chapter,
data owners should attempt to gather qualitative data from users and other actors within the
SDC workflow in order to limit the barriers to efficient data utilisation. Data controllers
can incorporate the users perspective through system and process design methodologies like
user-centred systems design (again see Chapter 5) and also through the implementation of
informal and formal feedback mechanisms.
As a pilot study, that might satisfy in part the user experience requirement set out above,
a small-scale interview study was undertaken. Between March and June 2012 five semi-
structured interviews were carried out with users of quantitative data, with a focus on linked
data. The users were drawn from academic, health board and local authority backgrounds
in order to offer evidence which provided coverage both relevant to this research and the
Scottish Government’s data linkage project; linking health, housing and social care data
(HHSC) (Scottish Government, 2011a) for more details on the methdology of this study see
Chapter 3.
These interviews covered a range of topics including metadata, remote access, disclosure
1details of the licence can be found at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
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control methods, and data analysis workflows. There was a clear distinction between aca-
demic users and other analysts in terms of their expectations regarding data quality and level
of available detail across variables in a dataset. The academic participants had been working
with linked data for some time, and this had occurred under a number of different information
governance regimes. Previously, linked datasets had been provided to researchers directly
on CD or by FTP transfer direct to their computers. This earlier model placed the majority
of the responsibility burden for security and disclosure control upon the individual user, not
the data owner. Therefore, the introduction of physical infrastructure such as safe havens, or
other restrictions on data accessibility, have been met with some scepticism by researchers.
Academics discussed the negative impact of accessing data for a prescribed amount of time
in a location away from their own work environment. These included lack of access to good
metadata or previous analytical work, as well as other local resources.
However, they acknowledged that the changing information governance landscape has meant
that these changes were necessary. They also discussed the positive aspects of working
within safe haven environments. These largely centred on the capacity for collaborative
working supported by emerging virtual research infrastructures that accompany some safe
havens (e.g. websites, forums, shared drive spaces). This topic is revisited in part in a later
discussion regarding the metadata from statistical disclosure control process.
For the analysts, whose primary role involved service planning and analysis used for opera-
tional purposes, these streams of linked data were quite new. As a consequence, expectations
were not as concrete as those expressed by academic users. A general feeling at the local
operational level was that they supply data to a number of projects and very rarely see any
return or engagement beyond the initial transaction.
Analysts expressed some concern about their capacity to manage and analyse this new data
effectively. Informal feedback from different local authorities (LAs) suggested that the re-
sources allocated for analysis, especially in terms of staffing, and the use of statistical pack-
ages, varies widely across LAs. The Scottish Government, for its part, has acknowledged
that some analytical support will need to be in place to help LA’s and health boards make
the most of new data on offer. Statistical disclosure control was highlighted as a particular
issue in this context. Analysts reported a lack of resources both human and technical to sup-
port statistical disclosure control work beyond the ad hoc solutions developed by individual
analysts or analytical teams.
The areas of convergence for all users lay in the work environment and tools to aid efficient
analysis. The theme that emerged most strongly from these discussions was what work could
be done before entering safe havens or other physical infrastructure. Metadata was a popular
topic in this vein. Respondents expressed a view that good metadata is often discussed but
rarely implemented successfully — it is important that data be detailed and accurate, but also
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accessible, a point emphasised by a number of respondents. Projects often opt for compre-
hensive data dictionaries which can be inaccessible to novice users without the right tools
for self-navigation. For example, the NHS ISD’s data dictionary for the Scottish Morbidity
Record (SMR) datasets contains a significant amount of detail, but few tools for navigating
it by topic of interest, keyword, etc. In contrast, a good example of metadata is provided by
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) which is now part of the Understanding Society
Survey (Boreham and Constantine, 2008).
Extending metadata from a flat document into a more interactive format was also an idea
that both groups discussed. This was considered in a similar vein to the transition of web-
sites from flat html documents to Web 2.0 structures (such as forums, social networking
sites, etc.). Participants expressed an interest in the development of user-led metadata that
could complement the ‘official’ metadata. They suggested that this could include space for
users to work collaboratively on a piece of analysis, or where users can post their own com-
ments, derived variables and pieces of code. It was noted that projects like Method Box (The
MethodBox Project, 2011) and MyExperiment (De Roure et al., 2008) appear to include the
type of virtual infrastructure that users expressed support for. Both of these projects were
created through e-Science funding calls by UK research councils.
In addition to good metadata, it was also noted that access to good training data could help
make user’s time in the safe haven more efficient. Training data would give users a safe
dataset, formatted in the same way as the real data, upon which they could develop their
analysis prior to accessing real data. Both groups of users expressed an interest in this idea,
with different motivations. For academic users it would negate some of the constraints that
accessing a physical safe haven might place on their workflow. For the local analysts it would
be a useful tool for learning about a dataset that they had not used before, so they know what
to expect from the real data.
It was also observed that this combination of training data, good metadata and a view to more
collaborative working would reduce the amount of ‘reinventing of the wheel’ that partici-
pants suggested occurs in this field. For example, without communication between groups
of analysts, the same derived variable or cross classification will be created using similar
code numerous times. Lastly, participants identified the impact that human resources would
have on their own work. Issues were raised such as potential bottle necks in output check-
ing, and general response times to queries if specific knowledge was concentrated in a few
individuals. In the worst cases, some participants suggested that these issues posed a threat
to the data being used at all.
From these findings, general themes can be drawn out to inform the development of tools
that advance this research but also address some of the needs of the user community. The
general themes identified here are: modes of access to data; the responsibility for disclosure
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control; communication and collaboration between users, and data controllers; the specialist
knowledge and expertise burden for analysis; and access to good metadata and training data.
Some of these themes are picked up elsewhere in this research. These will also form hooks
for the narrative in the remainder of this chapter.
The domain knowledge of the participants in the above was combined with the literature
reviewed in Chapter 4 and observations of disclosure control workflows during work carried
out at the Scottish Government. From this a number of potential use cases were summarised
to inform the development of research tools beyond just an implementation of k-anonymity
(see Section 3.7).
6.3 Comparison with ad hoc user generated scripts
It is important to understand how the approach in this research performs when compared to
existing methods. In order to compare the two approaches, the NIAH tool-set and an ad hoc
script provided by NHS Information Services Division were compared directly. This script
is typical of the type of user generated statistical package script that is used when assessing
disclosure risk in a real-world analysis.
The basis for comparison is a k-anonymity assessment of a series of randomly generated
comma separated datasets that range in size from 100,000 records to 4,000,000 records
(file sizes in MB range from 10 to 382). To establish a point of comparison, the NIAH
k-anonymity algorithm was implemented in both Java and C programming languages. These
implementation were tested against each other using a large memory instance provided by
Amazon cloud services. The specifications of the instance are provided in Table 6.1.
17.1 GB of memory
6.5 EC2 Compute Units (2 virtual cores with 3.25 EC2 Compute Units each)
420 GB of instance storage
64-bit platform
I/O Performance: Moderate
EBS-Optimized Available: No
API name: m2.xlarge
Table 6.1: Specification of the Amazon Cloud Instance used to test the Scalability of the
implementations of NIAH in Java and C
For the C and Java implementations of NIAH, both execution time and the amount of mem-
ory used were recorded. These results are provided in figure 6.1 and 6.2. These results
are not unexpected given the overheads associated with the Java Virtual Machine and Java’s
compliance with standards to ensure portability across platforms. The Java implementation
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only has results up to the 2M record test data as at 4M there was insufficient memory to com-
plete the test. In both time and memory usage, the C implementation outperforms the Java
implementation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the algorithm trades off memory usage
for faster execution times which explains the consistent scaling in the amount of memory
required (average of ˜28 times the input file size for the C version and ˜62 times for the Java
version).
As the C version of NIAH is a compatible version of the Java implementation, it is the C
implementation that is tested against the ad hoc user scripts. The example script used here
was provided by NHS Scotland Information Services Division. It is written for the SPSS
statistical package. The same parameters that NIAH’s command line interface requires are
required to be hard coded into the script. Further to this, extra lines of code must be added for
the number of key variables specified. Due to the extra set up costs in configuring the script
per input file the comparison here should be seen as conservative, at best. This is because
the execution time provided does not include these extra time overheads. Figure 6.3 shows
the execution time comparison of the the C version of NIAH and the SPSS script for the
same datasets, increasing in size. Due to the requirement for SPSS to be installed, and only
a window licensed copy being available, a comparison of memory usage is not provided. At
an anecdotal level, using the windows system monitor as a guide the SPSS runtime uses less
memory to access and analyse datasets. Further information about the SPSS data structures
and memory usage are not publicly available. As Figure 6.3 shows the C version of NIAH
out performs the SPSS script for the range of dataset sizes provided. In this comparison,
the limitation on dataset sizes was local memory on the test machine (8GB RAM). For the
purposes of this research, the comparison up to 2 million records is adequate, given more
resources and further time this could be explored further. However, as indicated earlier, the
SPSS execution time values are quite generous given the extra script editing overhead.
What has been shown in this section is that the NIAH tool set can perform faster than ad hoc
users scripts commonly used by data owners at the present time. Also the design decisions
made in the development of the tool set are based on qualitative evidence drawn from both
the potential data end users and data owners. In addition, it has been shown that NIAH has
been developed with a view to added functionality and the integration of these tools within
existing workflows for statistical disclosure control. In the next section, the latter of these
two aspects, integration, will be discussed in the context of other emerging e-Science tools
in the field of data analysis.
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Figure 6.1: Execution Time for the C & Java Implementations of NIAH
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Figure 6.2: Memory Usage for the C & Java Implementations of NIAH
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Figure 6.3: Execution Time for the C & SPSS k-anonymity Assessments
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6.4 Integration of NIAH with existing e-Science in-
frastructure
As has been discussed in this chapter, the motivation for a tool set like NIAH is the provision
of tools that can be easily integrated with existing workflows. The decision to follow a
CSV data format allows for the transfer of inputs and outputs to and from the tool set via
other data analysis packages. For example, in the overview of the broader range of NIAH’s
functionality, the stata command is defined. This command would pass the NIAH outputs
to the stata package using stata’s own command line interface to import the CSV data. This
type of interoperability provides a simple example of the potential for integration. What is
set out in this next section is a more complex integration of NIAH with existing e-Science
infrastructures; STAT-JR and VANGUARD.
STAT-JR
STAT-JR2 is described as “a software environment for promoting interactive complex sta-
tistical modelling” (Charlton et al., 2012, 2013). This Python based system allows users of
different abilities to run statistical tests from their browser. It also provides inter-operability
by providing a wrapper for complex methods provided by packages like MLwiN (Rasbash
et al., 2009), JAGS (Plummer) and stata (StataCorp, 2013). STAT-JR fits a common e-
Science model by providing a browser-based solution that allows users to easily access a
range of statistical methods and tools to complement existing science workflows. To achieve
this STAT-JR uses a series of Python templates which when served with parameters by the
user through the browser interface calls the required tools and executes the task. The re-
sults are then presented through the browser and the user is given the option to download
associated outputs.
Given this range of interoperability, STAT-JR would seem an ideal candidate for NIAH inte-
gration. This gives the users of STAT-JR the added functionality of carrying out k-anonymity
assessments on their datasets prior to or after other operations have been carried out using
the STAT-JR system. Due to the templating system used by STAT-JR the technical aspects
of integrating NIAH are relatively trivial. A Python template was constructed that takes user
parameters from the browser interface and enters them into an appropriate command line ar-
guments string for NIAH. NIAH is then executed using the those command line arguments.
The returned outputs are then displayed in the browser and the option to download the data
is given. Below is a worked through example of how NIAH operates within the STAT-JR
environment (including figures 6.4,6.5,6.6 & 6.7).
1. Select the NIAH Template: The NIAH template is selected from the Data Manipula-
2More information about STAT-JR can be obtained from http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/software/statjr/
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tion category. It should be noted that the data has already been selected at this stage.
2. Input NIAH Parameters: The value of k is set for the assessment, and the key vari-
ables are chosen from a list generated from the input data set.
3. Review Input: Before the operation is executed STAT-JR displays the input parame-
ters and information about the system.
4. Review Outputs and Export: Datasets generated by NIAH can be viewed in the
browser window, and files associated with this execution of NIAH can be downloaded.
As the outputs are generated by NIAH within the STAT-JR environment, those outputs
can then subsequently be selected and used in the other statistical functions that are
available within the environment.
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Figure 6.4: STAT-JR: Template Selection
Figure 6.5: STAT-JR: Setting NIAH Parameters
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Figure 6.6: STAT-JR: Review of NIAH Inputs
Figure 6.7: STAT-JR: Review of NIAH Output
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VANGUARD
The VANGUARD (Virtual ANonymisation Grid for Unified Access of Remote Data) sys-
tem is a secure data transfer system specifically designed for use in data-linkage scenarios
where data sources are distributed across external locations and organisations (Stell et al.,
2009; Sinnott et al., 2008b). It was developed by the National e-Science Centre in the con-
text of e-Health projects that considered the infrastructure requirements for the sharing and
linking of electronic health records for research. These projects (for example Sinnott et al.
(2008a); Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP)) also identified the need to combine
ethical and technological approaches to address issues of data access, which resonates with
the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2 (Sinnott et al., 2006, 5). More specifically,
the Virtual Organisations for Trials and Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project which
sought to streamline the clinical trials process across a number of participating partner insti-
tutions, added a substantial caveat that their grid computing based system would be subject
to “strict ethical, data protection and security constraints” (Sinnott et al., 2006, 2). However,
these constraints were only included in the design as a signpost to human processes within
data-owning organisations. What is set out below is a proposal to integrate the NIAH tool
set within the VANGUARD system to provide an operationalisation of these constraints to
further streamline the research process.
At the conceptual level of VANGUARD’s design are the following components (Stell et al.,
2009, 332):
1. Viewers are used to access potentially remote datasets (typically this is associated
with a specific clinical research study that has been approved by an independent ethics
body).
2. Guardians protect the data resources being provided to the virtual organisation.
3. Agents mediate the exchange between the guardian and the viewer.
4. Bankers maintain a record of all transactions that have taken place and limit resource
data exchanges based on accountability information.
In the context of this research, the Guardian component is of particular interest. Stell et
al define the Guardian as the protector of the data sources. There could also be multiple
Guardians for each discrete data source. The specific tasks of the Guardian are defined
as: “The Guardians periodically check for requests (queries) they should respond to; the
Guardian pulls requests that they should act upon; the Guardian decrypts and makes a locally
defined authorization decision on the query, and when satisfied that it meets all local policy
criteria on data access and usage, executes the query” (Stell et al., 2009, 333). Current
practice would indicate that the Guardian is akin to the data owner role more familiar in
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the context of this research. Therefore, they would need to perform their own queries to
ascertain if the required policy criteria have been satisfied. As has been argued elsewhere,
existing approaches to this role are potential sites for bottlenecks in the data access and
analysis workflow.
If NIAH were integrated with the VANGUARD system, a Guardian could use the tools set
out earlier in this chapter to facilitate their decisions. Further to this, if their policy criteria
could be framed and defined in he context of parameters to match the input requirements
of NIAH then a degree of analytical automation can be established to make the Guardian
workflows more efficient. A high-level comparison, using the methods at the disposal of a
Guardian of NHS records in Scotland versus the same Guardian using an integrated NIAH
tool set will be considered. Using the VANGUARD system within a common existing work-
flow, a query is created by researchers to link and analyse two datasets (e.g. The Scottish
Record of Morbidity and data from the GPASS system used by general practitioners). That
query is received by the Agent, which sends the relevant part of the query to the Guardians
for each specific data set. The Guardian must periodically check for queries from the Agent
to approve. When a Guardian becomes aware of a query, time and resources must be al-
located for testing the query against their policy criteria. If the model of ad hoc scripts is
used then the Guardian is required to provide a significant level of input (adjusting code
to meet the relevant dataset format and variables). While this process is being carried out
the researcher is waiting for data to progress their research. To use a software engineering
analogy, to some extent the research project is ’busy-waiting’ until the Guardian releases the
’lock’ on the query.
It should be remembered that this research does not hypothesise that a fully automated
‘Guardian’ role could or should be implemented. However, if NIAH and the associated tool
set were integrated into the VANGUARD workflow as set out above, some of the wasted
time between query submission and approval could be reclaimed. This can be achieved by
modifying the data owner’s workflow to include the following: a data owner should have
ostensibly developed their policy on data access and statistical disclosure control following
good practice as the literature sets out in chapter 4. In doing so they have knowledge of
their data environment, their data’s characteristics and the views of relevant stakeholders.
These policy considerations can be expressed in terms of values of k and a series of poten-
tial quasi-identifiers which can be used as input parameters for NIAH. This then allows for
the semi-automation of the Guardian process: a query is created by researchers to link and
analyse two datasets; that query is received by the Agent, which sends the relevant part of
the query to the Guardians for each data set to be linked; the Guardian’s system could then
carry out a range of k-anonymity assessments and implement different SDC algorithms; the
Guardian must periodically review the results of these assessments to carry out any further
SDC work.
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This modified workflow encompasses a number of benefits over existing approaches. The
systematic approach to creating policy, which is then applied in a consistent and replicable
way, ensures consistency within a data owning organisation. This has the added advantage
that this process can be well documented and creates additional metadata that the data users
can review to encourage trust in the data owners approach. The semi-automatic application
of SDC methods could remove the first pass of data analysis from the Guardian’s workload
allowing them to concentrate on reviewing the results of these methods and making an in-
formed decision on data access and linkage. This also increases the volume of queries that a
Guardian could process over time. The added logging, documentation and ability to replicate
analytical work that the NIAH tool set could provide, allows the Guardian to demonstrate the
processes that have been carried out if a data user were to appeal against a denial of access
and this documentation could form the basis for a discussion with the data users about their
requirements and what revisions might need to be made to their original query. For example,
perhaps requesting fewer variables, or requesting a variable at a more coarse level of detail.
128
Chapter 7
Case Study: Scottish Government
Deployment and Data Analysis
This Chapter presents a case study of the implementation of the tools and methods discussed
in the preceding chapters in the context of the Scottish Government’s analytical services. The
first section of the Chapter discusses the Scottish Government’s own deployment of NIAH
as a web application. The Chapter then continues with a demonstration of NIAH in use in a
secure setting at the Scottish Government. This demonstration provides a real-world analysis
of linked education data, and data regarding children looked after by the state, in which the
NIAH toolset is used to assess the potential risks and implement disclosure control measures
before the resulting data utility is assessed.
7.1 NIAH in use at the Scottish Government
Having shown how the NIAH tool set can be integrated into existing e-Science infrastructure,
one last example is presented to show how organisations have adapted NIAH to fit with
their own infrastructure and workflows. The Scottish Government through Health Analytical
Services and the Scottish Exchange of Data Unit (ScotXed) have implemented a system for
using NIAH to carry out k-anonymity assessments on datasets they hold before publishing
data or distributing data to third parties. They use a web interface (see figures 7.1 & 7.2)
which communicates with NIAH installed on a centralised server. This allows analysts to
use the NIAH tool set without the limitations of their local machines resources and offers
the Scottish Government the ability to store logs of NIAH activity centrally so this activity is
resilient to changes in personnel. This model of implementation is also suitable for a wider
roll-out to local authorities. As identified in the discussion of the data users’ perspectives,
a problem for both local and national governments is a lack of consistency in analytical
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expertise, combined with the use of different software. Respondents highlighted the vastly
different resources available to Local Authorities for statistical disclosure control and data
publishing processes. Use of the NIAH tool set, as part of their data management workflow,
could ensure at least some consistency in approach between institutions.
Figure 7.1: The Scottish Government’s landing page for their implementation of NIAH
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Figure 7.2: The Scottish Government’s output page for their implementation of NIAH
7.2 A Demonstration of NIAH Within a Secure Envi-
ronment: Scottish Government Education Data
Having discussed the development of the NIAH tool-set earlier in Chapters 3 and 6, the focus
now moves to a case study using NIAH in a real-world setting as part of a statistical disclo-
sure analysis workflow. The subject of the case study are data from the Scottish Government,
drawn from administrative sources about ‘looked after children’. Looked after children in
this context are defined by the Children (Scotland) Act 19951:
‘Looked After Children’ are defined as those in the care of their local authority.
The majority will come into one of these categories:
Looked after at home:
1These details are taken from the Scottish Government, see http://www.Scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Young-
People/protecting/lac/about Accessed:03/07/2013
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Where the child (or young person) has been through the Children’s Hearings
system and is subject to a Supervision Requirement (regular contact with social
services) with no condition of residence. The child then continues to live in their
regular place of residence (i.e. the family home).
Looked after away from home:
Where the child (or young person) has either: been through the Children’s Hear-
ings system and is subject to a Supervision Requirement with a condition of
residence; is subject to an order made or authorisation or warrant granted by
virtue of Chapter 2, 3 or 4 of Part II of the 95 Act; is being provided with ac-
commodation under Section 25 (a voluntary agreement); or is placed by a local
authority which has made a permanence order under Section 80 of the Adoption
and Children Act 2007. In these cases the child is cared for away from their
normal place of residence, by foster or kinship carers, prospective adopters, in
residential care homes, residential schools or secure units.
The data are recorded at the local authority level by social work departments and then col-
lated centrally to form an annual Looked After Children Survey by the Scottish Government.
Publications are then generated centrally and these include aggregate statistics, for example
see Scottish Government (2013) and Scottish Government (2011d). In keeping with the
Scottish Government’s position on opening-up administrative data and offering data link-
age opportunities across sectors, data such as the Looked After Children Survey could be a
candidate for release in some sanitised form. For example, this data combined with other
education data sources such as the Pupil Census or Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA)
data could prove to be an important resource for education researchers, local authorities, and
central government. However, this data provides a realistic scenario for the work described
in this dissertation because the subject matter is particularly sensitive in that it concerns
children, and in particular vulnerable children looked after by the state.
Before proceeding to describe the dataset further and beginning the analysis, it is worth not-
ing the technical and administrative configuration used in this instance, as it demonstrates a
possible model for the integration of NIAH with existing work-flows in an applied setting.
The data are held centrally on servers controlled by the Scottish Exchange of Education Data
(ScotXed) unit which is part of the Education Analytical Services Division within the Learn-
ing and Justice Directorate of the Scottish Government. The data are stored in a Microsoft
SQL Server database and were exported as comma separated values for the NIAH processes.
NIAH was installed on the central ScotXed server with the following specification: Dell
PowerEdge R710 with 8 EM64T 2.9MHz Intel Processors, 32GB RAM, running Microsoft
Windows Server 2003 and Java version 1.6 64bit server edition. The server was accessed
by the researcher via a remote desktop connection and NIAH was operated from the com-
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mand line interface. Any post-processing of output data was done via the researcher’s local
machine connected to the Scottish Government’s central SAS statistics server. All data, out-
puts and analysis were contained within the Scottish Government’s systems and final outputs
were audited by the Education Analytical Services Division. Figure 7.3 shows a graphical
representation of this configuration.
Figure 7.3: The Technical Configuration for Analysis while Analysing the Education Dataset
at the Scottish Government
The dataset generated from administrative sources for the case study contained 8, 185 records
from the 2010 Looked After Children Survey and contained a range of demographic infor-
mation combined with data on education institutions, student attainment, and looked after
placement details. The subset of variables that either form part of the quasi-identifier key
variable analysis or are highlighted as sensitive variables that need to be protected will be
the main focus.2 Following the mixed qualitative/quantitative methodology detailed in chap-
2For more details on the looked after children data collected by the Scottish Government, including data
specifications and collection methods; see the ScotXed website www.ScotXed.net.
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ter 4.2, 2 possible intruder scenarios for the data were considered; this approach is based on
the work of Elliot and Dale (1999). Differing from Elliot and Dale’s work in the level of de-
tail, because of the available variables and metadata, two major groups of possible attackers
are defined — those known directly by the target and those that are not. These are labelled
‘relatives’ and ‘strangers’ and these were discussed informally with government education
analysts to assure their relative validity. The two intruder scenario groups are:
1. Relatives
Our first intruder scenario was based around a relative of a particular child attempting
to re-identify the child’s record to discover some details about their placement in care.
To this intruder scenario the following potential key variables are attributed that could
be mapped to the data: date of birth, gender, ethnic group, national identity, main
disability and datazone (low level geography).
2. Strangers
A stranger could be seeking information for a number of reasons, including journalism,
activism or political motivations. In legal cases involving young people for example,
efforts are made to preserve their anonymity and therefore disclosure from anonymised
sources could be an avenue of attack. To this intruder group the variables: gender, age
(specifically not date of birth), ethnic group (potentially at an abstracted level of detail),
and local authority are attributed.
From these two intruder scenarios the key variables are drawn out and presented in table
7.1; Scottish Parliamentary Constituency has also been included so that some comparative
work can be conducted across the three geographical variables present in the dataset. Student
stage and an urban/rural classification are also included to discuss the problems of proxy in-
dicators. Table 7.2 is a list of the potentially sensitive variables present in the subset of the
data. These represent information about the data subjects that might be considered espe-
cially private. With only a cursory examination, variables that might indicate an individual’s
socio-economic status, their educational attainment and their school type (specifically with
reference to those that attend a special school) have been chosen. Each key variable will be
described and some univariate statistics will be provided to illustrate how they are positioned
within the dataset as a whole.
Geographical Variables
The geographical variables give us an indication of where risk might be concentrated. It
should be noted that it would be unusual to release data with geographic areas smaller than
local authority for this type of data, however the presence of 3 geographic variables gives us
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Variable Description
Lacode Local Authority Code (3 digit)
Lacdob Date of Birth (YYYY-MM-DD)
Lacgender Gender (M/F)
Lacethnicgroup Ethnic Group (17 categories - 2 digit)
Nationalidentity National Identity (9 categories - 2 digit)
Datazone Datazone (small area geography)
SParlCon Scottish Parliamentary Constituency (2 digit)
MainDisability Main Disability (2 digit)
StudentStage Student Stage e.g. Primary 1 (coded as 2 characters)
Table 7.1: Education Data: Key Variables & Descriptions
Variable Description
FreeSchoolMealRegistered Whether a student is registered for
free school meals
StudentLookedAfter Whether the student is looked after
by the local authority either at
home or out of the home
SIMD Scottish Index of Multiple
Deprivation
Attainment Variables(Multiple) Various variables detailing a
students level & quantity of
qualifications
SchoolType Type of School (Primary,
Secondary, Special)
Table 7.2: Education Data: Potentially Sensitive Variables
the ability to see what the effect of different levels of geography have on disclosure risk in
this particular case.
Local Authority (LA)
Figure 7.4 provides a breakdown of the number of records by local authority. From these
initial descriptive statistics the number of records with a given value is considered as a crude
indication of disclosure risk. For example, consider LA 330 (Orkney) with only 23 cases;
the potential for re-identification given knowledge of the LA alone is greater than for LA 260
(Glasgow City) that carries 1604 cases.
Scottish Parliamentary Constituency
From Figure 7.5 it is shown that the geographical partitioning on constituency lines has
spread the distribution of cases across a larger number of geographies. However constituency
67 (Shetland) has the lowest number of cases but at 16 this does not look very different from
the 23 cases for Orkney at the LA level. It should be noted that different geographical
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Figure 7.4: Education Data: Frequency Distribution of Local Authority (N=8185)
partitioning with a similar number of areas can have completely different risk profiles. With
this comparison of LA and Parliamentary Constituency it can be shown that the counter-
intuitive effects of geographic detail on disclosure risk highlighted by Elliot et al. (1998) and
Witkowski (2008) are partially in affect. This literature focuses on the effects of different
scales of geography for which the disclosure risk does not scale similarly. For example, a
group of records with particularly unique characteristics present at the datazone level might
also be particularly unique at local authority level despite the aggregation of geography.
In addition, if multiple geographical variables were released, or variables that could act as a
proxy for geography were included, for example the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation
(SIMD) or Urban Rural indicators, then particular attention should be paid during any dis-
closure risk assessment in case records can be better located by an intruder combining their
knowledge of geographic details, see Steel and Sperling (2001).
As a small example of the proxy geography problem consider an analysis of the data that
includes LA codes and the commonly used 8 fold Urban-Rural indicator. Using the NIAH
tool-set’s k-anonymity algorithm, 24 records were identified with unique combinations of
LA and Urban-Rural Indicator. To achieve this NIAH was executed with the key variables
local authority and the urban/rural indicator using a threshold of 2. With this knowledge,
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Figure 7.5: Education Data: Frequency Distribution of Scottish Parliamentary Constituency
(N=8185)
an intruder could use publicly available maps of the urban rural classifications published by
the Scottish Government in order to significantly narrow the geographical area attached to
a particular record. To better illustrate this point, Figure 7.6 is a subsection of a map of
Scotland colour coded by urban/rural indicator. Consider the area circled in Figure 7.6, this
area in the Highland Local Authority north of Inverness is made up of ‘Very Remote Small
Towns’ in the 8 fold urban rural classification and forms a small part of the Highland area
as a whole. If an intruder had access to this knowledge beyond simply the local authority it
would significantly narrow down the geographical location of the record.
Datazones
The datazones are based on census output areas and form the key small area statistical geog-
raphy in Scotland. There are over six thousand areas and they have populations of between
500 and 1, 000 individuals. As such they carry a much greater potential disclosure risk than
the LA and constituency areas. Table 7.3 gives us an insight into this risk level by showing
the relative uniqueness of records in the dataset that belong to a particular datazone. As
we can see 60% of records belong to a datazone with less than 5 records associated with it
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Figure 7.6: Education Data: A Section of the 8 fold Urban-Rural Classification Map
and over 50% of datazones have less than 3 records associated with them. The implication
of these percentages is that the ability of an intruder to narrow down the pool of possible
correct matches is greatly enhanced if the data contain datazone as a geographic variable,
because this increases their chance of finding unique records that could match their a priori
knowledge.
Demographic Variables
Age (Date of Birth)
Our dataset contains the full date of birth, however it is unlikely this would ever be re-
leased without some perturbation because including a full date of birth further increases
the chances of uniques in the data, see the treatment of date of birth in Iyengar (2002) and
Sweeney (2001) for example. It is of little analytical value, apart from in studies of attain-
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Datazones
with only 1
record
Datazones
with less
than 3
records
Datazones
with less
than 5
records
Datazones
with less
than 10
records
% of
records
(N=8185)
14% 32% 60% 92%
% of
datazones
(N=2988)
38% 62% 85% 98%
Table 7.3: Education Data: Summary of the Number of Records per Datazone
ment in which where a student’s birthday falls in the year is important such as Angrist and
Krueger (1992). This highlights, again, the qualitative elements of the analysis, as argued
by microdata projects such as the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) at the
University of Minnesota: data utility is highly user specific and can only be determined ac-
curately through dialogue with users. To cover the general use case, an age in years variable
is derived for the analysis and this is used below. To clarify here, age in this dataset is the age
derived from the date of birth for end of the Looked After Children collection period (31st
July). Age is a common key variable across a number of datasets and it is relatively easy to
obtain from public sources. Figure 7.7 shows the distribution of the age variable, given that
this is education data concerning young people the data is fairly homogeneous. However,
immediate areas of concern, with regard to statistical disclosure, are concentrated in the up-
per end of the distribution with both ages 20 and 21 having counts of less than 100 records.
At this stage it can only be speculated upon as to how this potential disclosiveness can be
addressed and these records might be candidates for top-coding or suppression, as seen in
the Sample of Anonymised Records (Willenborg and De Waal, 1996, 42). This method is
suggested as other forms of non-perturbative disclosure control have little effect for outlying
values with few records associated with them.
Gender
Gender itself does not normally present a disclosure risk, but it can be a mitigating factor
when cross-tabulations with other key variables are taken into account. As with age, gender
is a fairly easy variable for an intruder to know a priori. Table 7.4 provides the breakdown
of gender in the data. All factors being equal it might be expected that the gender balance
would match that of the population3 however, there is a slightly higher number of males than
females looked after by the state. To demonstrate the potential problem of combining the
gender key variables with others, Figure 7.8 shows Gender in combination with age for the
3the 2011 Scottish Census shows a split of 48% male and 52% female —
http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/en/censusresults/bulletin.html.
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Figure 7.7: Education Data: Age Distribution (N=8185)
N=8185 Female Male
% of Records 46% 54%
Table 7.4: Education Data: Gender Distribution
City of Edinburgh Local Authority. The population distribution of gender is largely reflected
in figure 7.8. In terms of a potential intrusion scenario, knowledge of a target’s gender can
potentially half the ambiguity associated with a match. For example, from figure 7.8 we
know that there are 72 individuals aged 14, if it is known that an intruder is targeting a
female, the target group is reduced to 38.
Ethnic Group
Ethnicity data presents a particular problem for disclosure control in Scotland especially, be-
cause ethnicity in Scotland is relatively homogeneous, with the majority of the population
falling into a ‘white’ category with few outliers. This data is often removed from research
datasets because the disclosure risk outweighs the analytical utility unless the study has a
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Figure 7.8: Education Data: Gender Distribution by Age for the City of Edinburgh Local
Authority (N=759)
particular focus on ethnicity. This lack of data sources has been highlighted, especially in
the health field (Bhopal et al., 2011; Ranganathan and Bhopal, 2006). This homogeneity is
very apparent in Figure 7.9. However, it is possible to counter this argument about homo-
geneity The categorisation of ethnicity into a large number of very specific groups, which
are subjectively assigned potentially introduces a significant amount of ambiguity for an in-
truder to navigate. Even if the level of detail is reduced to ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ an intruder
cannot be certain to which category their target might be assigned. This also resonates with
issues of operationalising ethnicity data in analysis more generally, see Lambert (2010).
National Identity
National identity also presents a similar challenge to ethnic group because of the relative
homogeneity of the data. However, the ability for an adversary to know national identity a
priori is less obvious than for ethnic group because of the greater subjectivity in the assigned
value. Figure 7.10 provides a breakdown of national identity.
It is again worth noting that the suppression of a variable such as ethnic group or national
identity is not a universal rule. A study interested in the attainment of children from different
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Figure 7.9: Education Data: Ethic Group Distribution (N=8185)
ethnic groups or national identities might not be interested in gender or age for example.
Therefore, the level of detail required for effective analysis could be negotiated for specific
research projects. Throughout this case study, the focus has been the more general public
use case and the typical variables such as age and gender which are common to the majority
of analyses, but this need for flexibility should not be forgotten.
Main Disability
Main disability is perhaps not a commonly analysed variable, however given that this is
an exploratory analysis it is considered for its disclosive potential. The scenario here is
that a target for re-identification has a disability known to the adversary that could aid their
attack. Figure 7.11 displays the distribution of main disability categories. The majority
of individuals have no disability and besides social, emotional and behavioural difficulties
the other disability categories are too small to be represented here. These include visual
and hearing impairments, physical disabilities and learning disabilities. These form ‘non-
obvious’ categories and it is unclear that they would be significant in an intruder’s attempt to
disclose sensitive data or re-identify an individual, however consider the scenario represented
in Figure 7.12, in which the intruder knows the age, local authority and that the individual
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Figure 7.10: Education Data: National Identity Distribution (N=8185)
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has a physical disability. The ambiguity is reduced significantly, in some cases down to one
record.
Figure 7.11: Education Data: Main Disability Distribution (N=8185)
Student Stage
Our last key variable is student stage, an indicator of what level of schooling the individual
receives. This has been included as a proxy for age, because they are strongly correlated;
if student stage and age were released together it could undermine any disclosure control
carried out on the age variable. Figure 7.13 demonstrates the proxy for age problem by
stacking student stage against age when age is recoded into 5 year bands. The banding was
carried out using the ‘Banding’ command in the NIAH tool-set, bands were created using the
‘BandingCreate’ command (Bands are created by specifying a banding schema in advance
or interactively; users can chose to automatically divide the age range into equally sized bins
or by manually entering the age groups). Using student stage it is possible to partition the
age bands into their constituent parts, this is more ambiguous than releasing age in years
because of the possibility of individuals with different ages from the norm for their stage
of education, however it demonstrates the ability to undermine disclosure control methods
using proxy indicators.
Risk Assessment Across the Key Variables
Now that there is a better grasp of the dataset and the key variables that were chosen, the
demonstration of NIAH can proceed toward completing a risk assessment for the education
dataset. Specifically what is proposed to do in the next section is to use NIAH to implement
a range of k-anonymity partitions (k=3,5,10) for the key variable combinations. Using the
output of NIAH’s k-anonymity algorithm as a guide, statistical disclosure control methods
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Figure 7.12: Education Data: Main Disability Distribution by Age for the City of Edinburgh
Local Authority (N=759)
included in the NIAH tool-set will be implemented. Once a sanitised copy of the original data
has been created, the effects of the disclosure control on the data’s utility will be examined
by conducting a small exploratory analysis for the research question: what factors affect the
school attendance of ‘looked after children’. This analysis will be carried out on the original
data and the sanitised data in order to draw some comparison. This approach to data utility is
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.4 and is in keeping with the qualitative need to discuss data
utility in terms of research questions and realistic scenarios.
Our first NIAH k-anonymity iteration includes all key variables listed in table 7.1 except
we have chosen to use Local Authority as the geographic variable in this first iteration.4
Later examples including the other geographical variables will follow. Table 7.5 provides
an overview of the results generated by NIAH for all key variables by Local Authority. The
first point to note is the number of records deemed to be ‘at risk’ of disclosure, with the
threshold set at 3, in this instance 40% of the records are flagged. Remember that k=3 is a
relatively loose threshold (i.e. an indicator that the data are not deemed particularly sensitive
4The NIAH command used here was: NIAH -kv 1,4,5,6,7,37,41,51,52 -th 3 -o kv-all-k3 ageinyrs.csv —
the iterations that follow will be some variation on this command string.
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Figure 7.13: Education Data: Student Stage by Age (Recoded to 5yr Bands) for the Angus
Local Authority (N=156)
or disclosive), the logic being that for every record there are at least 2 other records with
the same values across the key variables. However, at this stage, the raw data are still being
used without any disclosure control, therefore this position of 40% should decrease as we
continue with the analysis.
Table 7.5 also highlights the problem of identifying risk in a dataset with particularly ho-
mogeneous variables. By using the mode as the summary measure, and knowing that the
data are heavily skewed, there is little substantive change in the variable values across the
partitions. However, the percentage of N represented by the modal value has been included,
which does give some indication of the movement of records from ‘safe’ to ‘at risk’. As
discussed in the section on key variables, ethnicity is a particular challenge here. However
we can see that the partitioning on k=3 has an effect on the homogeneity of ethnic group and
national identity. It would not be unrealistic to assume these two variables are strongly cor-
related. Table 7.6 and 7.7 show the contingency table for these two categorical variables and
some association statistics. This supports the assumption about ethnic group and national
identity. Given that there are a significant number of cells with low cell counts, the Likeli-
hood Ratio Chi-square result is the more useful association statistic. There is a statistically
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=4922)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=3263)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (10.7) 14.0 (17.3) (10.5) 13.7 (16.9) (11.0) 14.4 (17.8)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(53%) Male (55%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White (92%) White (99%) White (88%)
National Identity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (76%) Scottish (91%) Scottish (53%)
Main Disability
Mode (% of N) No Disability (80%) No Disability (91%) No Disability (63%)
Student Stage
Mode (% of N) S3 (10%) S3 (11%) SP (12%)
Table 7.5: Education Data: Summary of NIAH Output using all Key Variables and Local
Authority, k=3
significant correlation here and the strength of the association is indicated by Cramer’s V (a
measure of association between two nominal variables).
Ethnic
Group
National Identity
Scottish English Northern
Irish
Welsh British Other Total
White 79.62 2.51 0.1 0.11 11.77 0.45 96.92
Mixed 1.11 0.08 0 0 0.4 0.08 1.7
Asian 0.15 0.01 0.01 0 0.25 0.04 0.51
Black 0.01 0.04 0 0 0.1 0.14 0.29
Other 0.15 0 0 0 0.03 0.1 0.29
Total 81.3 2.66 0.11 0.11 12.57 0.81 100.0
Table 7.6: Education Data: A Contingency Table of National Identity by Ethnic Group (val-
ues are percentages)
Statistic (N=8185) DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 30 1039.69 .0001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 30 239.83 .0001
Cramer’s V 0.1688
Table 7.7: Education Data: Association Statistics for Table 7.6
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Having identified a shift in the percentage of records that carry the modal value, this is further
illustrated in figures 7.14,7.15,7.16 and 7.17 which show the distribution of ethnic group and
national identity for the at risk and safe partitions of the data in this first iteration. These
figures illustrate the broader picture and confirm that the shift in the pervasiveness of modal
value did indicate a removal of less-well-represented national identities and ethnicities to the
at risk partition.
Continuing the comparison of geographical effects on disclosure risk, Table 7.8 provides the
same summary of outputs generated by NIAH for the Scottish Parliamentary Constituencies
(SPC). In the earlier discussions of the key variables, some coarse indications of disclosure
risk were identified by looking at counts across the geographical variables. It was noted that
despite the smaller areas at SPC level, the size of the cell counts for each area did not look
significantly different from the LA areas. At this level of analysis, taking into account the
cross tabulations of key variables, it can be seen that at the SPC level 63% of records are
considered to be at risk, which is a large increase on the 40% of records in the LA analysis.
Given that the key variables are the same and only LAs for SPCs were exchanged, some
confidence can be taken in the assumption that the increase in the at risk records partition
can be attributed to the use of SPCs.
Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=4922)
NIAH at Risk
Output (N=3263)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (10.7) 14.0 (17.3) (10.7) 13.8 (17.0) (10.7) 14.1 (17.5)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(53%) Male (54%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) 1.White (92%) 1.White (95%) 1.White (91%)
National Identity
Mode (% of N) 1.Scottish (76%) 1.Scottish (95%) 1.Scottish (91%)
Main Disability
Mode (% of N) 84.No Disability (80%) 84.No Disability (92%) 1.No Disability (72%)
Student Stage
Mode (% of N) S3 (10%) S3 (12%) S3 (10%)
Table 7.8: Education Data: Summary of NIAH Output using all Key Variables and Scottish
Parliamentary Constituency, k=3
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Figure 7.14: Education Data: Ethnic Group for the ‘safe’ Partition (N=4922)
Figure 7.15: Education Data: Ethnic Group for the ‘at risk’ Partition (N=3263)
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Figure 7.16: Education Data: National Identity for the ‘safe’ Partition (N=4922)
Figure 7.17: Education Data: National Identity for the ‘at risk’ Partition (N=3263)
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Due to the low level of geography that datazones represent, the same summary of key vari-
ables has not been included because with a threshold of k=3 (the least onerous of the thresh-
olds) 97% of the records are flagged as at risk of disclosure. Referring back to the earlier
description of datazones, it can be noted that a figure of 97% is not unexpected as the number
of records in each datazone is very small.
From the summary tables, the modes for categorical variables provide an indicator of a shift
in the distribution across the partitions for safe and at risk. However, to be able to hone in
on areas of disclosure risk, the data can be described in a different way. Figures 7.18 &
7.19 are detailed comparisons of the categorical variable implied student stage for all data
and the safe partition, and subsequently the safe partition and at risk partition. If pairs of
data points are compared for each respective student stage it can be seen whether there is a
significant difference in the proportions. A difference between the safe and at risk partitions
was expected, however the original versus safe partition comparison is worth exploring fur-
ther. Despite 40% of records being flagged as at risk, the proportions for the safe records
are relatively unchanged for the student stage variable. All student stages have overlapping
confidence intervals until the later stages (S5 onwards). S5 and S6 are poorly represented in
the dataset, especially S6 which only has 25 associated records.
Special education (coded as SP) has the largest variation in proportions for safe and original
data. Considering only frequency counts, this variation is not expected as there are 500 SP
records, which is comparable in size to most of the other student stages. However, there is
a possible interaction between the key variables student stage and main disability. For the
SP records 4˜0% have a main disability recorded, compared to less than 20% for most other
student stages. What is implied here is that these records are more likely to have been flagged
as at risk because they contain a relatively rare main disability, which has the knock on effect
that they are more likely to be in special education. Cross-tabulating these two variables for
the original data (student stage, recoded into three stages - Primary, Secondary and Special)
shows a significant correlation (Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square = 571.71, p<.0001, Cramer’s
V = 0.246).
Another way the results can be interpreted (figure 7.18) is to consider the analytical validity
of analysis were it only to be carried out on the safe partition. The overlapping confidence
intervals for the earlier student stages, up to S4, suggests that student stage could be anal-
ysed using the safe data with no significant loss of validity from a researcher’s perspective.
This comparison between the raw data and the, albeit crudely, sanitised data could assist in
developing trust in the efficacy of the disclosure methodology of a data controller. This type
of analysis would fit well with the arguments of Reiter et al. (2009) on the need for ‘verifi-
cation servers’ that offer analysts the opportunity to confirm the validity of their results with
reference to the original data. This could also be applied to the difference between the NIAH
iterations for LAs and SPCs. Taking the overall number of records deemed at risk, as above,
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Figure 7.18: Education Data: Student Stage Proportions with 95% CIs for All Records &
the ‘safe’ Partition
Figure 7.19: Education Data: Student Stage Proportions with 95% CIs for the ‘safe’ & ‘at
risk’ Partitions
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is one indication of difference. However, if Table 7.8 is considered for analytical validity
from original records to the safe partition, it is interesting to note that despite the greater
number of at risk records the modal values for some of the variables in the safe partition
track the original data more closely than the safe partition in the LA summary.
Having considered the relatively generous k-anonymity threshold of k=3, k is now increased
to 5. Table 7.9 provides the same summary from the NIAH output as seen in 7.5. As we
would expect the number of records considered safe for this iteration is less than k=3, here
we have an 18% decrease. From this decrease it can be extrapolated to the line of argument
governing the use of k-anonymity; by increasing the threshold, the requirement for privacy,
we have reduced the volume of data considered safe, in this case by approximately 18%,
and therefore attention should be paid to the resulting data utility. This is done as before,
by comparing the summary outputs of k=3 and k=5. Age has remained stable varying only
by 0.1 years at the mean, as has gender. Ethnic Group shows that the propensity toward
homogeneity that one expects with a threshold approach such as k-anonymity can be mis-
leading. ‘White’ now constitutes 95% of the safe data as opposed to 99% at k=3. From this
result, it can be surmised that given an increase in the threshold, instead of just records with
a less well represented ethnicity being transferred into the at risk partition, there are now
a number of ‘white’ records with a combination of key variables that do not meet the k=5
requirement. This counter intuitive trend does not continue through National Identity where
the homogeneity increases; ‘Scottish’ now representing 95% as opposed to 91%, the same is
true of Main Disability.
Comparing the summaries of k=3 and k=5 builds a more nuanced picture of the interplay of
disclosure risk and data utility. As is the case with ethnicity and the earlier comparison of
LAs and SPCs, counter intuitive effects have been shown. These products of the interaction
of the different key variables and their ability to satisfy a given threshold make it difficult
to create generalised rules of disclosure control, even within the confines of a single dataset
or research project. To continue this narrative, the summary results for the k=10 iteration
have been included. From table 7.10 it is first observed that there is a significant drop in
the number of safe records, only 19% of the records are deemed to satisfy k=10. It is worth
noting here that such a strong threshold is not unrealistic, standard operating procedure for
Information Services Division of NHS Scotland is to apply a k=10 threshold when assessing
statistical disclosure control. Given the size of the at risk partition it is not unsurprising that
it is now that partition that begins to look closer to the distribution of the original data. The
counter intuitive trend in ethnic group can still be seen if k=10 is compared with both k=3
and k=5, also the homogeneity in national identity and main disability continue.
To reinforce the lack of clear linear rules which can fit the disclosure analysis, consider first
the trend in the size of partitions across k=3,5,10. Figure 7.20, with only three data points,
still shows that the decrease in the size of the safe partition is not linear. Although no further
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=3546)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=4639)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (10.7) 14.0 (17.3) (10.4) 13.6 (16.8) (10.9) 14.3 (17.7)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(52%) Male (54%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White (92%) White (95%) White (91%)
National Identity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (76%) Scottish (95%) Scottish (62%)
Main Disability
Mode (% of N) No Disability (80%) No Disability (93%) No Disability (69%)
Student Stage
Mode (% of N) S3 (10%) S3 (12%) SP (11%)
Table 7.9: Education Data: Summary of NIAH Output for all Key Variables and Local
Authority, k=5
Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=1584)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=6601)
Age
Mean(±1σ) (10.7) 14.0 (17.3) (10.6) 13.7 (16.8) (10.6) 14.0 (17.4)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(52%) Male (54%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White (92%) White (97%) White (92%)
National Identity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (76%) Scottish (98%) Scottish (71%)
Main Disability
Mode (% of N) No Disability (80%) No Disability (97%) No Disability (76%)
Student Stage
Mode (% of N) S3 (10%) S3 (12%) S3 (10%)
Table 7.10: Education Data: Summary of NIAH Output for all Key Variables and Local
Authority, k=10
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Figure 7.20: Education Data: Size of the Safe Partitions for the k-anonymity Thresholds 3,5
& 10
Figure 7.21: Education Data: Modal Values as a Percentage of N over the k-anonymity
Thresholds 3,5 & 10
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increases in k were made during the allocated analytical time at the Scottish Government, it
would be expected that k=15 for example would result in none or very few records deemed
safe. Figure 7.21 attempts to capture the comparison between the key variables for different
values of k. Gender and Student Stage remain flat across the iterations of k, Ethnic Group
decreases in a non-linear fashion, while National Identity and Main Disability increase. At
this stage the results indicate that the variables ethnic group, national identity and main
disability are potential targets for disclosure control alongside age which is often also a target
because of it’s accessibility. Iterations of k-anonymity with some exploratory disclosure
control applied are now explored.
Recoding as discussed in chapter 4.3 is a common strategy for disclosure control. The vari-
able values are recoded to remove some aspect of the variable’s detail and therefore reduce
the ability of an adversary to make a correct match to a unique record. This also makes the
possible matches more ambiguous by providing a coarser level of detail should an adversary
take a fuzzy, rather than exact, matching approach. For some institutions, recoding is the de-
fault position for disclosure control, for example ISD in NHS Scotland (NHS Scotland ISD,
2012b) defines recoding as the only strategy open to data controllers without explicit per-
mission from senior statisticians. Recoding can often change the variable type, in the case
of age in years the numerical variable becomes categorical representing a group of ages.
Using the NIAH BandingCreate and Banding commands the age variable was recoded into
categories spanning 5 years, e.g. 11 − 15 and applied bottom-coding to capture all of the
lower values— age 10 and below. By choosing to recode age, the student stage variable
was suppressed, as indicated earlier student stage acts as a proxy for age as they share a di-
rect correlation. Therefore, the revised re-identification key is LA, age(5yr bands), Gender,
Ethnic Group, National Identity and Main Disability.
We then run NIAH’s k-anonymity algorithm for k=3 with this key; table 7.11 shows the sum-
marised outputs. First note that 86% of records are in the safe partition, this in an increase
of 25% from the original k=3 iteration with age in single years and student stage. Having
retained more of the original records the distribution of the key variables should be consid-
ered. Age and Gender remain relatively static, the mode representing the same proportion
of records ±1%. Ethnic Group sees a small increase of 3% in those records with a ‘white’
value. The biggest shifts in this iteration are seen in the National Identity and Main Dis-
ability variables, the safe records representing a more Scottish sample with fewer recorded
disabilities. These results would seem to indicate that the last two variables are the potential
source for the disclosure risk. In the next iteration Main Disability was recoded to assess
these effects.
Recall that the distribution of main disability (figure 7.11) in the raw data had a skew toward
no disability; this makes finding a suitable recoding scheme difficult because to retain the
relatively rare disability details would leave too many records open to the risk of disclosure.
7.2. A Demonstration of NIAH Within a Secure Environment: Scottish Government
Education Data 156
Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=7001)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=1184)
Age
Mode(% of N) 11-15(41%) 11-15(42%) 16-20(44%)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(53%) Male (54%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White (92%) White (95%) White (80%)
National Identity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (76%) Scottish (83%) Scottish (36%)
Main Disability
Mode (% of N) No Disability (80%) No Disability (85%) No Disability (46%)
Table 7.11: Education Data: Summary of NIAH Output for Recoded Age and Suppression
of Student Stage by Local Authority, k=3
In this example, a binary indicator was created for whether a disability was recorded or not.
The aim here is to at least preserve some utility from the main disability variable rather than
suppress it entirely. Table 7.12 shows that the number of safe records has increased by 4%
and the apparent gap has narrowed in the distribution of the main disability variable across
the original and safe records. The biggest gap between the original and safe records in the
summary is now national identity, with a gap of 7% in the records represented by the modal
value.
In order to contemplate disclosure control for the national identity variable the association
effects with ethnicity and the relative distributions of these variables should be considered.
As highlighted in the earlier consideration of key variables, ethnicity represents a particular
problem for data in Scotland, national identity provides some protection from disclosure risk
through its greater subjectivity. Considering the distributions of these two variables, ethnic
group is more heavily skewed than national identity; the ‘white’ ethnic group constitutes
92% of the records, whereas ‘Scottish’ is recorded for 77% of the records. For these reasons
it was decided to recode national identity into a binary indicator, ‘Scottish’ or ‘Other’ and
suppress the ethnic group variable. It is worth reiterating that k=3 is a relatively generous
threshold, especially for population level data. It should be noted, therefore, that significant
sacrifices were made in respect of data utility to increase the number of records that satisfy
the k-anonymity requirement. Table 7.13 provides a summary of the final iteration at this
stage. The increase of 6% in the number of safe records is noted, and now 96% of all
records are captured. Instead of considering the safe output values, the at risk partition was
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=7328)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=857)
Age
Mode(% of N) 11-15(41%) 11-15(42%) 16-20(43%)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(54%) Male (51%)
Ethnic Group
Mode (% of N) White (92%) White (95%) White (73%)
National Identity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (76%) Scottish (83%) British (24%)
Recoded Disability
Mode (% of N) No
Disability/Not
Recorded (89%)
No
Disability/Not
Recorded (91%)
No
Disability/Not
Recorded (71%)
Table 7.12: Education Data: Summary of NIAH Output using Recoded Age and Disability
with the Suppression of Student Stage by Local Authority, k=3
considered to evaluate the effect the disclosure control had. It can been seen that the at risk
records are more likely to be older, of another national identity and are more likely to have a
recorded disability.
Thus far the closeness between distributions in the safe partition has been considered. When
compared with the original data, this provides the rudimentary measure of the data’s utility
after disclosure control. The impact of the disclosure control is now considered with respect
to a potential research question. The remaining 4% of records that do not satisfy k=3 are sup-
pressed and therefore only the safe partition is used. These results will be compared with the
same analysis carried out on the original data. The research question is to explore what fac-
tors affect looked after children achieving above or below the median percentage attendance
at their educational institution. The variables age, gender, local authority and placement
type were used as exploratory variables. A binary indicator was constructed dependent on
whether a record has above or below the median attendance (c.92%).
The analysis has been broken down into a series of models. Table 7.14 is a comparison of
models 1-6 for reference, however each model is discussed in detail below. These models
were generated using the Scottish Governments SAS Statistics Server, using the binary logit
regression model as there was a binary dependent variable in the below and above median
attendance variable ‘GoodAttend’. It should first be noted that to aid the ability to directly
compare the models, the age recoding was applied to the original data without any further
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Variable (Measure) Original Data
(N=8185)
NIAH Safe Out-
put (N=7821)
NIAH At Risk
Output (N=364)
Age
Mode(% of N) 11-15(41%) 11-15(42%) 16-20(40%)
Gender
Mode (% of N) Male (54%) Male(54%) Male (51%)
Recoded National Identity
Mode (% of N) Scottish (76%) Scottish (79%) Other (37%)
Recoded Disability
Mode (% of N) No
Disability/Not
Recorded (89%)
No
Disability/Not
Recorded (91%)
No
Disability/Not
Recorded (51%)
Table 7.13: Education Data: Summary of NIAH output using Recoded Age, Disability and
National Identity with Student Stage and Ethnicity Suppressed by Local Authority, k=3
statistical disclosure control; although this does sacrifice some of the original data’s utility, it
makes comparison between models easier rather than having to interpret age as a numerical
and a categorical variable. To mitigate the effect of this on the overall assessment, Table
7.15 was included, which is a simple linear regression for the dependent variable percentage
attendance and age in years. The F-test shows that the model is statistically significant and
has R2 value of 0.1096 suggesting that 11% of the variance in percentage attendance can
be explained by age in years. Also the t-test is significant with a parameter estimate of
−0.02 - i.e., for every unit increase in age one would expect a 0.02 unit decrease in the
percentage attendance. Therefore, the model suggests that as looked after children get older,
their percentage attendance in education declines.
Model 1 is the first model using the disclosure controlled data, and recoded age is the only
exploratory variable. The N here is different because those records that remained in the at risk
partition after the various disclosure control methods were implemented were suppressed. It
should be noted that SAS defaults to modelling the 0 value in its binary logit model rather
than the 1 value as in stata and R, this behaviour highlights one aspect of the problems
associated with working in constrained safe haven conditions where unfamiliarity can lead to
errors in interpretation. Therefore, when considering these results, remember that negative
parameter estimates are counter-intuitive, a negative value indicates that the parameter is
associated with a positive change in attendance above the median.
Consulting table 7.16 it should be noted that N has dropped to 7821 to account for those
suppressed records. There is a R2 of 0.1018 similar to the indicative linear regression for
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dataset Safe Orig. Safe Orig. Safe Orig.
Age 11-15 −0.0258 −0.0405 −0.0251 −0.0402 −0.0249 −0.0400
(standard error) (0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0321) (0.0308)
Age 16-20 −0.6100 −0.5916 −0.6091 −0.5912 −0.6080 −0.5899
(0.0329) (0.0318) (0.0329) (0.0318) (0.0329) (0.0318)
Age 21-25 0.00155 0.000363 −0.00359
(0.2647) (0.2648) (0.2648)
Gender(F) −0.00140 −0.00728 −0.0150 −0.00815
(0.0236) (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0230)
No. of Placements 0.0532 0.0553
(0.0296) (0.0291)
pseudo R2 0.1018 0.0926 0.1019 0.0926 0.1024 0.0932
Table 7.14: Education Data: Models 1-6: Influences on having lower than median atten-
dance, using the ‘safe’ & Original Data
No. Obs: 8185 R-Square: 0.1096
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value Pr>F
Model 1 39.91177 39.91177 1007.02 <.0001
Parameter Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-Value Pr>t
Intercept 1 1.12491 0.00956 117.67 <.0001
Age(yrs) 1 −0.02113 0.00066584 −31.73 <.0001
Table 7.15: Education Data: Linear Regression for Percentage Attendance and Age(in years)
using the Original Data
percentage attendance and age in years. However, this figure needs to be interpreted dif-
ferently given the different models being used. SAS reports the Cox-Snell R2 which is not
directly comparable with theR2 reported for the linear regression. However, the later models
are all binary logits and therefore the R2 will be more comparable. As a general indication
the R2 value suggests that 10% of the records are explained by this model. For more detail
on the differences between R2 measures see Menard (2000). The bottom age group of less
than 10yrs is excluded, so the results are based, on being in one of the older categories as op-
posed to less than 10yrs old. Age group 11-15 shows a negative estimate, suggesting a small
positive effect on good attendance, however it is not statistically significant. Age group 16-
20 shows a strong positive effect on good attendance when compared against being less than
10yrs old. The top age group 21-25 is not present as all records with this value have been
suppressed as part of the disclosure control. Although the 11-15 estimate is not significant,
it is in keeping with the positive trend seen at 16-20, and therefore the first model indicates
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that as looked after children get older the probability that they will have above average atten-
dance at school increases. This differs from the position seen in the linear model of age and
percentage attendance. Although the trend was not strong, the linear model indicated that
a decrease in percentage attendance as the data subjects got older should be expected. It is
difficult to compare directly these two models as the dependent variable is slightly different
— percentage attendance vs. above average attendance — however, Model 1 and 2 which
share the same dependent variable and recoding of age can be compared.
No. Obs: 7821 R-Square: 0.1018
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 1 0.1465 0.0264 30.8955 <.0001
Age 11-15 1 −0.0258 0.0320 0.6494 0.4203
Age 16-20 1 −0.6100 0.0329 344.6688 <.0001
Table 7.16: Education Data: Model 1, Good Attendance and Recoded Age using the ‘safe’
Data
Model 2 shown in table 7.17 repeats model 1 using the original data. The goodness of fit
statistics, 0.0926 and 0.1018 can now be compared, so the models explain about the same
percentage of the data. The model estimates are also not too dissimilar from model 1. The
age group 16-20 still has a significant positive effect on good attendance. 11-15 continues
the trend but is not significant, and there are also results from the upper age group but these
provide no significant insights. The strength of the effect of being 16-20 rather than less
than 10yrs is also similar, only differing by 3%. Thus far the disclosure control has not
significantly affected the data utility for this specific research question.
No. Obs: 8185 R-Square: 0.0926
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 1 0.2282 0.2660 0.7360 0.3910
Age 11-15 1 −0.0405 0.0308 1.7274 0.1887
Age 16-20 1 −0.5916 0.0318 346.5663 <.0001
Age 21-25 1 0.00155 0.2647 0.0000 0.9953
Table 7.17: Education Data: Model 2, Good Attendance and Recoded Age using the Original
Data
Model 3 extends the exploratory variables to include gender. In this iteration the safe data are
used. TheR2 remains close to 0.10. The inclusion of gender has not significantly changed the
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model estimates for the different age groups, there is still a strong positive effect from the 16-
20 category. Gender modelled as female rather than male has a small positive effect however
this is not significant. If this is compared with model 4 in table 7.19, it is observed that
the general pattern remains the same, the R2 values are similar, and the parameter estimates
do not change sign or strength. The age group 16-20 still provides the only statistically
significant result. Gender is also not significant in model 4. Again, thus far the disclosure
control has not adversely effected the analysis; this is discussed further in the conclusion
to this section, however it is important to note that the disclosure control did not directly
manipulate the dependent variable or the exploratory variables (except age).
No. Obs: 7821 R-Square: 0.1019
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 1 0.1452 0.0265 30.1275 <.0001
Age 11-15 1 −0.0251 0.0320 0.6125 0.4339
Age 16-20 1 −0.6091 0.0329 343.1089 <.0001
Gender(F) 1 −0.00140 0.0236 0.3499 0.5542
Table 7.18: Education Data: Model 3, Good Attendance with Recoded Age and Gender
using the ‘safe’ Data
No. Obs: 8185 R-Square: 0.0926
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 1 0.2287 0.2660 0.7394 0.3899
Age 11-15 1 −0.0402 0.0308 1.6974 0.1926
Age 16-20 1 −0.5912 0.0318 345.6693 <.0001
Age 21-25 1 0.000363 0.2648 0.0000 0.9989
Gender(F) 1 −0.00728 0.0230 0.1001 0.7518
Table 7.19: Education Data: Model 4, Good Attendance with Recoded Age and Gender
using the Original Data
Models 5 and 6 in tables 7.20 and 7.21 respectively now include the further exploratory
variable of the number of placements associated with a record. The hypothesis here is that
one might see a greater number of placements as having a destabilising effect, which could
affect a data subject’s attendance. As the number of placements is numerical and continuous
we can interpret the results in model 5 and 6 as the effect of the number of placements
increasing. Comparing model 5 and 6 the R2 values are again similar. The recoded age
variable shares the same strength and significance across both models. The change in sign
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Table 7.20: Education Data: Model 5, Good Attendance with Recoded Age, Gender and No.
of Placements using the ‘safe’ Data
No. Obs: 7821 R-Square: 0.1024
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 1 0.0725 0.0483 2.2531 0.1333
Age 11-15 1 −0.0249 0.0321 0.6039 0.4371
Age 16-20 1 −0.6080 0.0329 341.6138 <.0001
Gender(F) 1 −0.0150 0.0237 0.4003 0.5269
No. of
Placements
1 0.0532 0.0296 3.2346 0.0721
Table 7.21: Education Data: Model 6, Good Attendance with Recoded Age, Gender and No.
of Placements using the Original Data
No. Obs: 8185 R-Square: 0.0932
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Variable DF Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 1 0.1572 0.2687 0.3425 0.5584
Age 11-15 1 −0.0400 0.0308 1.6816 0.1947
Age 16-20 1 −0.5899 0.0318 343.8998 <.0001
Age 21-25 1 −0.00359 0.2648 0.0002 0.9892
Gender(F) 1 −0.00815 0.0230 0.1251 0.7236
No. of
Placements
1 0.0553 0.0291 0.3425 0.0578
of the 21-25 age group from model 4 to 6 to fit the general trend should be noted, although
this is not a significant result. The new independent variable, the number of placements,
does show a slight discrepancy between the safe and original data. For model 6 using the
original data, the negative effect of an increasing number of placements is just short of the
0.05 significance level; however, using the safe data, the result is considerably further away;
in either case the effect is small.
Having established the example research question, it has been demonstrated that this type of
sensitivity analysis is important when data are changed or manipulated to satisfy statistical
disclosure control conditions. Given the possible variations in analysis, it is difficult to pre-
dict the globalised effects of different disclosure control methods without probing the dataset
beyond the surface level. In the example, the analyses would lead an analyst to very similar
conclusions, although there are possible variations in the relationship between age and atten-
dance, and the potential for a significant result when considering the number of placements.
It should be noted that the research question was designed to avoid using variables that had
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been heavily effected by the disclosure control choices. This was predominately due to a
need for actual results for comparison and to demonstrate NIAH’s use in a realistic form.
We should remember the data utility that has been lost—we suppressed ethnicity and student
stage, and heavily recoded national identity and disability. If a research question looking at
the effects of ethnicity, disability or national identity had been chosen, an analytical dead-end
would have been found rather quickly.
This example analysis reinforces the need for data controllers to be able to work through
any number of variations of disclosure control, sensitive to the type of release they intend to
make and to the needs of the research community. The tools available in the NIAH tool set
allow for this to be carried out as an iterative process, as has been seen above. It provides
clear documentation and replicability to aid in building trust with data users and avoid hu-
man bottlenecks in the flow of information, as well as to assist in the application of general
standards across data releases.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This research has sought to explore the ideas surrounding statistical disclosure control by
applying an interdisciplinary lens in the context of e-Health and administrative data access.
Through this lens the duality of managing risk through the combination of scientific and
value judgements has been captured and examined in order to provide a theoretical frame-
work for considering SDC. Within this framework the current literature and methods have
been critically reviewed and the contemporary arrangements for secure data access have been
scrutinised. This scrutiny resulted in the extension of SDC workflows to encompass the data
user experience alongside the more common tests for statistical utility. From these founda-
tions, a tool-kit has been designed and implemented to provide a semi-automated approach
to SDC and one that can be integrated with existing workflows to increase the efficiency of
research output review and therefore improve the overall experience for data users and data
controllers.
The theoretical framework for this research was produced by first reviewing the data con-
troller’s legal and ethical obligations to estimate and mitigate the risks of unauthorised dis-
closure. This was established using the existing data protection legislation as well as similar
examples from Europe, the US and Canada. The landscape underpinning those rules was
then explored in terms of its ethical dimensions and societal attitudes to privacy risk using
the perspectives of Garfinkel, Solove and Nissenbaum. Using the work of Ulrich Beck it
was possible to describe the fusion of scientific and value judgements that lies at the heart
of risk management, and therefore by extension the mitigation of meta-risks like statistical
disclosure. Heidegger’s writing on the relationship between people, their world and technol-
ogy and the concepts of disclosure and enframing provide a greater depth to the theoretical
framework and enrich it through a discussion of the fear and insecurities that feature in the
debate over data access, anonymisation and SDC.
8.1. Conclusions 165
Having established such a narrative it was then challenged from two dimensions. It was
noted what impact future legislation could have on the public versus private balance that
are central to contemporary SDC debates that the balance is in danger of tipping too far to
the private weight. Also the apparent discrepancy between the approach of the public and
private sectors was set against the earlier narrative of the relationship between people and
technology to demonstrate the complex relationships people have with services that utilise
their data.
The existing literature on risk measurement, statistical disclosure control methods, and data
utility were discussed and a case study using the Scottish Health Survey was used to illus-
trate the major elements; risk measurement, disclosure control methods and estimation of
data utility. What emerged at this stage was the vast array of innovative statistical methods
that have occurred in the literature, however most have failed to find an application in the
contemporary data controller workflow and very few seek to marry a sociological concep-
tualisations of risk and the technical calibration of systems used to estimate and mitigate
disclosure risk. Many of the methods discussed cause severe damage to the data’s statistical
utility which has the potential undermine the trust between data users and data controllers if
their subjective experiences are not acknowledged.
From this position, it was possible to elucidate on the potential barriers to research in the
data access, analysis and dissemination process within contemporary data access settings,
such as SafePods or Virtual Research Environments. Using data collected through qualita-
tive semi-structured interviews, it was shown that the restrictions researchers face in using
physical secure-settings in the UK including relocation, lack of access to good meta data
or other analytical aids, and the bottleneck and lack of clarity in output checking could be
mitigated by the use of virtual research infrastructure. It was also discussed how this virtual
infrastructure brings other benefits to increase productivity by allowing users to share data
resources within a secure environment. These early models for VREs offered a backdrop
for the exploration of SDC workflows within these settings which fed into the e-Science
approach proposed, and later tested, in Chapters 6 and 7.
It should be noted that although the case for the user experience was made, it is recognised
that operationalising that experience in the development of SDC workflows is not a simple
task. Although, aided by the e-Science methodological context, suggestions were made for
how this might be approached. For example, framing the user experience in the same way
that software development treats it through user centred systems design.
Drawing on these findings, the NIAH tool-set was designed with input from potential users
and data controllers through a small, qualitative, pilot study. This tool set makes available
an algorithm that implements k-anonymity, a common assessment method for testing data
against a predetermined disclosure risk, which should incorporate the value judgements of
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the preceding chapters in the setting of thresholds for rare combinations of key variables.
In addition, the tool-set design was broadened to include tools to service other parts of the
data controller’s SDC workflow. These included implementing SDC methods for recoding
data variables to more coarse-grained values, adding noise to numerical values or randomly
miss-classifying categorical values, as well as value suppression. These tools were designed
so that data provenance is well documented and SDC decisions can be reproduced. Also
these tools were designed to allow for scripting, automation, and integration with existing
research infrastructures.
This last element was demonstrated through the integration of NIAH with the STAT-JR sta-
tistical analysis environment and a proposal for integration with the VANGUARD system
for secure data transfer and linkage. Lastly, the potential advantages of the NIAH tool set
over the existing approaches that use ad hoc user written scripts for statistical packages were
discussed and demonstrated. These included a significant time saving in the reduction of the
number of parameters that must be input by hand, a clear log of activity, a lack of reliance
on proprietary statistical packages, and the possibility of some automation. Based on these
aspects of this research, the tool set is in use by the Scottish Government and their imple-
mentation is described in Chapter 7; as such this has the potential to provide a test-bed for
future development.
As set out above this research met at least for the most part the aims set out in 1, with per-
haps the exception of fully making the case for the operationalisation of the user experience.
As an interdisciplinary project, the balance of material across disciplines is difficult to strike
and on reflection although the space dedicated to the existing SDC literature seems quite
large it was deemed necessary as it was the least intuitive of the Chapters. Beck and Heideg-
ger might be the more unfamiliar to audiences for this research, but the issues they discuss
(risk, privacy, uncertainty, fear of technology, etc.) are issues that people can identify with,
whereas, statistical methods such as those used to measure and mitigate disclosure risk and
data utility can seem quite abstract.
It is important to also acknowledge that the central contribution of this research to the lit-
erature is not a new statistical disclosure method (as so many contributions have been) but
an attempt to examine the process of statistical disclosure control in practice itself. Through
this examination, this thesis grounds disclosure control in the theoretical framework of risks
that are an integral part of the modern world and suggests a potential way forward for statis-
tical disclosure control workflows to meet the demands that arise from the data deluge. The
challenge for practitioners in this space is to develop rule-sets and tools that operate at scale
while demonstrating an understanding of the public’s concerns about their privacy and that
do not become detached from that understanding during their implementation, while also
acknowledging in an active way the needs of the data users who ultimately pursue these data
to advance knowledge and perhaps contribute to the perceived public good.
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8.2 Future Work
In the process of completing this research a number of avenues for future work have be-
come apparent. In part, these ideas are drawn from the interactions with data users and data
controllers, but some are also drawn from other gaps in the literature and the limitations
identified in the conclusions above. The first avenue concerns the focus on e-Health and
administrative data, in this case limited to data sources in Scotland. It could be assumed that
the approach taken here would be applicable to data from across disciplines. However, fur-
ther research using a broader range of case studies could yield interesting results, especially
if the data subject was not an individual. For example, could data about businesses disclose
sensitive information about its owners or employees?
Has was noted in the conclusions, the small pilot study on user experiences only goes part of
the way to realising the potential for user experience to be considered fully in the develop-
ment of disclosure control processes and data access more generally. More qualitative work
could be undertaken to better understand the user experience, and more research could be
dedicated to the problem of operationalisation raised in this thesis.
To shift focus from data to methods, one of the limitations of the current implementation
of NIAH is the small range of algorithms for statistical disclosure control. As discussed in
this research, few of the more complex methods in the literature have been developed into
applications that can perform real-world analyses on different data types at scale without a
significant amount of calibration from the user. Given further resources it would be novel
to attempt such applications and be able to tie them to the theoretical framework discussed
above in order to give data controllers consistency in the transition between value judgements
and scientific analyses.
In order to address the potential scaling problem for the NIAH tool set, there could be merit
in pursuing future work into how ‘big data’ methods for processing large volumes of data
efficiently might be adapted for the purpose of SDC. In the implementation of NIAH pre-
sented in this research the data structure used results in a pattern of memory usage that scales
linearly at approximately 28 times the input file size. One could distribute the task of sorting
the data if is too large to be held in memory. A MapReduce model could map chunks of
the dataset to individual machines to provide an in-memory sort of their respective chunks.
Then a merge sort engine could be used to reconstruct the dataset. However, it is not the de-
fault behaviour of these approaches to enforce a stable sorting algorithm. This would prove
problematic for the NIAH algorithm as it relies on records undergoing a stable sort.
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Appendix A
Interview Materials: Information
Sheet
 Information Sheet for ‘Analysing stakeholder perspectives of statistical 
disclosure control in the context of cross-sector data-linkages.’ 
Purpose of the Research: 
This data collection form part of my PhD research into statistical disclosure control (SDC) approaches and 
applications. The purpose is to collect and analyse the views of the various stakeholders in the process of 
linking personal data from various sources for analysis. These stakeholders include subject experts, data 
custodians, and members of the public and data analysts. This data will inform the development of statistical 
disclosure control methods and the implementation of SDC algorithms.   
What is involved in Participating? 
Key stakeholders are being asked to participate in semi-structured interviews about their experience of 
disclosure control and their views on how why and how it should be implemented. 
Terms for Withdrawal: 
All participants have a right to withdraw from the study at any point, and need provide no reason for doing so. 
Any data collected up to their withdrawal will be securely destroyed and not used in any part of the research.  
Usage of the Data:  
The data collected will be used in my PhD thesis as a means of providing the context for the implementation of 
statistical disclosure control algorithms, as well as influencing the development of software tools for such an 
implementation.  From this the data could also be used in other published research outputs connected with 
this research. 
The data will be submitted for archiving to a relevant repository such as the UK Data Archive. This is for the use 
of future researchers only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in the 
accompanying consent form. It is possible to give consent for your data to be used only within this research 
project and not archived.   
Confidentiality: 
 
In the use of survey and interview data, ID numbers will be assigned to participants and all identifying data will 
be removed from published material.  Non-anonymous data will only be used with the explicit permission of 
the participants involved.  
Details of the Research: 
This research is funded by the Economic & Social Research Council and is being carried out as part of a PhD 
research project at the University of Glasgow. More information can be found by contacting the researcher: 
Michael Comerford, National e-Science Centre, Rm246c Kelvin Building, University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ. Tel 
No. 0141 330 2598 email: comerm@dcs.gla.ac.uk  
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Interview Materials: Consent Form
 
 
Consent Form for ‘Analysing stakeholder perspectives of statistical 
disclosure control in the context of cross-sector data-linkages.’ 
 
Please tick the appropriate boxes Yes No 
Taking Part   
I have read and understood the project information sheet dated 26/09/12. 
   
  
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.  
 
  
I agree to take part in the project.  Taking part in the project will include being interviewed and 
recorded (audio).
 
 
  
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at any time and I do not 
have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part. 
 
  
Use of the information I provide for this project only   
I understand my personal details such as phone number and email address will not be revealed to 
people outside the project. 
 
  
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research 
outputs. 
 
  
Please choose one of the following two options: 
I would like my real name used in the above  
I would not like my real name to be used in the above. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Use of the information I provide beyond this project    
I agree for the data I provide to be archived at the UK Data Archive.
 
 
  
I understand that other genuine researchers will have access to this data only if they agree to 
preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this form.  
 
  
I understand that other genuine researchers may use my words in publications, reports, web 
pages, and other research outputs, only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the 
information as requested in this form. 
 
  
So we can use the information you provide legally    
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project to Michael Comerford.   
 
________________________ _____________________ ________  
Name of participant [printed] Signature              Date 
 
________________________  _____________________ ________  
Researcher  [printed] Signature                 Date 
 
Project contact details for further information:  Michael Comerford, National e-Science Centre, University 
of Glasgow. Tel. No. 0141 330 2958 
This work is a derivative of the consent form template provided by the UK Data Archive http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/  
This work is licenced under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales License. To 
view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/ 
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Interview Materials: Interview Guide
Open Ended Questions for Researchers/Analysts/Users
• What experiences have you had working with linked data? Or large datasets 
in general?
• What level of detail would you expect from the data?
• Were there any issues in terms of access or disclosure control (i.e. access to 
outputs)? 
• What expectations do you have of the linked data? What types of analysis do 
you commonly produce? What output do you regularly publish?
• Have you used a safe haven before?
 If so what has your experience been like?
 If not what are your expectations of this type of set up?
• How  to  do  you  prefer  to  develop  your  analysis?  Do  you  produce 
SAS/SPSS/STATA code from looking at metadata or do you do much of the 
development while working with the data?
• Do you use any tools for data management or workflow documentation?
• Would  a  set  of  dummy data,  be  useful  for  developing  early  code  before 
booking into a safe haven?
• What statistical disclosure control techniques have you come across in your 
own work? E.g. in publications, or FoI responses, etc.
• What  format  do  you  prefer  metadata  to  be  in?  Do  you  have  any  good 
examples of metadata format? E.g. Wiki’s, html, etc.
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